

THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

A Quarterly Journal of Philosophy

THE NATURAL DESIRE FOR HAPPINESS

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Has St. Thomas Aquinas a doctrine of a natural desire of the will for happiness, which desire is independent of prior cognition? It is generally taken for granted that he has. Sometimes two natural desires are discovered in his teaching on the will; at other times only one. In either case, a natural desire for happiness that has nothing to do with prior intellectual cognition has a meaning for many interpreters of St. Thomas.

I

Cajetan and Sylvester of Ferrara, although they emphasize the elicited desire for happiness that follows cognition, nevertheless leave the door open for a noncognitive appetite or desire by the two senses in which they understand the term "natural desire." First, it refers to the innate inclination of nature which is not an elicited act, but only a tendency or relation of every nature or natural power to its proper function, object, or end. This innate natural appetite does not depend upon prior cognition in its subject, but only on the knowledge that is in God, the author of nature. Second, natural appetite can mean an elicited act of the will, determined or necessary and following upon intellectual apprehension. While Cajetan's explanation is clear,¹ Sylvester of Ferrara

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¹In *I Summae Theologiae*, 78. 1: "... appetitus naturalis dupliciter sumi consuevit. Primo, pro inclinatione a natura indita. Et sic non est actus aliquis elicited, sed est velut actus primus, habens naturalem habitudinem ad tale quid. Et talis appetitus invenitur in omnibus potentiis, tam activis quam passivis, ut in littera dicitur. Secundo, sumitur pro actu secundo, quo tenditur in prae-cognitum sic quod non potest in oppositum tendi. Et haec est operatio appetitus

gives us perhaps the clearest account of these two senses of natural appetite.

. . . natural appetite . . . can be taken in two ways: one as it is distinguished from the appetite following cognition; the other as it is distinguished from free appetite. In the first way it denominates merely the ordination of a nature toward something, *and implies nothing more than the form of a thing together with its natural relation to something*, such as the appetite of a heavy body for a place below . . . and it is as first act. In this way any potency whatever naturally desires what suits itself. . . . In the second way it denominates the elicited act following cognition, but determined to one of two opposites in such fashion that it cannot be bent toward the other; just as all naturally desire beatitude by an act elicited by the will following the apprehension of beatitude.²

It is not difficult to recognize in the innate natural appetite of Cajetan and Sylvester of Ferrara the so-called transcendental ordination of finality that is evident in the teaching of John Duns Scotus, of Dominic Soto, and of many modern authors. In this view the will has an innate natural desire for happiness that is independent of prior cognition in the intellect. This innate natural desire is merely the order of relation of the will to happiness as its natural end. Only the elicited natural appetite for happiness follows necessarily the notion of happiness in the intellect. The innate natural appetite is altogether independent of this cognition.

animalis, sive intellectualis sive sensitivi. Ex eo enim quod ad apprehensum ut sic immediate tendit, animalis appetitio est: ex eo vero quod determinatum est a natura ita ad hoc tale objectum quod non ad oppositum, naturalis est; naturalium enim est proprium determinatum esse ad unum." Further quotations from Cajetan may be found in *The Eternal Quest* (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1947), pp. 35, 37, 223, 248. Italics are mine in quotations, except where otherwise noted.

²In *I Contra Gentiles*, 4. ". . . appetitus naturalis . . . dupliciter sumi potest: uno modo, ut distinguitur contra appetitum sequentem cognitionem; alio modo, ut distinguitur contra appetitum liberum. Primo modo nominat solum ordinem naturae in aliquid, et nihil aliud importat quam rei formam cum habitudine naturali ad aliquid, sicut appetitus gravis ad locum deorsum . . . et se habet tanquam actus primus. Hoc modo quaelibet potentia naturaliter appetit sibi conveniens. . . . Secundo modo nominat actum elicited sequentem cognitionem, ita tamen ad unum oppositorum determinatum, quod ad alterum flecti non potest: sicut omnes naturaliter appetunt beatitudinem actu elicito a voluntate sequente beatitudinis apprehensionem." For further quotations see *The Eternal Quest*, pp. 66, 233-34. John of St. Thomas also has two natural appetites: one innate without cognition; the other a necessary elicited act that is opposed to the freely elicited act (cf. *Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus*, ed. Reiser, II, 78a 11-30).

Sometimes, however, with Cajetan and Sylvester of Ferrara, natural appetite is not understood as of two kinds, innate and elicited, but in only one uniform way. In an article on the natural desire for the vision of God appearing in *Ephemerides Carmeliticae*, the author, Enrico di S. Teresa, O.C.D., sees in the teaching of St. Thomas a single natural appetite that is always a noncognitive, innate inclination impressed upon all things by the author of nature.³ This one natural appetite is more than a simple metaphysical ordination or transcendental relation of a potency to its act. For St. Thomas Aquinas, natural appetite adds to a mere relation the note of positive inclination towards the end.⁴ Yet natural appetite in all the natures and powers in which it is found never requires prior cognition in its subject, not even when it is found in the will.⁵ In this respect natural appetite differs from elicited appetite, which always follows cognition.⁶

So far as the will is concerned, Father Enrico di S. Teresa finds in the teaching of St. Thomas—especially in the *Summa Theologica*, I-II, 5. 8—a distinction between the natural appetite for happiness and the elicited appetite for happiness, depending upon the absence or presence of cognition. When St. Thomas speaks of beatitude *secundum communem rationem*, he is referring to the happiness that is the object of the necessary, innate, natural desire of the will that does not follow intellectual cognition. Beatitude *secundum specialem rationem*, on the other hand, is the object of the elicited appetite that is subordinated to a previous judgment.⁷ What, then, are we to make of texts in which St. Thomas seems to say that natural appetite, when it is found in an

³ Enrico di S. Teresa, O.C.D., "Il Desiderio naturale della visione di Dio e il suo valore apologetico secondo S. Tommaso," *Ephemerides Carmeliticae*, I (1947), 55-102. Cf. especially pp. 83-89.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 89: "Nè questa tendenza si confonde semplicemente con l'ordinazione metafisica o relazione transcendente della potenza all'atto, ma dice qualcosa di più: dice una *inclinazione* della potenza, realmente esistente, a ricevere o a porre l'atto al quale è positivamente determinata." (All italics in quotations from this author are his, not mine.)

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 85: "L'Angelico però nega assolutamente che per l'appetito naturale il soggetto debba previamente conoscere l'oggetto."

⁶ *Ibid.*: "A differenza dell' appetito elicito, qualunque esso sia, l'appetito naturale è una inclinazione passivamente impressa dall' Autore stesso della natura. Ad essa dopo la cognizione dell' oggetto verrà a sommarsi l'appetito elicito."

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 90: "Rispondendo alla questione '*Utrum omnis homo appetat beatitudinem*' distingue tra beatitudine '*secundum communem rationem*' e beatitudine '*secundum specialem rationem*.' Della prima afferma un desiderio *necessario, naturale*, non dipendente da una previa cognizione. Dell' altra afferma un desiderio subordinato al previo giudizio discriminatore dell' oggetto appetibile, '*secundum apprehensionem rationis*.' In sostanza della prima un appetito *innato*, dell' altra un appetito *elicito*."

intellectual nature, follows the conditions of such a nature, as in the case of the will? Father Enrico simply says that these texts are to be taken with a grain of salt.⁸ He insists that for St. Thomas Aquinas natural appetite is always and without exception a noncognitive tendency, requiring only the knowledge of God as a necessary prerequisite.⁹ His conclusion follows: The natural desire of the will for happiness *secundum communem rationem* is a tendency that flows from the natural form of the will, apart from knowledge in the intellect. It is more than a mere order or relation of the will to happiness in general as its end, since it is a positive inclination in that direction. Yet it is always independent of intellectual cognition.¹⁰

It is important to see where these two views differ and where they agree. They differ to the extent that one of them finds in the teaching of St. Thomas two natural desires, while the other finds only one. Yet both views agree that the will has an innate natural desire for happiness that is independent of intellectual apprehension. To support his contention, Father Enrico cites many passages in which St. Thomas says that natural appetite does not follow the apprehension of its subject, but only that of the author of nature.¹¹ He could also have added a text in which St. Thomas asserts that every power of the soul seeks its own good by natural appetite that does not follow cognition.¹² An apparently strong case can be made out for a noncognitive natural tendency of the will from these and similar texts, as interpreters of St. Thomas have done from the days of the older commentators down to the present. They argue from the two different ways in which the will is moved in

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 88, n.94. After quoting the text of *CG*, III, 26—"Appetitus autem non est proprium intellectualis naturae, sed omnibus rebus inest: licet sit diversimode in diversis. Quae tamen diversitas procedit ex hoc quod res diversimode se habent ad cognitionem. Quae enim omnino cognitione carent, habent appetitum naturalem tantum. Quae vero habent cognitionem sensitivam, et appetitum sensibilem habent . . . Quae vero habent cognitionem intellectivam, et appetitum cognitioni proportionatum habent, scilicet voluntatem"—Father Enrico concludes that the lower grade of appetite, especially natural appetite, is not destroyed when the higher is added to it. He then remarks: "Questo testo ci permette di intendere *cum granu* (sic) *salis* espressioni come la seguente: 'In natura intellectuali invenitur *inclinatio naturalis secundum voluntatem*; in natura autem sensitiva *secundum appetitum sensitivum*; in natura vero carente cognitione secundum solum ordinem naturae in aliquid' [*ST*, I, 60. 1c]."

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 85: "L'Angelico non richiede *nel soggetto* appetente la previa cognizione dell' oggetto, perche l'oggetto e conosciuto da Colui che e l'autore dell' inclinazione naturale."

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 85-86.

¹² *ST*, I-II, 30. 1 ad 3: "Unicuique potentiae animae appetere competit proprium bonum appetitu naturali, qui non sequitur apprehensionem; sed appetere bonum appetitu animali, qui sequitur apprehensionem, pertinet solum ad vim appetitivam . . ."

the teaching of St. Thomas: exteriorly, by the object; interiorly, by the power itself or by God.¹³ When the will is moved by the object, apprehension is required, since only an apprehended good moves the will. When, however, St. Thomas speaks of the will tending by its nature as a power of the soul towards its end, it is generally concluded that this interior inclination, or movement, in contrast with the movement from without, does not require cognition. In the language of St. Thomas, natural appetite follows the natural form, while animal appetite follows a cognitional form of sense or intellect.¹⁴ The former, for interpreters like Father Enrico, would never follow cognition; the latter would always do so.

II

Is this doctrine of a noncognitional natural tendency of the will, in either of the two forms just presented, the genuine teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas? In particular, has St. Thomas a doctrine of a natural appetite of the will for happiness, an appetite that does not depend upon some kind of knowledge of happiness in the intellect? To help us form a judgment in this matter, three general considerations will be given first; they will be followed by a detailed exposition of some pertinent passages in the writings of St. Thomas bearing upon the will and its natural appetite.

In the first place, when St. Thomas discusses the origin of the will, he roots it by nature in the intellect or in intelligence.

. . . in any intellectual nature whatever will must be found. . . . Wherefore it is also necessary that there follow from the intelligible form an inclination in the agent toward its proper operations and its proper end. *But this inclination in an intellectual nature is will . . .*¹⁵

Will, therefore, insofar as it is appetite, is not the property of an intellectual nature, *but only insofar as it depends upon intellect . . .*¹⁶

¹³ Cf. *ST*, I-II, 80. 1: "Voluntas autem . . . a duobus moveri potest: uno modo ab objecto; sicut dicitur quod appetibile apprehensum movet appetitum: alio modo ab eo quod interius inclinat voluntatem ad volendum; hoc autem non est nisi vel ipsa voluntas, vel Deus . . ."

¹⁴ Cf. *ST*, I, 78. 1 ad 3: "Appetitus naturalis est inclinatio cujuslibet rei in aliquid ex natura sua; unde naturali appetitu quaelibet potentia desiderat sibi conveniens: sed appetitus animalis consequitur formam apprehensam." Also *De Malo*, 16. 2: ". . . sicut appetitus naturalis consequitur formam naturalem, ita et appetitus sensitivus vel rationalis, sive intellectivus, sequitur formam apprehensam."

¹⁵ ". . . in qualibet intellectuali natura oportet inveniri voluntatem. . . . Unde etiam oportet quod ex forma intelligibili consequatur in intelligente inclinatio ad proprias operationes et proprium finem. Haec autem inclinatio in intellectuali natura voluntas est . . ." (*CG*, IV, 19).

¹⁶ "Voluntas igitur, secundum quod est appetitus, non est proprium intel-

... that reasoning process would hold, if will and intellect, besides being distinct potencies, were distinct also as regards their subject: for thus what is in the will would not be present in the intellect. But as it is, since both are rooted in the one substance of the soul, and one is in some way the principle of the other, *the consequence is that what is in the will is also in some fashion in the intellect.*¹⁷

... therefore the objects of will *fall* under the intellect; and the objects of intellect *can* fall under the will.¹⁸

But if will is considered with regard to the subject in which it is rooted, then, since the will does not have a corporeal organ, any more than the intellect does, will and intellect will be reduced to the same part of the soul. And thus sometimes intellect or reason is taken in the sense in which it includes both in itself; *and in this way it is said that will is in reason* . . .¹⁹

Will does not proceed directly from intelligence, but from the essence of the soul, *presupposing intelligence.*²⁰

Will is in reason so far as it follows the apprehension of reason . . .²¹

... from the affinity of the will to reason it happens that the will *according to the very intrinsic structure of the potency* corresponds to reason . . .²²

Although intellect is a higher faculty than will by reason of order, *because it is prior and is presupposed by will* . . .²³

The rational part by its essence is not said to be merely reason itself, but also the appetite annexed to reason, that

lectualis naturae, sed solum secundum quod ab intellectu dependet . . ." (*ibid.*, III, 26).

¹⁷ " . . . ratio illa procederet, si voluntas et intellectus, sicut sunt diversae potentiae, ita etiam subjecto differrent; sic enim quod est in voluntate, esset absens ab intellectu. Nunc autem, cum utrumque radicetur in una substantia animae, et unum sit quodammodo principium alterius, consequens est ut quod est in voluntate sit etiam quodammodo in intellectu" (*ST*, I, 87. 4 ad 1).

¹⁸ " . . . ideo quae sunt voluntatis cadunt sub intellectu; et quae sunt intellectus possunt cadere sub voluntate" (*ibid.*, ad 2).

¹⁹ "Si vero voluntas consideratur secundum id in quo radicatur; sic, cum voluntas non habeat organum corporale, sicut nec intellectus; voluntas et intellectus ad eandem partem animae reducentur. Et sic quandoque intellectus vel ratio sumitur prout includit in se utrumque; et sic dicitur quod voluntas est in ratione . . ." (*De Ver.*, 22. 10 ad 2).

²⁰ "Voluntas non directe ab intelligentia procedit, sed ab essentia animae, praesupposita intelligentia" (*ibid.*, 11 ad 6).

²¹ "Voluntas est in ratione inquantum sequitur apprehensionem rationis . . ." (*Quaest. Disp. de Anima*, a. 13 ad 12).

²² " . . . ex propinquitate voluntatis ad rationem contingit quod voluntas secundum ipsam rationem potentiae consonet rationi . . ." (*De Virt. in Comm.*, a. 5 ad 11).

²³ "Quamvis intellectus sit superior virtus quam voluntas ratione ordinis, quia prior est et a voluntate praesupponitur . . ." (*In I Sent.*, d. 25, 1. 2 ad 4).

is to say, will; wherefore the Philosopher says in 3 *De Anima* that will is in reason.²⁴

Will denominates rational appetite; and therefore cannot be in things which lack reason.²⁵

Second, St. Thomas has not a univocal notion of natural appetite, but views it according to the analogy of being and of nature. Where cognition does not enter as a factor in a nature, natural appetite will be completely independent of cognition in the subject. Where, however, cognition is a factor in the nature of a power, as it is in the case of the sensitive appetite and the will, natural desire will not be independent of knowledge.

But it is common to every nature to have some inclination, which is natural appetite, or love. *This inclination, however, is found differently in different natures, in each according to its kind.* Wherefore in an intellectual nature there is found natural inclination according to will; and in a sensitive nature, according to sensitive appetite; but in a nature lacking cognition, according to the mere ordination of the nature to something.²⁶

For natural appetite is in certain beings as a result of apprehension, just as the wolf naturally desires the killing of the animals on which it feeds, *and man naturally desires happiness;* but in certain others, without apprehension, from the mere inclination of natural principles, which in some things is called natural appetite, as a heavy body desires to be below.²⁷

Will is distinguished from natural appetite taken precisely, that is, [appetite] which is natural only, just as man is opposed to that which is animal only; *but it is not*

²⁴ "Pars rationalis per essentiam non dicitur solum ipsa ratio, sed etiam appetitus rationi annexus, scilicet voluntas; unde Philosophus dicit in 3 *De Anima* quod voluntas in ratione est" (*In III Sent.*, d. 27, 2. 3 ad 1). Cf. *In II Sent.*, d. 38, 1. 3: "Appetitus autem intellectui conjunctus voluntas dicitur; sed appetitus ab intellectu separatus est appetitus sensibilis et naturalis."

²⁵ "Voluntas nominat rationalem appetitum; et ideo non potest esse in his quae ratione carent" (*ST*, I-II, 6. 2 ad 1).

²⁶ "Est autem hoc commune omni naturae, ut habeat aliquam inclinationem, quae est appetitus naturalis vel amor. Quae tamen inclinatio diversimode invenitur in diversis naturis, in unaquaque secundum modum eius. Unde in natura intellectuali invenitur inclinatio naturalis secundum voluntatem; in natura autem sensitiva secundum appetitum sensitivum; in natura vero carente cognitione, secundum solum ordinem naturae in aliquid" (*ST*, I, 60. 1).

²⁷ "Naturalis enim appetitus quibusdam quidem inest ex apprehensione, sicut lupus naturaliter desiderat occisionem animalium de quibus pascitur, et homo naturaliter desiderat felicitatem; quibusdam vero absque apprehensione ex sola inclinatione naturalium principiorum, quae naturalis appetitus in quibusdam dicitur, sicut grave appetit esse deorsum" (*CG*, II, 55).

*opposed to natural appetite taken absolutely, but includes the same, just as man includes animal.*²⁸

The consequence of this analogous character of natural appetite is that a natural intellectual knowledge is a necessary prerequisite for the natural tendency or inclination of the will. The knowledge that governs the natural tendency of the will is the *intellectus* of first principles rather than the *ratio* as such. The latter governs the *voluntas deliberata* or the *voluntas ut ratio*; the former is the controlling principle behind the *voluntas ut natura*.

Will, according as it naturally desires something, corresponds more to the understanding of natural principles than to reason, which relates to opposites. Wherefore, to

²⁸ "Voluntas dividitur contra appetitum naturalem cum praecisione sumptum; id est, qui est naturalis tantum, sicut homo contra id quod est animal tantum; non autem dividitur contra appetitum naturalem absolute sed includit ipsum, sicut homo includit animal" (*De Ver.*, 22. 5 ad 6 sed contra).

Cf. *De Virt. in Comm.*, a. 6: "Inter virtutes naturales et rationales haec differentia assignatur quod naturalis virtus est determinata ad unum, virtus autem rationalis ad multa se habet. Oportet autem ut appetitus animalis vel rationalis inclinetur in suum appetibile ex aliqua apprehensione praeeistente; inclinatio enim in finem absque praeeistente cognitione ad appetitum pertinet naturalem, sicut grave inclinatur ad medium. Sed quia aliquod bonum apprehensum oportet esse objectum appetitus animalis et rationalis; ubi ergo istud bonum uniformiter se habet, potest esse inclinatio naturalis in appetitu et iudicium naturale in vi cognitiva, sicut accidit in brutis. Cum enim sint paucarum operationum propter debilitatem principii activi quod ad pauca se extendit, est in omnibus unius speciei bonum uniformiter se habens; unde per appetitum naturalem inclinationem habent in id, et per vim cognitivam naturale iudicium habent de illo proprio bono uniformiter se habente; et ex hoc naturali iudicio et naturali appetitu provenit quod omnis hirundo uniformiter facit nidum, et omnis arenea uniformiter facit telam; et sic est in omnibus aliis brutis considerare. Homo autem est multarum operationum et diversarum . . . Et ideo non sufficeret homini naturalis appetitus boni, nec naturale iudicium ad recte agendum, nisi amplius determinetur et perficiatur. Per naturalem siquidem appetitum homo inclinatur ad appetendum proprium bonum; sed cum hoc multipliciter varietur et in multis bonum hominis consistat, non potuit homini inesse naturalis appetitus huius boni determinati secundum conditiones omnes quae requiruntur ad hoc quod sit ei bonum . . . Et eadem ratione naturale iudicium, quod est uniforme et ad huiusmodi bonum quaerendum non sufficit; unde oportuit in homine per rationem, cuius est inter diversa conferre, invenire et diiudicare proprium bonum, secundum omnes conditiones determinatum, prout est nunc et hic quaerendum."

The point of importance here is that the natural inclination of the sensitive and of the rational appetite is preceded by cognition called natural judgment. See also *ibid.*, ad 5: "Bonum et verum sunt objecta duarum partium animae, scilicet intellectivae et appetitivae: quae quidem duo hoc modo se habent quod utraque ad actum alterius operatur . . . Et ideo haec duo, bonum et verum, se invicem includunt; nam bonum est quoddam verum, inquantum est ab intellectu apprehensum; prout scilicet intellectus intelligit voluntatem velle bonum, vel etiam inquantum intelligit aliquid esse bonum . . . Nihilominus tamen verum intellectus practici est bonum, quod est finis operationis: bonum enim non movet appetitum, nisi inquantum est apprehensum." Cf. also *ST*, I, 59. 1, below.

this extent, it is more an *intellectual* than a *rational* power.²⁹

. . . just as we are fixed immobily in the knowledge of first principles, their [the angels'] intellect is immobily fixed regarding everything that it naturally knows. *And because will is proportioned to intellect, it follows that their will too is naturally unchangeable regarding the things which pertain to the order of nature.*³⁰

. . . some natural habit is required in the will for natural desire; and especially since the will is moved as a consequence of the natural habit of intellect, inasmuch as the good understood is the object of will.³¹

Be it understood, however, that since there are different degrees of appetite following different apprehensions, no appetite is bound to tend toward that good of which it does not apprehend the intimate nature. For example, there is in us a certain sensitive appetite following the apprehension of sense. . . . *There is also a certain natural will in us, by which we desire that which is in itself the good for man, insofar as he is man; and this follows the apprehension of reason, in its function of considering a thing absolutely: as a man desires knowledge, virtue, health, and the like.* There is also in us a kind of deliberate will following the act of reason deliberating about an end and the different circumstances . . .³²

But rational will, *inasmuch as it is the nature of man, or follows the natural apprehension of universal principles of right, is what inclines to the good.*³³

²⁹ "Voluntas, secundum quod aliquid naturaliter vult, magis respondet intellectui naturalium principiorum, quam rationi, quae ad opposita se habet. Unde secundum hoc, magis est intellectualis quam rationalis potestas" (ST, I, 82, 1 ad 2).

³⁰ ". . . sicut immobiliter nos habemus in cognitione primorum principiorum, ita intellectus eorum [sc. angelorum] immobiliter se habet circa omnia quae naturaliter cognoscit. Et quia voluntas proportionatur intellectui, consequens est quod etiam voluntas eorum naturaliter sit immutabilis circa ea quae ad ordinem naturae pertinent" (De Malo, 16, 5).

³¹ ". . . requiritur aliquis naturalis habitus in voluntate ad naturale desiderium; et praecipue cum ex habitu naturali intellectus moveatur voluntas, inquantum bonum intellectum est objectum voluntatis" (De Virt. in Comm., a. 8 ad 13).

³² "Sciendum tamen, quod cum sint diversi gradus appetitus consequentes diversas apprehensiones, nullus appetitus tenetur tendere in illud bonum cujus rationem non apprehendit. Verbi gratia, in nobis est quidam appetitus sensitivus consequens apprehensionem sensus . . . Est et quaedam voluntas in nobis naturalis, qua appetimus id quod secundum se bonum est homini, inquantum est homo; et hoc sequitur apprehensionem rationis, prout est aliquid absolute considerans: sicut vult homo scientiam, virtutem, sanitatem, et huiusmodi. Est etiam in nobis quaedam voluntas deliberata consequens actum rationis deliberantis de fine et diversis circumstantiis . . ." (In I Sent., d. 48, 1, 4).

³³ "Voluntas autem rationalis, prout est natura hominis, sive prout consequitur naturalem apprehensionem universalium principiorum juris, est quae in bonum inclinat" (In II Sent., d. 39, 2, 2).

Will as deliberate, and as nature, do not differ according to the essence of the potency: because natural and deliberate are not differences of will in itself, but insofar as it follows the judgment of reason; *because in reason there is something naturally known as an indemonstrable principle in the operative order, which exists by way of end. . . . Wherefore that which is the end of man is naturally known in reason to be good and to be sought, and will following that knowledge is called will as nature.*³⁴

Thelesis according to the Damascene is *natural will*; *will, that is to say, which is moved in the fashion of a nature toward something according to the absolute goodness considered in it*; boulesis, however, is rational appetite, which is moved toward some good in virtue of its ordination to another; and these two the Master calls by different names, *will as nature*, and *will as reason*; but the potency of will is not diversified according to them, because the diversity in question arises from the fact that we move toward something without discourse, or with discourse. But discourse is not essential to will, but to reason. Wherefore that division of will is not by essential notes but by accidental ones; and for this reason they are not distinct potencies, but one, differing according to its relation to the preceding apprehension, which can be with discourse, or without discourse.³⁵

The third general consideration is this: because natural appetite as such flows from the natural form, and animal appetite from the cognitive form, St. Thomas very often speaks of natural appetite solely as it exists below the level of sense, where obviously it is always *sine cognitione* in its subject. Because natural appetite on these lower levels is without cognition, it does not follow that it is also without cognition

³⁴ "Voluntas ut deliberata, et ut natura, non differunt secundum essentiam potentiae: quia naturale et deliberatorium non sunt differentiae voluntatis secundum se, sed secundum quod sequitur iudicium rationis: quia in ratione est aliquid naturaliter cognitum quasi principium indemonstrabile in operabilibus, quod se habet per modum finis . . . Unde illud quod est finis hominis est naturaliter in ratione cognitum esse bonum et appetendum, et voluntas consequens istam cognitionem dicitur voluntas ut natura" (*ibid.*, ad 2).

³⁵ " . . . thesis secundum Damascenum est voluntas naturalis, quae scilicet in modum naturae movetur in aliquid secundum bonitatem absolutam in eo consideratam; boulesis autem est appetitus rationalis, qui movetur in aliquid bonum ex ordine alterius; et haec duo a Magistro aliis nominibus dicuntur voluntas ut natura, et voluntas ut ratio; secundum quae tamen non diversificatur potentia voluntatis, quia diversitas ista est ex eo quod movemur in aliquid sine collatione, vel cum collatione. Conferre autem non est per se voluntatis, sed rationis. Unde illa divisio voluntatis non est per essentialia, sed per accidentalitatem; et propter hoc non sunt diversae potentiae, sed una differens secundum respectum ipsius ad apprehensionem praecedentem, quae potest esse cum collatione, vel sine collatione" (*In III Sent.*, d. 17, 1. 1 sol 3 ad 1).

on the two higher levels of the sensitive appetite and the will. St. Thomas more or less habitually confines natural appetite to natures or powers in which cognition is not a factor (for example, the vegetative powers), and in this sense he contrasts it with the sensitive appetite and the will. A few examples will make this point clear.

But it belongs to any being whatever to desire its perfection and the conservation of its *esse*: to each however, according to its kind; to intellectual beings by will, to animals by sensible appetite, *but to beings that lack sense, by natural appetite.*³⁶

For there is in all beings an appetite for good, since good is what all things desire . . . *and this kind of appetite in beings which lack cognition is called natural appetite*, just as it is said that a stone desires to be below; but in beings which have sensitive cognition it is called animal appetite . . . while in those which are intelligent, it is called intellectual or rational appetite, which is will.³⁷

Just as in an inanimate thing the natural inclination relates to its proper end, and this is called natural appetite, so the will in an intellectual substance is similarly related and this is called intellectual appetite.³⁸

Since all things proceed from the divine will, all, in their own way, incline toward the good through appetite, but in different fashions. *For some things incline toward the good by a natural relationship without cognition, such as plants, and inanimate bodies; and such an inclination to good is called natural appetite.* But some things incline to the good with some kind of cognition . . . such as sense. And the inclination following this cognition is called sensitive appetite. *Still other things however incline to the good with the kind of cognition by which they know the very intrinsic nature of good, and this is the property of intellect. . . . And this inclination is called will.*³⁹

³⁶ "Cuiuslibet autem enti competit appetere suam perfectionem et conservationem sui esse; unicuique tamen secundum suum modum; intellectualibus per voluntatem, animalibus per sensibilem appetitum, carentibus vero sensu per appetitum naturalem" (CG, I, 72).

³⁷ "Inest enim omnibus appetitus boni, cum bonum sit quod omnia appetunt . . . huiusmodi autem appetitus in his quidem quae cognitione carent dicitur naturalis appetitus, sicut dicitur quod lapis appetit esse deorsum; in his autem quae cognitionem sensitivam habent dicitur appetitus animalis . . . in his vero quae intelligunt, dicitur appetitus intellectualis, seu rationalis, qui est voluntas" (*ibid.*, II, 47).

³⁸ "Sicut in re inanimata se habet inclinatio naturalis ad proprium finem, quae appetitus naturalis dicitur, ita se habet in substantia intellectuali voluntas, quae dicitur appetitus intellectualis" (*ibid.*, III, 88).

³⁹ ". . . cum omnia procedant ex voluntate divina, omnia suo modo per appetitum inclinantur in bonum, sed diversimode. Quaedam enim inclinantur in bonum per solam naturalem habitudinem absque cognitione, sicut plantae, et corpora inanimata; et talis inclinatio ad bonum vocatur appetitus naturalis.

Certain acts proceed from natural appetite, while certain others proceed from animal or intellectual appetite; for every agent in some way desires an end. *But natural appetite does not follow any apprehension*, as animal and intellectual appetite do . . . therefore those acts which proceed from intellective or animal appetite can be commanded by reason, but not those acts which proceed from natural appetite: *for acts of this sort belong to the vegetable soul* . . .⁴⁰

Appetite is twofold: *one natural, which pertains to the powers of the vegetable soul* . . . but there is another also, the sensitive appetite . . .⁴¹

But there is in man a threefold appetite. *One natural, so far as the appetitive power pertains to the vegetable soul, just as the digestive and eliminatory and retentive powers do.* The second appetite is sensuality; which is moved according to the apprehension of sense. The third appetite is will, which is moved according to the judgment of reason.⁴²

In the light of these texts it is clear that when St. Thomas speaks of the natural appetite for food as caused, not by the imagination, but by natural dispositions, he is referring to the natural appetite of the

Quaedam vero ad bonum inclinantur cum aliqua cognitione . . . sicut sensus. Inclinatio autem hanc cognitionem sequens dicitur appetitus sensitivus. Quaedam vero inclinantur ad bonum cum cognitione qua cognoscant ipsam rationem boni, quod est proprium intellectus . . . Et haec inclinatio dicitur voluntas" (ST, I, 59. 1).

Cf. ST, I, 19. 1: ". . . in Deo voluntatem esse, sicut et in eo est intellectus. Voluntas enim intellectum consequitur. . . . Quaelibet autem res ad suam formam naturalem hanc habet habitudinem, ut quando non habet ipsam, tendat in eam; et quando habet ipsam, quiescat in ea; et idem est de qualibet perfectione naturali, quod est bonum naturae. Et haec habitudo ad bonum in rebus carentibus cognitione vocatur appetitus naturalis. Unde et natura intellectualis ad bonum apprehensum per formam intelligibilem similem habitudinem habet, ut scilicet cum habet ipsum, quiescat in illo, cum vero non habet, quaerat ipsum; et utrumque pertinet ad voluntatem. Unde in quolibet habente intellectum est voluntas, sicut in quolibet habente sensum est appetitus animalis."

⁴⁰"Actus quidam procedunt ex appetitu naturali, quidam autem ex appetitu animali vel intellectuali; omne enim agens aliquo modo appetit finem. Appetitus autem naturalis non consequitur aliquam apprehensionem, sicut sequitur appetitus animalis, et intellectualis. . . . ideo actus illi qui procedunt ab appetitu intellectivo vel animali possunt a ratione imperari, non autem actus illi qui procedunt ex appetitu naturali: huiusmodi enim actus sunt vegetabilis animae . . ." (*ibid.*, I-II, 17. 8).

⁴¹"Duplex est appetitus: unus quidem naturalis, qui pertinet ad vires animae vegetabilis . . . est autem et alius appetitus sensitivus . . ." (*ibid.*, II-II, 148. 1 ad 3).

⁴²"Est autem in homine triplex appetitus. Unus quidem naturalis, secundum quod vis appetitiva pertinet ad animam vegetabilem, sicut et vis digestiva et expulsiva et retentiva. Secundus appetitus est sensualitas; qui movetur secundum apprehensionem sensus. Tertius appetitus est voluntas, qui movetur secundum iudicium rationis" (*Quodlibet. IV*, a. 21).

vegetative power of the soul and not that of the sensitive appetite or of the will. This is put beyond dispute in the following text.

Now there is in us a threefold appetite, namely the natural, the sensitive, and the rational. *Natural appetite, say for food, is one which imagination does not generate, but rather the very disposition of the natural qualities by which the natural powers exercise their actions . . .* But sensitive appetite is one which follows from a preceding imagination or sensation. . . . While rational appetite is that which follows the apprehension of reason . . .⁴³

Father Enrico seems to think that when St. Thomas says, "The same thing that is desired with natural appetite can be desired with animal appetite, when it is once apprehended," he is affirming the noncognitive character of natural appetite wherever it is found, as opposed to the cognitive nature of the elicited appetite.⁴⁴ It is important, however, to see that St. Thomas is not speaking here of the natural appetite of the sensitive appetite or of the will, but only of the natural appetite of the vegetative power for food, which does not require prior cognition. After food is apprehended by the senses, then it is also desired by the animal appetite, as the whole passage makes clear.

The same thing that is desired with natural appetite, can be desired with animal appetite, when it is once apprehended: *and in this way there can be animal concupiscence for food and drink and the like, which are naturally desired.*⁴⁵

It likewise does not follow that because St. Thomas says, "Natural appetite does not follow any apprehension, as animal and intellectual appetite do,"⁴⁶ he therefore excludes cognition from the natural appetite of the sensitive appetite and of the will. We have already seen this

⁴³ "Est autem in nobis triplex appetitus, scilicet naturalis, sensitivus, et rationalis. Naturalis quidem appetitus, puta cibi, est quem non imaginatio gignit, sed ipsa qualitas naturalium dispositio, quibus naturales vires suas actiones exercent. . . . Appetitus autem sensitivus est qui ex praecedenti imaginatione vel sensu consequitur . . . Appetitus autem rationalis est qui consequitur apprehensionem rationis . . ." (*In II Sent.*, d. 24, 3. 1).

The explanation of this text in *The Eternal Quest*, p. 214, assumes that St. Thomas has in mind the natural appetite of the sensitive appetite for food. This supposition is not correct, as the present explanation shows.

⁴⁴ *Ephemerides Carmeliticae*, p. 85. The quotation is from *ST*, I-II, 30. 3 ad 1.

⁴⁵ "Illud idem quod appetitur appetitu naturali, potest appeti appetitu animali, cum fuerit apprehensum: et secundum hoc cibi, et potus, et huiusmodi, quae appetuntur naturaliter, potest esse concupiscentia animalis" (*ST*, I-II, 30. 3 ad 1).

⁴⁶ "Appetitus naturalis non consequitur aliquam apprehensionem, sicut sequitur appetitus animalis et intellectualis" (*ST*, I-II, 17. 8).

text when we saw how St. Thomas very often restricts the term "natural appetite" to natures and powers below the level of sense. He makes clear in the article from which the quotation is taken that he is speaking of the natural appetite of the vegetative soul as contrasted with the sensitive appetite and the will. He is not speaking of natural appetite as it is found in these two animal appetites.

III

What is it that the will necessarily tends toward by its natural form as will? There is, I believe, no controversy over the answer to this question. St. Thomas gives us his reply in these typical texts.

Now this is the *good in general* toward which the will naturally tends—just as any potency whatever toward its object—and also the *last end* itself, which bears the same relationship in the order of appetition as first principles in the order of intellection, *and in general all the things which belong to a volitional being according to its nature*; for we do not desire by will only those things which belong to the power of will, but also the things which belong to each individual power, and to the whole man; wherefore a man naturally desires not only the object of will, but also all the things which belong to the other powers; such as the knowledge of truth, which belongs to the intellect; and to be, and to live, and other things of this kind, which regard natural subsistence: all of which are included under the object of will as certain particular goods.⁴⁷

. . . the will is moved by the good just as the intellect is moved by truth. But the intellect necessarily assents to first principles, which are known in themselves . . . *and similarly the will desires the last end*, which must be desired for its own sake (*for all men necessarily will to be happy*); likewise *the things without which it considers happiness impossible*.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ "Hoc autem est bonum in communi in quod voluntas naturaliter tendit, sicut etiam quaelibet potentia in suum objectum, et etiam ipse finis ultimus, qui hoc modo se habet in appetibilibus sicut prima principia demonstrationum in intelligibilibus; et universaliter omnia illa quae conveniunt volenti secundum suam naturam: non enim per voluntatem appetimus solum ea quae pertinent ad potentiam voluntatis, sed etiam ea quae pertinent ad singulas potentias, et ad totum hominem; unde naturaliter homo vult non solum objectum voluntatis, sed etiam alia quae conveniunt aliis potentiis; ut cognitionem veri, quae convenit intellectui; et esse, et vivere, et hujusmodi alia, quae respiciunt consistentiam naturalem: quae omnia comprehenduntur sub objecto voluntatis sicut quaedam particularia bona" (ST, I-II, 10. 1).

⁴⁸ ". . . movetur voluntas a bono sicut intellectus a vero. Intellectus autem ex necessitate assentit primis principiis, quae sunt secundum se nota . . . et similiter voluntas ex necessitate appetit ultimum finem, qui est propter se appetendus (omnes enim ex necessitate volunt esse beati); similiter ea quae

The will, too, so far as it is a kind of nature, naturally desires something; the will of man, for example, naturally tends toward happiness.⁴⁹

For it is necessary that any will whatever have some end which it naturally desires and whose contrary it cannot desire, *as man naturally and of necessity desires happiness*, and cannot desire unhappiness. But besides the fact that the will necessarily desires its natural end, it also desires of necessity the things without which it cannot have the end, *if it knows this*; and these are the things which are commensurate with the end; as, for example, if I desire life, I desire food.⁵⁰

Similarly, too, natural necessity does not contravene the will: rather it is necessary that, just as the intellect adheres of necessity to first principles, *so the will adhere of necessity to the last end, which is happiness*.⁵¹

The doctrine contained in these texts may be stated briefly. The human will has a natural appetite for the good of man in general, for happiness (again in general and not identified with any particular object), and for its ultimate end, which is happiness. The will also naturally desires all that is seen to have a necessary connection with the good in general or with happiness, such as to live and to exist. There is no question about the need of prior cognition for the latter class of objects; they cannot be naturally desired unless they are seen to have this necessary connection with the ultimate end of the will. The question at issue concerns the ultimate end of the will itself, the good of man, or happiness in general, which the will is tending towards by a necessity of its nature. Does *this* natural tendency or appetite also require prior intellectual cognition? Here is St. Thomas's answer:

1. Since *bonum apprehensum* is the end of the will, a knowledge of *bonum in universali* or *in communi* precedes its natural tendency towards this end.

The object of the will is the end, and good in general: wherefore *will cannot be in those beings which lack reason and intellect, since they cannot apprehend the*

considerat ut sine quibus beatitudo esse non possit" (*De Malo*, 16. 7 ad 18).

⁴⁹ "Etiam voluntas, inquantum est natura quaedam, aliquid naturaliter vult; sicut voluntas hominis naturaliter tendit ad beatitudinem" (*ST*, I, 41. 2 ad 3).

⁵⁰ "Oportet enim quod quaelibet voluntas habeat aliquem finem quem naturaliter velit et cuius contrarium velle non possit; sicut homo naturaliter et de necessitate vult beatitudinem, et miseriam velle non potest. Cum hoc autem quod voluntas velit necessario finem suum naturalem, vult etiam de necessitate ea sine quibus finem habere non potest, si hoc cognoscat; et haec sunt quae sunt commensurata fini; sicut si volo vitam, volo cibum" (*De Pot.*, 1. 5).

⁵¹ "Similiter etiam nec necessitas naturalis repugnat voluntati: quinimmo necesse est quod, sicut intellectus ex necessitate inhaeret primis principiis, ita voluntas ex necessitate inhaereat ultimo fini, qui est beatitudo" (*ST*, I, 82. 1).

universal; but there is in them natural or sensitive appetite determined to some particular good.⁵²

. . . the will of one who beholds the essence of God necessarily loves all that it loves, in subordination to God, *just as the will of one who does not behold the essence of God necessarily loves all that he loves under the general notion of good which he does know* . . .⁵³

. . . the good understood is the object of the will which is proportioned to it . . . *because the will can tend toward the universal good, which reason apprehends* . . .⁵⁴

Good under the aspect of good, that is, of the appetible, pertains primarily to the will rather than to reason; nevertheless it pertains primarily to reason under the aspect of the true, rather than to will under the aspect of the appetible, *because the appetite of will cannot regard the good, except it be first apprehended by reason*.⁵⁵

Will from the very nature of the potency inclines to the good of reason . . .⁵⁶

. . . all things incline by appetite to the good in their own way, but differently. For some incline to the good by a mere natural relationship, without cognition, such as plants and inanimate bodies. And such an inclination to good is called natural appetite. Some, however, incline to the good with some kind of cognition; not indeed so as to know the intrinsic nature of good, but they rather know some particular good; sense is of this sort . . . And the inclination following this kind of cognition is called sensitive appetite. *But some beings incline to the good with the kind of cognition by which they know the very nature of good, and this is the property of intellect*. And these beings incline most perfectly to the good, not indeed as

⁵² "Objectum voluntatis est finis, et bonum in universali: unde non potest esse voluntas in his quae carent ratione, et intellectu, cum non possint apprehendere universale; sed est in eis appetitus naturalis vel sensitivus determinatus ad aliquod bonum particulare" (*ibid.*, I-II, 1. 2 ad 3).

⁵³ ". . . voluntas videntis Dei essentiam ex necessitate amat quicquid amat sub ordine ad Deum, sicut voluntas non videntis Dei essentiam ex necessitate amat quicquid amat sub communi ratione boni quam novit . . ." (*ibid.*, 4. 4).

⁵⁴ ". . . bonum intellectum est objectum voluntatis proportionatum ei . . . quia voluntas potest tendere in bonum universale, quod ratio apprehendit . . ." (*ibid.*, 19. 3).

⁵⁵ "Bonum sub ratione boni, id est appetibilis, per prius pertinet ad voluntatem quam ad rationem; sed tamen per prius pertinet ad rationem sub ratione veri, quam ad voluntatem sub ratione appetibilis, quia appetitus voluntatis non potest esse de bono, nisi prius a ratione apprehendatur" (*ibid.*, ad 1).

⁵⁶ "Voluntas ex ipsa natura potentiae inclinatur in bonum rationis . . ." (*ibid.*, 50. 5 ad 3).

if merely directed toward the good by another, like beings which lack cognition . . . but simply endowed with an inclination to universal good itself. And this inclination is called will. *Wherefore, since the angels by their intellect know the very universal nature of good, it is plain that will is found in them.*⁵⁷

. . . for intellect apprehends not merely this or that good, but universal good itself; wherefore, since the intellect moves the will by an apprehended form, . . . the will of an intellectual substance will not be determined except to universal good.⁵⁸

. . . any other creature whatever is naturally ordered to some particular good; but an intellectual nature alone apprehends the very universal nature of good by intellect, and is moved to universal good by the appetite of will . . .⁵⁹

. . . will naturally desires what is good according to reason . . .⁶⁰

The natural inclination of will is not only toward the ultimate end, but toward that good which is shown it by reason. *For the good understood is the object of will, and to it the will is naturally ordered, just as any potency whatever is ordered to its object, provided this be its proper good.*⁶¹

⁵⁷ " . . . omnia suo modo per appetitum inclinatur in bonum, sed diversimode. Quaedam enim inclinantur in bonum per solam naturalem habitudinem, absque cognitione, sicut plantae et corpora inanimata. Et talis inclinatio ad bonum vocatur appetitus naturalis. Quaedam vero ad bonum inclinantur cum aliqua cognitione; non quidem sic quod cognoscant ipsam rationem boni, sed cognoscunt aliquod bonum particulare, sicut sensus . . . Inclinatio autem hanc cognitionem sequens dicitur appetitus sensitivus. Quaedam vero inclinantur ad bonum cum cognitione qua cognoscunt ipsam boni rationem, quod est proprium intellectus. Et haec perfectissime inclinantur in bonum, non quidem quasi ab alio solummodo directa in bonum, sicut ea quae cognitione carent . . . sed tantum inclinata in ipsum universale bonum. Et haec inclinatio dicitur voluntas. Unde cum angeli per intellectum cognoscant ipsam universalem rationem boni, manifestum est quod in eis sit voluntas" (*ibid.*, I, 59. 1).

⁵⁸ " . . . intellectus enim apprehendit non solum hoc vel illud bonum, sed ipsum bonum commune; unde, cum intellectus per formam apprehensam moveat voluntatem . . . voluntas substantiae intellectualis non erit determinata a natura nisi ad bonum commune" (*CG*, II, 48).

⁵⁹ " . . . quaelibet alia creatura naturaliter ordinatur in aliquod particulare bonum; intellectualis autem natura sola apprehendit ipsam rationem boni commune per intellectum, et in bonum commune movetur per appetitum voluntatis . . ." (*De Malo*, I, 4).

⁶⁰ " . . . voluntas appetit naturaliter quod est bonum secundum rationem . . ." (*De Virt. in Comm.*, a. 5 ad 1).

⁶¹ "Inclinatio naturalis voluntatis non solum est in ultimum finem, sed in id bonum quod sibi a ratione demonstratur. Nam bonum intellectum est objectum voluntatis, ad quod naturaliter ordinatur voluntas, sicut et quaelibet potentia in suum objectum, dummodo hoc sit proprium bonum" (*ibid.*, ad 2).

. . . the object of the will is good according to the general notion of good, which the intellect can apprehend but not the senses.⁶²

Even in the damned there remains the natural inclination by which man naturally desires good; yet this inclination does not denote any act, but merely the ordination of nature toward act. Now this order and aptitude never issues in act so as actually to desire the good, because of the perpetual impediment of obstinacy which binds the will; *nevertheless natural cognition remains*; and therefore there always remains the complaint of reason against the will; the will, however, never obeys reason.⁶³

2. A knowledge of *res in universali* precedes the natural tendency of the will towards the perfection of that knowledge.

Some knowledge must necessarily precede will. For the act of will is twofold. One imperfect, namely, to desire; and that act precedes the perfect knowledge of the things which are acquired in knowledge. For through the desire to know something a person is moved to its consideration, and by considering achieves knowledge of it; nevertheless an indeterminate knowledge by which the thing is known in the universal precedes this act of the will, and through that imperfect knowledge the appetite tends toward the perfection of the same; for if it were entirely unknown it would not be sought.⁶⁴

3. A notion of happiness in general precedes the natural tendency of the will towards it.

*. . . for man naturally desires happiness; and what man naturally desires, he naturally knows.*⁶⁵

. . . but only the perfect good, which is happiness, can

⁶² ". . . objectum voluntatis est bonum secundum communem boni rationem, quam potest intellectus apprehendere, non autem sensus" (*De Spe*, a. 1.)

⁶³ "Etiam in damnato manet naturalis inclinatio qua homo naturaliter vult bonum; sed haec inclinatio non dicit actum aliquem, sed solum ordinem naturae ad actum. Hic autem ordo etabilitas nunquam in actum exit ut bonum actualiter velit, propter perpetuum impedimentum obstinationis voluntatem ligantis; sed tamen naturalis cognitio manet; et ideo semper manet murmur rationis contra voluntatem; voluntas tamen nunquam rationi obedit" (*In II Sent.*, d. 39, 3. 1 ad 5).

⁶⁴ "Voluntatem oportet quod praecedat aliqua cognitio. Est enim duplex actus voluntatis. Unus imperfectus, scilicet appetere; et iste actus praecedit cognitionem perfectam eorum quae acquiruntur in cognitione. Per appetitum enim sciendi aliquid movetur aliquis ad considerationem alicujus, cujus cognitionem considerando accipit; sed tamen hunc actum voluntatis praecedit cognitio indeterminata qua res scitur in universali, et per illam cognitionem imperfectam tendit appetitus in perfectionem ipsius: si enim esset omnino ignotum, non quaereretur" (*In I Sent.*, d. 6, exposit. text.).

⁶⁵ ". . . homo enim naturaliter desiderat beatitudinem; et quod naturaliter desideratur ab homine, naturaliter cognoscitur ab eodem" (*ST*, I, 2. 1 ad 1).

reason not apprehend under the aspect of evil, or of some defect: *and therefore of necessity man desires happiness*, nor can he desire not to be happy, or to be wretched.⁶⁶ *Every rational mind naturally desires happiness, indeterminately and universally*, and in this regard it cannot fail; but in a particular case there is no determined movement of the creature's will to seek happiness in this or that . . .⁶⁷

For the will naturally tends toward the good as toward its object . . . Wherefore there cannot be sin in the movement of the will, that is to say, that it should desire evil, unless the defect first existed in the apprehensive power, by which evil was proposed to it as good. Now this defect in reason can come about in two ways: one from reason itself; the other from something extrinsic. From reason itself, I say, *because there is in it naturally and without change or error, knowledge of the good in general*, both of the good which is the end, and of the good which leads to the end; but not in particular . . . *and for this reason the will naturally desires the good which is the end, namely, happiness in general*, and likewise the good which leads to the end; for each and every man naturally seeks his own advantage.⁶⁸

Now it belongs to natural knowledge that the soul know itself created for happiness, and that happiness consists in the acquisition of perfect good; but that that perfect good for which man is made is the glory which the saints possess, is beyond natural knowledge.⁶⁹

The souls of children dying in original sin know happiness in general according to its universal notion, but not in

⁶⁶ " . . . solum autem perfectum bonum, quod est beatitudo, non potest ratio apprehendere sub ratione mali, aut alicujus defectus: et ideo ex necessitate beatitudinem homo vult, nec potest velle non esse beatus, aut esse miser" (*ibid.*, I-II, 13. 6).

⁶⁷ "Felicitatem indeterminate et in universali omnis rationalis mens naturaliter appetit, et circa hoc deficere non potest; sed in particulari non est determinatus motus voluntatis creaturae ad quaerendam felicitatem in hoc vel illo . . . " (*De Ver.*, 24. 7 ad 6).

⁶⁸ "Voluntas enim naturaliter tendit in bonum sicut in suum objectum . . . Unde non potest esse peccatum in motu voluntatis, scilicet quod malum appetat, nisi in apprehensiva virtute defectus praeexistat, per quem sibi malum ut bonum proponatur. Hic autem defectus in ratione potest dupliciter accidere: uno modo ex ipsa ratione; alio modo ex aliquo extrinseco. Ex ipsa quidem ratione, quia inest ei naturaliter et immutabiliter sine errore cognitio boni in universali, tam boni quod est finis, quam boni quod est ad finem; non autem in particulari . . . et propter hoc voluntas naturaliter appetit bonum quod est finis, scilicet felicitatem in generali, et similiter bonum quod est ad finem; unusquisque enim naturaliter appetit utilitatem suam . . . (*ibid.*, 8).

⁶⁹ "Pertinet autem ad naturalem cognitionem quod anima sciat se propter beatitudinem creatam, et quod beatitudo consistit in adeptione perfecti boni; sed quod illud bonum perfectum, ad quod homo factus est, sit illa gloria quam sancti possident, est supra cognitionem naturalem" (*De Malo*, 5. 3).

particular; and therefore they do not grieve for its loss.⁷⁰ Now since will is in potency with respect to the universal good, no good overcomes the power of will as though moving it of necessity, *except that which is good according to every consideration; and this alone is perfect good, which is happiness*, and the will is unable not to desire it, so as to desire its opposite, that is; it is able, however, not to desire actually, because it can turn away the thought of happiness, so far as it moves the intellect to its act; and to this extent it does not desire even happiness out of necessity . . .⁷¹

Though happiness be hidden with respect to its substance, *still the notion of happiness is known: for all understand by happiness a certain most perfect state*: but in what that perfect state consists, whether in life or the after life, or in corporal or spiritual goods, and in what spiritual goods, is hidden.⁷²

Essentially the object of the will is the good; accidentally, this or that good. And just as good, taken universally, is essentially the object of the will; so also the highest good is the last end of the will essentially. But this or that good is laid down as the last end of the will and its principal object, as it were accidentally. *Therefore happiness with respect to that which in it is essentially the principle object of will, is known to all*; but with respect to that which is accidental to the essential object it is not known. *For all know the perfect good, and this they desire when they desire happiness*; but that this perfect good should be pleasure, or riches, or anything of this kind whatever, is accidental; and therefore in this regard the existence of many errors involves no contradiction.⁷³

⁷⁰ "Animae puerorum in peccato originali decedentium cognoscunt quidem beatitudinem in generali secundum communem rationem, non autem in speciali; et ideo de ejus amissione non dolent" (*ibid.*, ad 1).

⁷¹ "Cum autem voluntas se habeat in potentia respectu boni universalis, nullum bonum superat virtutem voluntatis quasi ex necessitate ipsam movens, nisi id quod secundum omnem considerationem est bonum; et hoc solum est bonum perfectum, quod est beatitudo, quod voluntas non potest non velle, ita scilicet quod velit ejus oppositum; potest tamen non velle actu, quia potest avertere cogitationem beatitudinis, inquantum movet intellectum ad suum actum; et quantum ad hoc nec ipsam beatitudinem ex necessitate vult . . ." (*ibid.*, 6. 1 ad 7).

⁷² "Quamvis beatitudo sit occulta quantum ad substantiam, tamen ratio beatitudinis nota est: omnes enim per beatitudinem intelligunt quemdam perfectissimum statum: sed in quo consistat ille status perfectus, utrum in vita, vel post vitam, vel in bonis corporalibus, vel spiritualibus, et in quibus spiritualibus, occultum est" (*In II Sent.*, d. 38, 1. 2 ad 2).

⁷³ "Per se objectum voluntatis est bonum; sed per accidens est hoc vel illud bonum. Et sicut bonum, communiter loquendo, est per se objectum voluntatis; ita et summum bonum est ultimus voluntatis finis, per se loquendo: sed hoc vel

When it is asked how the natural desire for happiness, if it depends upon prior cognition, can underlie all our volitions, even when we are not actually thinking about happiness, St. Thomas gives this reply:

Just as in the intelligible order it is not necessary for the first principles to enter essentially into all succeeding demonstrations, as actually considered, but only virtually, while the demonstration is completed from materials which draw their persuasive power from the first principles; *so too, though every desire relates to happiness, still it is not necessary that in every desire happiness be actually considered; but desire for happiness is in all other desires virtually, as cause in effect.*⁷⁴

The first good is willed essentially, and the will essentially and naturally wills it; it does not, however, will it always actually: *for it is not necessary that the things which are naturally suited to the soul be always actual in the soul;* just as the principles which are naturally known are not always actually considered.⁷⁵

4. The will moves towards its natural end in the light of intellectual knowledge.

The good understood is the object of the will, and moves it as end.⁷⁶

We do not have to go on to infinity, but rather halt in the intellect as in the first principle. *For an apprehension must necessarily precede every motion of will;* but a motion of the will does not precede every apprehension.⁷⁷

illud bonum ponitur ut ultimus finis et principale ejus objectum quasi per accidens. Beatitudo ergo quantum ad id quod in ipsa est per se voluntatis principale objectum est omnibus nota; sed quantum ad id quod accedit per se objecto non est nota. Omnes enim cognoscunt perfectum bonum, et hoc appetunt dum beatitudinem appetunt; sed hoc perfectum bonum esse voluptatem vel divitias, virtutem, vel quidquid hujusmodi, est per accidens; et ideo circa hoc non est inconveniens multos esse errores" (*In IV Sent.*, d. 49, l. 3 sol. 1 ad 1).

⁷⁴ "Sicut in intelligibilibus non oportet ut in omnibus consequentibus demonstrationibus prima principia essentialiter ingrediantur quasi actualiter cogitata, sed virtute tantum, dum demonstratio conficitur ex his quae per prima principia fidem habent; ita etiam quamvis omne desiderium ad beatitudinem referatur, non tamen oportet quod in omni desiderio de beatitudine actualiter cogitetur; sed desiderium beatitudinis est virtute in omnibus aliis desideriis, sicut causa in effectu" (*ibid.*, sol. 4 ad 6).

⁷⁵ "Primum bonum est per se volitum, et voluntas per se et naturaliter illud vult; non tamen illud semper vult in actu: non enim oportet ea quae sunt naturaliter convenientia animae semper actu in anima esse; sicut principia quae sunt naturaliter cognita non semper actu considerantur" (*De Ver.*, 22. 5 ad 11).

⁷⁶ "Bonum intellectum est objectum voluntatis, et movet ipsam ut finis" (*ST*, I, 82. 4).

⁷⁷ "Non oportet procedere in infinitum, sed statim in intellectu sicut in primo. Omnem enim voluntatis motum necesse est quod praecedat apprehensio; sed non omnem apprehensionem praecedat motus voluntatis . . ." (*ibid.*, ad 3).

*The intellect apprehends the end before the will does; but movement toward the end begins in the will . . .*⁷⁸
*. . . but the last end itself must be in the intellect before it is in the will, because the will is not drawn toward anything except so far as it is apprehended by the intellect . . .*⁷⁹

*Natural inclination in the appetitive power follows natural conception in cognition.*⁸⁰

*For the appetitive potency is a passive potency, the nature of which is to be moved by an object apprehended . . .*⁸¹

In the light of these texts, especially of those that speak of the natural tendency towards happiness, it does not seem correct to interpret the natural appetite for beatitude considered *secundum communem rationem* as a tendency of the will that is independent of prior intellectual cognition, as Father Enrico does in his exegesis of *Summa Theologica*, I-II 5, 8 ad 2. In answering the second objection St. Thomas expressly asserts that the will follows the apprehension of the intellect, and that the natural tendency of the will towards happiness in general follows a *consideration* of happiness in this light by the intellect.

*Since the will follows the apprehension of the intellect or reason, just as it happens that a thing is the same in reality, but is different according to the consideration of reason, so it happens that a thing is the same in reality, and yet is desired in one way, and not desired in another; therefore happiness can be considered under the aspect of final and perfect good, which is the general notion of happiness: and thus considered, the will naturally and necessarily tends toward it, as has been said: it can also be thought of according to other special considerations, either from the side of the operation itself, or from the side of the operative potency, or from that of the object; and thus considered the will does not tend toward it of necessity.*⁸²

⁷⁸ "Finem primo apprehendit intellectus, quam voluntas; tamen motus ad finem incipit in voluntate . . ." (*ibid.*, I-II, 3. 4 ad 3).

⁷⁹ ". . . ipse autem ultimus finis oportet quod prius sit in intellectu quam in voluntate, quia voluntas non fertur in aliquid nisi prout est in intellectu apprehensum . . ." (*ibid.*, II-II, 4. 7).

⁸⁰ "Naturalis inclinatio in appetitiva sequitur naturalem conceptionem in cognitione" (*In IV Sent.*, d. 33, l. 1 ad 9).

⁸¹ "Potentia enim appetitiva est potentia passiva, quae nata est moveri ab apprehenso . . ." (*ST*, I, 80. 2).

⁸² "Cum voluntas sequatur apprehensionem intellectus, seu rationis, sicut contingit quod aliquid est idem secundum rem, quod tamen est diversum secundum rationis considerationem, ita contingit quod aliquid est idem secundum rem; et tamen uno modo appetitur, alio modo non appetitur; beatitudo ergo potest considerari sub ratione finalis boni, et perfecti, quae est communis ratio beatitudinis: et sic naturaliter et ex necessitate voluntas in illud tendit, ut

The whole point of the body of the article is that while all men know the common *ratio* of happiness and necessarily tend towards it in this light, all do not know what this common *ratio* is verified in, in particular; so that there is no natural or necessary tendency towards any particular object or activity as constituting true human beatitude. In answering the third objection St. Thomas is not opposing a noncognitive natural appetite for happiness to an elicited appetite that follows cognition, as Father Enrico asserts. He is opposing to the natural desire for happiness the desire for things which man wishes to have according to the apprehension of his reason (*secundum apprehensionem rationis*), many of which turn out to be causes of misery rather than of true happiness. We have already seen that for St. Thomas Aquinas the natural tendency of the will towards happiness in general follows *intellectus* rather than *ratio*. Mistakes may occur in the particular judgments we make concerning the things that will yield us true happiness; no mistake is possible in the natural tendency of the will towards happiness in general.

IV

The view of natural desire that we have seen so far does full justice to the analogy of nature and natural inclination. St. Thomas, however, seems at times to have another conception of natural desire in mind that does not take into account the analogy of nature but views this inclination more in a univocal way. The following texts are typical of this other view.

It belongs to each and every potency of the soul to desire its proper good by natural appetite, *which does not follow apprehension*; but to desire good by animal appetite, which follows apprehension, belongs only to the appetitive power

. . . ⁸³

Each and every power of the soul is a certain form or nature and has a natural inclination toward something. Wherefore each one desires the object suited to it by natural appetite, *over and above which is animal appetite following apprehension*; and by this a thing is not desired because it is the object suited to the act of this or that faculty—as, for example, a sight merely for seeing or a

dictum est; potest etiam considerari secundum alias speciales considerationes, vel ex parte ipsius operationis, vel ex parte potentiae operativae, vel ex parte objecti; et sic non ex necessitate voluntas tendit in ipsam" (*ibid.*, I-II, 5. 8 ad 2).

⁸³ "Unicuique potentiae animae appetere competit proprium bonum appetitu naturali, qui non sequitur apprehensionem; sed appetere bonum appetitu animali, qui sequitur apprehensionem, pertinet solum ad vim appetitivam . . ." (*ibid.*, 30. 1 ad 3).

sound merely for hearing—but because it is suited to the whole animal.⁸⁴

In these texts, natural appetite is indeed the inclination that flows from the natural form; but in every power of the soul (including, by implication, the sensitive appetite and the will) this natural inclination does not follow apprehension. In one text St. Thomas speaks of the natural appetite of the will in terms of proportion or order to its end.

The will has a twofold relation to the object willed. One according as the object willed is somehow in the volitional agent through some kind of proportion, or ordination toward the object willed. *Wherefore even the things which are naturally proportioned to some end are said to desire it naturally.*⁸⁵

Here, however, prior cognition is not ruled out; and it may even be implied, since a *volitum* exists in one who wills (*volente*) through its representation in the intellect. Likewise, proportion and order do not necessarily exclude the inclination that St. Thomas regularly associates with natural desire. In the *Summa Theologica*, I-II, 9. 6, the will is said to have an *ordinem ad universale bonum*; yet in the same article this order to the universal good is referred to as a universal inclination (*inclinationem universalem*).

In the *Summa Theologica*, 26. 1, we are told that natural appetite does not follow apprehension in its subject, as the other two do. The principle of the movement of natural appetite is *amor naturalis*, which is the connaturality that the subject of the tendency has to its object. In this way we may speak of the natural love of a heavy body for the center of the earth. This natural love, which is practically the same as natural desire, exists in all the powers of the soul.

*Natural love is not only in the powers of the vegetative soul, but in all the potencies of the soul, and even in all the parts of the body, and universally in all things, . . . since each and every thing has a connaturality to that which is suited to itself according to its nature.*⁸⁶

⁸⁴ "Unaquaeque potentia animae est quaedam forma, seu natura, et habet naturalem inclinationem in aliquid. Unde unaquaeque appetit objectum sibi conveniens naturali appetitu, supra quem est appetitus animalis consequens apprehensionem; quo appetitur aliquid non ea ratione qua est conveniens ad actum hujus vel illius potentiae; utpote in visu ad videndum, et auditu ad audiendum; sed quia est conveniens simpliciter animali" (*ibid.*, I, 80. 1 ad 3).

⁸⁵ "Voluntas duplicem habitudinem habet ad volitum. Unam quidem secundum quod volitum est quodammodo in volente per quandam proportionem, vel ordinem ad volitum. Unde et res quae naturaliter sunt proportionatae ad aliquem finem dicuntur appetere illum naturaliter" (*ibid.*, I-II, 16. 4).

⁸⁶ "Amor naturalis non solum est in viribus animae vegetativae sed in omnibus potentiis animae, et etiam in omnibus partibus corporis, et universaliter in omni-

Yet in the *Summa*, 23. 4, the inclination, aptitude, or connaturality of the appetitive power is caused by the good that is its object.

In the movements of the appetitive part, however, the good has a sort of attractive power. . . . *The good, therefore, first causes in the appetitive potency a certain inclination, or aptitude, or connaturality to the good, and this pertains to the passion of love . . .*⁸⁷

A close examination of the use of the term *appetitus naturalis* by St. Thomas Aquinas shows us two different accounts of this inclination of nature running through his works. When he takes into account the analogy of natural desire, as he does when he discusses the natural tendency of the will and of the sensitive appetite, he includes the element of cognition in the natural tendencies of these appetitive powers of the soul—"the very nature of the will inclines it to the good of reason";⁸⁸ "the understood good is the object of the will, to which it is naturally ordered in the same way as any potency is to its object, provided this is its proper good."⁸⁹ In the article in which he asserts that the will naturally tends towards the *bonum in communi* as every other power is naturally inclined towards its object, he introduces his remarks with the statement that this natural tendency is preceded by natural cognition in the intellect.

But on the other hand there is the fact *that the movement of the will follows the act of the intellect*: but the intellect understands some things naturally; *therefore the will, too, wills some things naturally.*⁹⁰

The reference here is to the natural knowledge of first principles by the intellect, which, we have seen, precedes the natural tendency of the will towards its proper object or end. A similar precedence of knowledge in the natural appetite for God is asserted in this text:

Although God is the last end in actual achievement, and the first object in the striving of natural appetite, still it is

bus rebus . . . cum unaquaeque res habeat connaturalitatem ad id quod est sibi conveniens secundum suam naturam" (*ibid.*, 26. 1 ad 3).

⁸⁷ "In motibus autem appetitivae partis bonum habet quasi virtutem attractivam . . . Bonum ergo primo in potentia appetitiva causat quamdam inclinationem seu aptitudinem, seu connaturalitatem ad bonum, quod pertinet ad passionem amoris . . ." (*ibid.*, 23. 4).

⁸⁸ ". . . voluntas ex ipsa natura potentiae inclinatur in bonum rationis" (*ST*, I-II, 50. 5 ad 3).

⁸⁹ "Bonum intellectum est objectum voluntatis ad quod naturaliter ordinatur sicut et quaelibet potentia in suum objectum, dummodo hoc sit proprium bonum" (*De Virt. in Comm.*, a. 5 ad 2).

⁹⁰ "Sed contra est, quod motus voluntatis sequitur actum intellectus: sed intellectus aliqua intelligit naturaliter; ergo et voluntas aliqua vult naturaliter" (*ST*, I-II, 10. 1).

not necessary that he be first in the knowledge of the human mind, which is ordered to the end, but in the knowledge of the orderer; just as in the case of other things which tend toward their end by natural appetite. *Yet it is known from the beginning and is striven for in a kind of general way, insofar as the mind desires its wellbeing and good life, which it possesses only when it has God.*⁹¹

When, on the other hand, St. Thomas speaks of natural appetite in a general way, without express mention of the special manner in which it exists in the sensitive appetite and in the will, the univocal view prevails. This is especially the case when he contrasts natural appetite with the other two appetites that flow from an apprehended form, as we see in the following text: "Natural appetite, however, does not follow any apprehension, as animal and intellectual appetite do."⁹² Yet the instance St. Thomas cites in this article as an example of natural appetite is the natural tendency of the vegetative soul. To offset this univocal view of natural appetite, we have St. Thomas's formal acknowledgement of the analogy of natural appetite when he discusses its mode of existence in the sensitive appetite and in the will—" . . . this inclination, however, is found in different natures, in each according to its kind."⁹³ We may not ignore this analogous notion of natural appetite, especially when St. Thomas himself pays so much attention to it when he speaks of the natural inclination of the will.

St. Thomas was not always consistent or uniform in his use of terms or even in his doctrine. In the present matter we find two such irregularities: one in his teaching on *appetitus animalis* and the other in his teaching on *appetitus naturalis*. Sometimes he uses *appetitus animalis* widely enough to include the sensitive appetite and the will. More commonly, however, he restricts this term to the sensitive appetite, to the exclusion of the will.⁹⁴ The same variation can be observed in

⁹¹ "Quamvis Deus sit ultimus finis in consecutione, et primum in intentione appetitus naturalis, non tamen oportet quod sit primum in cognitione mentis humanae, quae ordinatur in finem; sed in cognitione ordinantis; sicut et in aliis quae naturali appetitu tendunt in finem suum. Cognoscitur tamen a principio et intenditur in quadam generalitate, prout mens appetit se bene esse et bene vivere, quod tunc solum est ei cum Deum habet" (*In Boet. de Trin.*, 1. 3 ad 4).

⁹² "Appetitus autem naturalis non consequitur aliquam apprehensionem, sicut sequitur appetitus animalis, et intellectualis" (*ST*, I-11, 17. 8).

⁹³ ". . . quae tamen inclinatio diversimode invenitur in diversis naturis, in unaquaque secundum modum ejus" (*ibid.*, I, 60. 1).

⁹⁴ *Appetitus animalis* is the appetite of an *animal* that follows apprehension. Since apprehension may be of two kinds, sensible or intellectual (rational), animal appetite is sometimes used in a generic sense to include both the sensitive and the rational appetite (the will). This is the case in the following texts: *In III Sent.*, d. 27, 1. 2 sol. and ad 3; *De Ver.*, 22, 3c and ad 5 (where "sed

appetitus naturalis. Most of the time when St. Thomas uses this term, he uses it in opposition to the sensitive appetite and to the will. In this sense, obviously, it designates the tendencies that flow from natural forms without prior cognition in their subjects. Natural appetite almost always means this noncognitive tendency that is found in stones, in plants, and in the vegetative powers of the soul. This univocal view, as we have seen, is sometimes extended to all the powers of the soul taken generally, although we never find St. Thomas expressly asserting the presence of a natural appetite in the will that does not follow intellectual apprehension in its subject. On the contrary, he admits and teaches the adaptation of natural appetite to the natures in which it is found, so that in an intellectual nature it will be according to the nature and functioning of the will, which is the rational appetite, and in a sensitive nature it will be according to the nature and functioning of the sensitive appetite.

It is apparently easy to solve the difficulty presented by these two views of natural appetite—one univocal that excludes prior cognition and the other analogical that includes it in the case of the will and of the sensitive appetite—by distinguishing with Cajetan and Sylvester of Ferrara between two natural appetites, one innate and the other elicited. We must remember, however, that St. Thomas himself has not this terminology. He has but one natural appetite which is always (making due allowance for the natural appetite of matter for form) the tendency that flows from the natural form. The elicited natural appetite of the commentators, however, is not the tendency that flows from the natural form but an act that is elicited by the will or the sensitive appetite in the wake of prior cognition. Besides, St. Thomas never speaks of two natural appetites of the will, one preceding and the other following intellectual cognition. This would imply three determinations in reference to the will: one by God, the author of the innate inclination; a second by an apprehended object; and a third by the will itself, determining itself as to the choice of means to reach its end. St. Thomas, however, knows only two determinations of the will: the first by God and its natural inclination towards *bonum sibi conveniens*, and

appetitus naturalis ad specialem potentiam pertinet" would read better either if *naturalis* were changed to *animalis*, or if a *non* were inserted before *pertinet*) ; *ST*, I, 80. 1 ad 3; *ibid.*, 78. 1 ad 3; *ibid.*, I-II, 30. 3 ad 1. In many other places, however, St. Thomas restricts *appetitus animalis* to the sensitive appetite alone. Here are some texts that illustrate this restricted use of the term: *ST*, I, 19. 1; *ibid.*, I-II, 8. 1; *ibid.*, 17, 8; *ibid.*, II-II, 29. 2 ad 1; *CG*, II, 47, *Has autem substantias*; *De Virt. in Comm.*, a. 6. In the latter set of texts the will is definitely excluded from the animal appetite, while in the former set the animal appetite includes the will.

the second by itself, freely and not through necessity, choosing means to its end.

Now nature and will are related in such a way that the will itself is a kind of nature, because everything that is found in reality is said to be a kind of nature. And therefore in the will must be found not only what belongs to will, but also what belongs to a nature. But it is proper to any nature whatever to be ordered to good by God, so that it naturally seeks the same. *Wherefore even in the will itself there is a certain natural appetite for the good that suits it: and besides this it has the power of desiring a thing according to its own determination, not of necessity; and this belongs to it insofar as it is will.*⁹⁵

We have already seen that the *bonum* to which the will is naturally ordained by God is *bonum intellectum*, in the same way that every power is ordained to its connatural object.

The main issue is this: Are there any natural forms that depend upon cognition, so that the natural appetite flowing from such forms will be towards an apprehended good? When St. Thomas recognizes the analogy of natural appetite he answers this question in the affirmative. The will is by definition the rational appetite; even as a natural power of the soul it is inclined towards the apprehended good as its proper object or end. This means a priority of the apprehended good over the natural movement of the will, as the final cause maintains a priority over all the movements that lead to it as their end. The only apprehended good that can finalize the will in this life is happiness in general; to this alone is the appetitive power of an intellectual nature tending by a necessity of its nature. When God is seen as he is in himself, it will no longer be happiness in general but the divine essence that will finalize the will and terminate the movement of its natural desire.

As opposed to the view of Cajetan and Sylvester of Ferrara, Father Enrico di S. Teresa is, we believe, correct in finding in St. Thomas only one natural appetite, which is always the tendency that flows from the natural form.⁹⁶ At the same time, this interpreter does not seem

⁹⁵ "Natura autem et voluntas hoc modo ordinata sunt, ut ipsa voluntas quaedam natura sit; quia omne quod in rebus invenitur natura quaedam dicitur. Et ideo in voluntate oportet invenire non solum id quod voluntatis est, sed etiam quod naturae est. Hoc autem est cujuslibet naturae creatae, ut a Deo sit ordinata in bonum, naturaliter appetens illud. Unde et voluntati ipsi inest naturalis quidam appetitus sibi convenientis boni; et praeter hoc habet appetere aliquid secundum propriam determinationem, non ex necessitate; quod ei competit in quantum voluntas est" (*De Ver.*, 22. 5).

⁹⁶ Cf. *De Ver.*, 25. 1: "... nihil enim est aliud appetitus naturalis quam quaedam inclinatio rei et ordo ad aliquam rem sibi convenientem, sicut lapidem ferri ad locum deorsum." That natural appetite is *inclinatio consequens formam*

to be equally correct in understanding this one natural appetite as always a noncognitive tendency, even when it is found in the sensitive appetite and in the will. In particular, his interpretation of the natural desire of the will for happiness in general as a necessary tendency that does not depend upon previous cognition⁹⁷ cannot be reconciled with the many texts in which St. Thomas, recognizing the analogy of natural appetite, asserts that apprehension is a factor in the natural appetite of the sensitive appetite and of the will.

*For natural appetite is in some beings as a result of apprehension, just as the wolf naturally desires the killing of the animals on which it feeds, and man naturally desires happiness; but it is in certain others without apprehension, in consequence of the mere inclination of natural principles, and this in some beings is called natural appetite, as, for example, a heavy body desires to be below.*⁹⁸

Both the commonly accepted view, which sees two natural appetites, innate and elicited, in the teaching of St. Thomas, and the view of Father Enrico which finds only one, the innate inclination that is always without prior cognition, take for granted that St. Thomas has a consistent, uniform teaching on natural desire. St. Thomas, however, is consistent in this: natural appetite is always the inclination that flows from the natural form; and in this respect it differs from the sensitive appetite and the will which are inclinations flowing from apprehended forms. This general difference prompts St. Thomas to speak usually of natural appetite as it is found in natures and powers below the level

naturalem is asserted, among many other texts, in these clear statements: *ST*, I, 78. 1 ad 3; 80. 1; 87. 4.

When discussing the desire of matter for form St. Thomas speaks of its natural appetite in terms of *ordinatio* alone: "Nihil est igitur aliud appetitus naturalis quam ordinatio aliquorum secundum propriam naturam in finem suum. Non solum autem aliquid ens in actu per virtutem activam ordinatur in suum finem, sed etiam materia secundum quod est in potentia; nam forma est finis materiae. Nihil igitur est aliud materiam appetere formam quam eam ordinari ad formam, ut potentia ad actum" (*In I Phys.*, 15). In this special case of matter seeking form, natural appetite may be nothing more than the ordination of potency to act, although even here, as a real relation, the element of inclination is not entirely absent (cf. *ST*, I, 28. 1: "... quando aliquae res secundum suam naturam ad invicem ordinatae sunt, et invicem inclinationem habent. Et hujusmodi relationes oportet esse reales"). In all other cases natural appetite is the inclination that flows from the natural form of a nature or power.

⁹⁷ *Ephemerides Carmeliticae*, p. 90.

⁹⁸ "Naturalis enim appetitus quibusdam quidem inest ex apprehensione, sicut lupus naturaliter desiderat occisionem animalium de quibus pascitur, et homo naturaliter desiderat felicitatem; quibusdam vero absque apprehensione ex sola inclinatione naturalium principiorum, quae naturalis appetitus in quibusdam dicitur, sicut grave appetit esse deorsum" (*CG*, II, 55).

of intellectual or sense cognition. Yet he admits that natural appetite exists in all the powers of the soul. At this point the divergence in St. Thomas's teaching begins.

When he is speaking generally, without special reference to the sensitive appetite and the will, the univocal view of natural appetite seems to dominate, at least in some instances; and he states that natural appetite, which does not follow apprehension, is found in every power of the soul. When, on the other hand, he has definitely in mind the two appetites of the soul that depend upon prior cognition, the sensitive appetite and the will, he recognizes the analogous character of natural appetite and affirms its dependence upon apprehension in these two cases. This is the reason why, for St. Thomas Aquinas, the natural desire for happiness is not a blind tendency of the will towards happiness in general, but a tendency that follows a notion of happiness in the intellect. The will may be regarded as a blind faculty by those who look upon it as a power parallel to the intellect. St. Thomas, however, roots will in intellect and makes it depend by nature upon intelligence, so that it goes off on a tangent to the intellect instead of being parallel to it. In this view the notion of the will as a blind power of the soul is meaningless.

THE MIND OF KIERKEGAARD

II. THE SPHERES OF EXISTENCE AND THE ROMANTIC OUTLOOK

JAMES COLLINS

The first phase of Kierkegaard's serious authorship comprises a group of books which appeared in rapid succession during the years 1843 to 1845 and to which he gave the common designation of "aesthetic works."¹ That they were composed so closely together and with such intensity is due mainly to the part which some of them played in the events following on his broken engagement with Regina Olsen. There was equal pressure exerted upon him, however, by his desire to speak his mind to his contemporaries concerning some disputed issues. He had in distant view his disturbing thoughts about the meaning of Christian faith and living, along with the need of establishing a contrast between Christianity and Hegelian philosophy. More immediately, he felt called upon to deal with romanticism as a widespread popular mood and ruling literary fashion. The philosophical aspects of his treatment of romanticism reveal important traits of his own personality and standpoint.

By the eighteen-forties, over a generation had passed since Novalis and Tieck and the Schlegels had inspired men to think and feel in terms of individual freedom and subjectivity, the unconstrained movement of genius toward the infinite, and the ironical play of life's contrasts.² Theologians like Schleiermacher and philosophers like Schell-

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¹ Kierkegaard's main aesthetic writings are these: *Either/Or. A Fragment of Life*, Vol. I trans. D. F. and L. M. Swenson; Vol. II trans. W. Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1944); *Repetition*, trans. W. Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1941); *Fear and Trembling*, trans. W. Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1941); *Concept of Dread*, trans. W. Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1944); *Stages on Life's Way*, trans. W. Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1940).

² For the philosophical aspects of German romanticism consult R. Haym, *Die romantische Schule* (4th ed.; Berlin, 1920); O. Walzel, *Deutsche Romantik* (5th ed.; Leipzig: Teubner, 1923); H. Knittemeyer, *Schelling und die romantische Schule* (Munich: E. Reinhardt, 1929); *Les Cahiers du Sud*, special no., "Le Romantisme allemande" (1937). Haym has been criticized rather severely by

ing had been attracted by this movement as a protest against the shallowness of a dying Enlightenment. The original message had been reaffirmed with more restraint in Germany by Brentano and Von Arnim, and had spread rapidly to other countries, especially to Denmark. During his university years, Kierkegaard had moved in literary circles dominated by romanticism and had read most of the representative German works. His *Journals* are crowded with excerpts, critical comments, and imitations in the manner of the great romantics. His works written previous to 1843 (works which he did not consider to be part of his formal authorship, but only by-products of his *vita ante acta*) betray the closest acquaintance with the whole literature and also a degree of sympathy with the romantic conception of life which is never equaled in his later publications.

During his youthful period of disaffection from both his father and the Christian religion (from 1835 to 1838), Kierkegaard took refuge in an aesthetic attitude which seemed to provide a safe middle ground between Christianity and Hegelianism.³ In his typically thoroughgoing and practical way, he made the experiment of conducting his entire life according to the pattern recommended by the romantics. The attempt led him to the brink of moral dissolution, despair, and suicide. Thereafter he believed himself to have empirical grounds for declaring that the romantic genius was a will-o'-the-wisp of the imagination which could not pass the simplest tests of ordinary living. This ideal may be the crowning creation of the aesthetic power, but if translated into terms of actual existence it spells ruin for a mortal man. At the same time, Kierkegaard recognized in all men in some degree, and in himself first of all, a poetic element which must somehow be approached sympathetically and perhaps made to serve an end which is higher than that assigned to man by the romantics. This is in large measure the consideration which prompted him to make a thorough analysis of the aesthetic life, and to make it in such a way that those who had already given their allegiance to it might listen to him and perhaps recognize its shortcomings.

There are two questions which immediately confront the reader of the aesthetic works: What is one to make of the use of pseudonyms? and What is the general import of the doctrine of the three stages of life? These questions will be considered in the first two sections of the present study. In addition, something must be said more especially

later investigators, including A. Lovejoy in *Essays in the History of Ideas* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1948), essay 10.

³ For biographical information about this period as well as about the succeeding decade of literary activity, cf. W. Lowrie, *Kierkegaard* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1938), parts 2-3.

about the first of these stages on life's way, the aesthetic mode of existence. Kierkegaard's treatment of aesthetic existence contains his most sustained critique of romanticism.

1. THE USE OF PSEUDONYMS

Various problems arise in the interpretation of philosophical texts. The more common ones concern the authentic reading of a manuscript and the exact sense of texts which are sufficiently established but require to be read in their context. Occasionally, however, there are other levels of meaning which must be determined. Some of the Platonic dialogues and Hume's *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* present us with the difficulty of deciding which of the interlocutors comes closest to expressing the author's own position. In the case of the last-named work it is likely that Hume allowed much more weight in public print to the arguments of orthodoxy than he admitted in private meditation and correspondence. Moses Maimonides's *Guide for the Perplexed* is a good example of a work which has an obvious and coherent meaning, and yet which has another esoteric message which is apparent only to those who are properly prepared beforehand by the use of other sources. Nietzsche comes closest in recent times to the situation presented by Kierkegaard. Nietzsche often boasted of being a philosopher with many masks, just as Kierkegaard refers to himself as a *Janus bifrons*.⁴ One can never be sure, at the moment, whether the German philosopher is merely giving a special viewpoint free rein to advocate its case as strongly as possible or whether he is speaking his own integral mind on a subject. In this trait of cultivated ambiguity he proves himself to be a true descendant of the romantics.

An analogous situation confronts us in the case of Kierkegaard's aesthetic works. Kierkegaard never steps forward *in propria persona* to claim any of the opinions as his own. They are not presented anonymously, since his authorship was common knowledge (and was filed with the government censor) long before his formal acknowledgment in the *Postscript*; but he attributes the books to pseudonymous "authors" and "editors," and peoples the aesthetic pages with a whole company of personages who give *their* opinions on a variety of topics. Furthermore, in his *Journals* he quotes and refers to these pseudonyms quite objectively and warns readers against attributing to himself any statement found in the aesthetic writings. What accounts for this tortuous device and in what predicament does it leave the careful student?

⁴ *The Journals of Søren Kierkegaard* (a selection ed. and trans. A. Dru [New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1938]), No. 140; H. A. Reyburn and others, *Nietzsche, the Story of a Human Philosopher* (New York: Macmillan, 1948), chap. 23, "The Man of the Masks."

Kierkegaardian scholars have outdone themselves in the cleverness of their explanations and justifications of this procedure, but none has surpassed Kierkegaard himself in this respect. Entry after entry in the *Journals* is consecrated to this problem, which continued to bother him almost as much as his behavior in regard to his one-time fiancée. In addition, he deals with it formally in two of his later books, the *Postscript* and *The Point of View*.⁵ It would seem that at first he had resort to pseudonyms out of a natural inclination and that only later on did reflection reveal to him the deeper significance and purpose of this practice. Sorting through the many references to his employment of pseudonyms, Kierkegaard's reasons can be discussed under three main headings: personal motives, the ends of truth, and religious considerations. It was only gradually and, as he was convinced, under the guidance of Providence that he himself was able to distinguish between these different phases of the problem and its solution.

PERSONAL MOTIVES

Kierkegaard confesses that from his earliest years he took childlike delight in mystifying people, in setting them wondering and puzzling about remarks he might let drop. Where he could express himself in less straightforward fashion, without doing injury to the truth or to a serious duty to others, he was prompted to take the path of indirection. He liked to construct intellectual Chinese puzzles, having one compartment cleverly concealed within another.⁶ In this penchant for raising dust for its own sake, he detected a feeling of inferiority and a need to compensate for it by convincing himself of his ability to bemuse less agile minds. Although he brought this motive out into the open and sought to control it, Kierkegaard never succeeded completely in outgrowing or disciplining this secretive and obfuscating tendency. Many passages in the aesthetic works and even in his religious discourses and tracts overwhelm one with their straining after sheer virtuosity in the statement of difficulties and nuances. At times this love of mystification defeats the primary aim of communicating truth, because it destroys the reader's confidence and produces an obscurity not dispelled by other means.

⁵ *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, trans. D. F. Swenson (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1941), pp. 225 ff. and 551 ff.; *The Point of View for My Work as an Author*, trans. W. Lowrie (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1939), *passim*. The most judicious discussion by later scholars will be found in E. Hirsch, *Kierkegaard-Studien* (2 vols.; Gütersloh, 1933), 134 f.; W. Ruttenbeck, *Sören Kierkegaard, der christliche Denker u. sein Werk* (Berlin, 1929), chap. 3.

⁶ Cf. the "editorial" comment in *Either/Or*, I, 7-8, on this as a typically aesthetic trait. Curiously enough, one of Kierkegaard's pseudonyms adopts the same motto used by Descartes: *Bene vixit qui bene latuit* (*Stages*, p. 34).

On a far different footing is another reason advanced by Kierkegaard for using pseudonyms in three of his aesthetic writings: *Either/Or*, *Repetition*, and *Fear and Trembling*. These books were his means of communicating with Regina Olsen after their separation, while Kierkegaard still hoped to become reconciled with her. He clothed his intimate utterances in the guise of poetic experiments, myths, lyric outpourings, biblical exegesis, literary criticism, and memoirs. In this way he hoped to speak to her significantly, without betraying her confidence to the casual reader. He succeeded well in concealing the most immediate personal significance of these publications by the use of such literary devices. To the extent that these biographical overtones are essential to an understanding of his mind, however, Kierkegaard was under obligation to supply a key for readers of later times. This he has done in his *Journals*, and these passages are fortunately explained in the introductions and notes to the English editions of these three books. After Regina's commitment to another man, this consideration ceased to move Kierkegaard. But other reasons for retaining the pseudonymous medium assumed increasing importance for him, although they had never been wholly absent even in the earliest aesthetic volumes.

TOWARD THE DISCOVERY AND COMMUNICATION OF TRUTH

Due weight has not always been accorded to Kierkegaard's repeated assertion that the aesthetic works constituted his own fundamental education and progress toward truth. In writing them he seems at times to have had his own development more in mind than the profit which his readers might be expected to draw from them. Sometimes the cloudiness of thought and crabbedness of expression are due more to his own hesitant searching for fact than to any merely literary requirement. Although he insisted that his own final standpoint was always higher than that represented in the aesthetic books, still they faithfully mirror his own previous attempts to wrestle with the problems under discussion. While it would be foolish to identify all of the opinions as his own or to accuse him of living in the manner described and praised by some of his pseudonyms, yet it is important to bear in mind that he was intellectually and imaginatively concerned about all the viewpoints which found pseudonymous champions in his books.

Natural endowment, parental upbringing, and cultural formation seem to have conspired to fill his mind with ideal conceptions of various and conflicting ways of life. His own vivid imagination was sharpened under his father's encouraging eye to the point where he could develop the slightest hint of an attitude into a full-bodied possibility for an outlook on life. Contact with Novalis's conception of truth as a clash of

such alternatives from which a broader synthesis might be drawn gave a philosophical ground for working out standpoints to their extreme and antagonistic consequences. The pseudonymous authors and personages are individualized spokesmen for these different solutions to life's problems. His poetic temperament led Kierkegaard to express these views in a concrete, psychological way rather than in the form of an abstract set of theses. This gave him a free hand both in displaying his own sympathy with various types of men and in developing their leading convictions with the utmost consistency and thoroughness. As he phrased it in his *Journals*, this medium of the incognito was his very element in which he could move about with plenty of elbowroom and a minimum of embarrassment.

This observation should caution us against taking literally as Kierkegaard's every dictum found in the aesthetic books. Yet they would be only idle exercises of imagination were they in no way connected with his own convictions. Sometimes he evades responsibility too easily on the ground that the views are proper to the pseudonym and his own peculiar character. Some of the published pages contain excerpts transcribed with scarcely a verbal change from intimate, confessional pages of the *Journals*. Kierkegaard does admit his responsibility at least for making these various viewpoints audible: he was not only the secretary but also the author of the pseudonymous "authors."⁷ As their author, who yet maintained a certain poetic distance from his creations, he has the right to ask us not to identify any of their statements with his own definitive position. But readers have in turn the right to ask him to provide them with some canon for determining his own stand, presuming his purpose to be a serious one. To what extent can any one of the pseudonyms be said to approach in any degree the view of Kierkegaard himself? At the time of the composition of the aesthetic works, he did not consider himself under any obligation to supply an answer to this question. He pointed out that all these works were written under the sign of "either/or," implying that the decision about the truth is a personal matter left for each individual reader.

This unsatisfactory reply is based on the theory of the indirect communication of truth which he held at that time. In calling upon the pseudonyms, he was seeking to revive the Socratic sense of dialectic by means of a popular romantic device. Out of a free clash of sciences—a head-on collision between opposing ways of life—he hoped to induce people to find for themselves some leading principles and clues to the *philosophia secunda* he was then seeking. His refusal to enter the

⁷ *Postscript*, p. 552.

arena with an unmistakable announcement of the truth was not due to any diabolical delight in leaving the issue in suspense. Rather, it was an indirect protest against the Hegelian pretensions to serve up all truth in an objective, cut-and-dried way. He contended rightly that truth is no finished product which can be handed over the counter of philosophy quite impersonally and effortlessly. If no conclusions are provided in a book which seriously engages attention, then the reader is forced to argue the issues through to a conclusion of his own finding. Because the pseudonyms can argue their case in a dramatic, engaging way, they lure the reader on until he is forced to judge for himself between them and perhaps even beyond the alternatives they present. Hence Kierkegaard looked upon these books as so many essays in Socratic deceit.⁸ Their purpose is to make us discover, first, that truth is a matter of personal insight and assimilation, and then that the full content of truth escapes the range of aesthetic minds.

Especially for people who have been trained in a school tradition of philosophy which lays much stress upon straightforward and comprehensive statement of positions in manual form, it is advantageous to read some of these aesthetic books. They serve to remind us that the habit of wisdom is a hard-won perfection and in no way identical with the ability to state and defend a scholastic thesis, whether of Hegelian or Thomist origin.⁹ On the other hand, no generalization of the method of pseudonymous communication ought to be made. Kierkegaard himself came to realize in later years that it is a human and even a religious duty to witness to the truth in as direct and unequivocal a way as possible. This can be done without denial of the need for personal effort in gaining an insight. Indeed, a motive for such an effort is more strongly provided by a simple but profound paragraph in Aristotle or Spinoza than by a good deal of convoluted reasoning on the part of Kierkegaard's pseudonyms. The demand required of each individual in the face of a direct metaphysical proposition or a moral principle and its applications is lessened in certain cases when the truth is clothed in imaginative form or when attention is directed overtly to the need for making a personal response. Kierkegaard's pseudonymous method is more a therapeutic means than a standard procedure to be followed by the philosopher. It is adapted to his own historical situation and to the corrective moral aims in which he was primarily interested.

⁸ *The Point of View*, pp. 38 ff. John Keats once observed to his friend, Reynolds, that "we have read fine things but never feel them until we have gone the same steps as the author."

⁹ The need for personal discipline and appropriation of philosophical wisdom is the burden of E. Gilson's *History of Philosophy and Philosophical Education* (Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1948).

THE RELIGIOUS PURPOSE

In the light of his profound religious experience of 1848, Kierkegaard reinterpreted his aesthetic writings in retrospect. The results of his reflection are set down in his most intimate book, *The Point of View*, which stresses the religious interest behind the entire aesthetic enterprise. In proportion as he gained a fuller appreciation of the religious character of his vocation as a writer he also came to see that even the pseudonymous books bore a relation to the problem of becoming a Christian. Yet this relation was not evident to the first eager readers of "The Seducer's Diary." They could not understand why a professedly religious writer should introduce himself by a kind of duplicity—the use of the pseudonyms—or why he should use the aesthetic genre to attain a religious goal. Kierkegaard's explanations on this point are so many elaborations upon a remark which he once passed on Novalis's use of poetic means: most men can relate themselves to the good and the true only through the imagination.¹⁰ Their view of the world is mediated *de facto* by the imagination or aesthetic power, and their natural aspirations toward God are fashioned along imaginative lines. Kierkegaard regarded the romantic soul as the type of the naturally religious mind, which is attracted to God through concrete symbols, myths, and other poetic representations. Hence anyone who wishes to discuss the religious problem with such a mind must make the first contact on the level of imagination through the portrayal of dramatic personalities which embody different positions.

Kierkegaard went on to maintain that the Christians of our day have only an aesthetic grasp upon the meaning of Christianity.¹¹ They accept it along with the other factors in their folkways, but it never becomes for them anything more than a customary way of acting and meeting crucial events like birth and marriage and death. All the thoughts that really count, the important free decisions, the attitudes which shape and build a man through his deliberate consent and self-formation are taken from outside the Christian, and even the religious, sphere. This meant for Kierkegaard that Christian religiousness has been transformed into a kind of automatic dreaming and that people's lives are being shaped by aesthetic rather than religious categories. But so omnipresent and resilient is the illusion concerning Christendom that it cannot be dispelled or even marked as such by a frontal attack or a blunt denunciation. Hence Kierkegaard thought that indirect tactics were called for even on religious grounds.

¹⁰ G. Niedermeyer makes this remark the point of departure for his excellent comparative study, *Sören Kierkegaard u. die Romantik* (Leipzig, 1909).

¹¹ *The Point of View*, pp. 25 ff.

Kierkegaard's attitude towards the Christian Establishment and his direct assault upon "Christendom" will be treated in the final essay in the present series. At this point, however, it is necessary to observe how he integrated his aesthetic writings with the wider religious program of renewing a lively sense of the following of Christ. People being what they are, it is best to assume the aesthetic standpoint and develop its assumptions and consequences as cleverly and entertainingly as possible through the pseudonymous characters and their worlds. Having won a hearing, the full import of living according to the rule of imagination can then be pressed home with an honesty and force seldom allowed in direct discussions. Then the contrast between this outlook and an ethico-religious one can perhaps be grasped by the readers themselves. Once their interest and reflection are aroused, they can decide for themselves at least that they are not patterning their conduct according to genuinely religious standards. Kierkegaard did not expect more from a reading of the aesthetic books than this negative sort of self-knowledge and a consequent clarification of the choice which men face.

Christianity is secretly weakened from within when allegiance to it is founded only on ingrained habit, without a mature appraisal of the alternatives. In our day there is a vast existential compass of life based upon other principles. Kierkegaard provides in his aesthetic works a *mapa mundi* for those who wish to know where they stand and what issues really confront them. This is his final justification for his descent into Avernus, a reason which has in view the hypercritical attitudes which are inculcated into modern men with regard to questions of lesser moment than the individual's salvation. But it must be remembered that this religious motive behind the use of the pseudonyms was neither dominant nor incisive when the aesthetic project was started.

2. THE SPHERES OF EXISTENCE

That there are three stages on life's way—the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious—is Kierkegaard's most influential doctrine, the one contribution with which he is usually credited by general histories of philosophy. It is clearly enunciated in his last purely aesthetic work, the *Stages*, is analyzed and refined still further in the *Postscript*, and serves as a handy trichotomy during the heat of battle which filled his last years. It is his way of stating the basic choices which confront the concrete individual is his search for mature self-possession. They are the existential determinants of human character, the general modes of living which serve as rival patterns and principles. Around this three-fold division Kierkegaard organizes the entire argument which runs

through the aesthetic works.¹² His later philosophical and religious studies suppose that this original analysis of central human motives is a sound one which can be applied even outside the aesthetic context.

Despite his readings in Schleiermacher about life's choices and his careful study of the Hegelian dialectic of the various types of minds, Kierkegaard did not take his triple division ready-made from such sources. It seems rather to have been forced upon him by reflection upon his own experience. Such an origin makes us wary of generalizing the doctrine of the three spheres beyond certain special historical circumstances, but at least it tempers the charge of artificiality and triadic mesmerism which is sometimes brought against it. An examination of Kierkegaard's early papers and journals reveals that for a long time he groped about in quest of the leading principles under which he could organize his literary studies, his extensive observation of human characters, and the lessons of his own life. At first he applied the terms "stage" and "sphere" to any field of human activity, such as political or military interests. Gradually, however, he came to reserve these terms in their pregnant and technical sense for the most fundamental commitments and organizing ideals available to men. In the first of the books which belong to his formal authorship—*Either/Or*—he states the alternative as one between the aesthetic and the ethical orders. Significantly enough, no decision is reached in this book, which suggests that the situation may require the introduction of still another possibility, a religious one, as indicated by the sermon with which the book concludes. Regarded schematically, the next two books in the aesthetic series subject both the *either* and the *or* to a fresh analysis: *Repetition* criticizes the aesthetic life anew, whereas *Fear and Trembling* submits the ethical claims to severe scrutiny and delimitation. In these two books, religious interests are present but not organized into a distinctive outlook. But the pseudonymous "author" of *Fear and Trembling* insists that his ethical standpoint is not sufficient to comprehend the realities of religious faith. Thus the way is paved for separate treatment of the religious sphere in the *Stages* and the *Postscript*, as well as in the religious works proper. There is a gradual development of this theory of the three spheres of existence, rather than an a priori deduction.

¹² Concerning the three stages, cf. W. Ruttenbeck, *op. cit.*, chap. 5; D. F. Swenson, *Something About Kierkegaard* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Pub. House, 1941), chap. 5; T. Bohlin, *Sören Kierkegaard, l'homme et l'oeuvre*, French trans. P. H. Tisseau (Bazoges-en-Pareds, 1941), chap. 6; H. Broudy, "Kierkegaard's Levels of Existence," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, I (1941), 294-312. Kierkegaard probably profited by a study of Schleiermacher's threefold division of human attitudes (*Über die Religion* [Stuttgart: Stredker, 1923]) and from Hegel's *Typenlehre* (*Phänomenologie des Geistes*); later on, he may have become acquainted with the classification suggested by Trendelenburg.

There are still other indications that this schema is regarded by Kierkegaard more as a supple tool for the interpretation of experience than as a rigid and absolute formula. He was always convinced that the distance between spheres of existence is bridged, not by any gradual merging or by a necessary transformation of one into another, but only by a "leap" or free decision on the part of the individual. He recognized certain states of soul, nevertheless, which indicate that a person has plumbed one of the inferior stages to its depths and reached the extreme limit of that mode of life—what Karl Jaspers calls a limit-situation. A cynical and despairing irony seemed to him to mark the man who has lived an aesthetic life through to its bitter consequences and is consequently placed at the borderline where a leap into the ethical sphere is possible. Similarly, he took humor at first to be the proper attitude of the Christian in regard to the things of time, a kind of protective covering or incognito in dealing with worldly fortunes and with individuals who do not see the world through the eyes of faith. But by 1845 he felt that humor is not so much a religious as an ethical passion—indeed, that it signifies that one has reached the borderline of ethical life and is faced with the choice of becoming religious in a plenary way or of thwarting the natural inclination of ethical existence to surmount itself.¹³ During this same year, which marked the composition of the *Postscript*, the distinctive nature of Christianity was so strongly impressed upon him that he ceased to speak of the religious sphere in an unqualified way and thereafter distinguished between all natural modes of the religious and the unique Christian religious spirit. This distinction between "religiousness A" and "religiousness B" is equivalent to designating four stages in the dialectic of life. The immanent modes of religious existence do not exhaust or naturally blend with the transcendent kind of religiousness, which comes only with the gift of Christian faith.

Attention has been called¹⁴ to a misconception to which the term "stage" can give rise. It may be thought that an individual is required to begin with the aesthetic rung of the ladder of life and advance in temporal sequence up to the ethical level and then the religious. But Kierkegaard did not intend this schema to be understood according to any temporal order, nor did he mean that one way of life is left com-

¹³ Compare *Journals*, No. 121, with *Postscript*, pp. 242 ff. and 289 ff. P. Mesnard (*Le Vrai visage de Kierkegaard* [Paris, 1948], pp. 462-63) believes that, to the end of his life, Kierkegaard's personal relation to Christianity remained a "humorous" or constantly striving one of praise and pointing toward an ideal which is not yet realized.

¹⁴ By W. Lowrie, in the notes to his English translation of *Stages*, p. 335, nn. 1-2.

pletely behind, as one would leave behind the lower steps of a ladder. In this respect the term "sphere of existence" is less misleading, since spheres may well be treated as simultaneously present and as overlapping. Once this erroneous interpretation is pointed out, however, the appropriateness of the term "stage" must also be recognized. Since Kierkegaard holds that everyone in Christendom is in some degree infected by the aesthetic outlook, the process of self-criticism and self-edification must begin with a reflection upon this ubiquitous attitude. Furthermore, the different stages are distinguished from each other and solicit our allegiance as rival viewpoints precisely so far as each makes an *absolute* claim upon our life. We may indeed *consider* these conflicting modes of existence together, but it is impossible to *live* them together. In the order of choice and existence there is no straddling and no compromise between these mutually exclusive outlooks. From this standpoint, one does leave the other stages behind in consenting to some particular mode of existence, although there is no special order which must be preserved in making the transition or in consolidating one's original position.

But there is a further problem for which Kierkegaard provided no satisfactory answer either in the aesthetic works themselves or in his later remarks about the spheres of existence. Granted that there is a mounting hierarchy of existential fullness passing from the aesthetic through the ethical to the religious life, what remains of the lower stage after a man has chosen a higher or the highest? Kierkegaard admits a difference between a particular stage as advancing a claim to autonomy and as it exists after this element of absoluteness has been removed by a definitive choice in favor of some other sphere. The "dethroned" sphere of existence does not simply disappear, for there are aesthetic and ethical needs and powers in every man which cannot be eradicated. But Kierkegaard is unwilling to make the flat statement that all lower values, once they are recognized to be genuine and yet inferior, can be incorporated on the higher level and made to serve the higher ends. He is not reluctant to admit that an ethical sort of existence can appropriate aesthetic values or that the entire content of the ethical sphere can be taken over by the religiously orientated man. His real difficulty centers about the relation between aesthetic and religious, especially Christian, existence.

His own experience rather than any theoretical requirements convinced Kierkegaard that man's real predicament is to be placed between a thoroughly aesthetic way of living and a thoroughly religious one. No permanent footing can be maintained on a purely ethical basis, and in this respect Kierkegaard stands opposed to all efforts to make morality

self-sufficient. Ethical principles are intrinsically ordained to the religious outlook, and a secular morality is either unaware of its religious significance or only an aesthetic discourse about being moral. The genuine alternatives are still the world and the cloister, the aesthetic and the religious kinds of existing. Recollecting his own bout of playing the romantic genius and also the tremendous upheaval involved in his return to faith, Kierkegaard was inclined to state the contrast as being one between "perdition and salvation"—between which there can be no compromise or reconciliation.¹⁵ On the other hand, he was convinced at times that aesthetic values are redeemable, once the claim to absoluteness has been rejected. The question was not merely an academic one for him, since on the aesthetic side he counted his own literary and psychological powers. These he certainly employed to good use in his religious discourses, and yet he was always troubled about whether his vocation as a writer was a religious vocation or not. Because he hesitated on this point, Kierkegaard also maintained an ambivalent attitude toward the possibility of a Christian humanism. Especially during the period of composition of the aesthetic works, human values suffered the same fate in his eyes as did aesthetic values. They are both reconcilable with the immanent form of the religious, but so great is the gap between the latter and Christian religiousness that Kierkegaard (or at least his "philosophical" pseudonym, Johannes Climacus) sometimes denied that anything from the aesthetic and human order survives the leap of faith. He lacked full confidence in the power of the supernatural order to transform natural abilities and perfections without compromising its own transcendent character.¹⁶

Apart from personal reasons, Kierkegaard was probably led to stress the antithesis between the aesthetic and the religious modes of existence because of a desire to differentiate his teaching on the spheres of existence from Hegel's triadic theory of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Kierkegaard profited a good deal from a study of Hegel's logic, but he concluded that Hegel's identification of the structure of thought with that of being was contradicted by human experience. Hence he sought

¹⁵ *Journals*, No. 367 (p. 95); *The Point of View*, p. 18.

¹⁶ The entire second part of Hirsch, *op. cit.*, is devoted to the knotty problem of the poetic ingredient in Kierkegaard's nature and vocation; cf. also M. Thust, *Kierkegaard, der Dichter des Religiösen* (Munich, 1931). Hirsch and Thust assign a more modest role to the aesthetic factor than does T. Wiesen-Grund-Adorno (*Kierkegaard, Konstruktion des Ästhetischen* [Tübingen, 1933]), who tries to dissolve his religious position into a form of poetic creativity. It was against this tendency in the romantics that Kierkegaard formulated his later teaching on the existential and historical character of religious belief. Even Hirsch, however, does not reckon sufficiently with Kierkegaard's later efforts to broaden his conception of the human beyond its aesthetic expression.

to ally the dialectical principle with the movement of concrete human choices rather than with the supposed unfolding of the absolute *Begriff*. The individual in his personal character and freedom rather than the individual as the locus of universal and necessary laws is the responsible agent in the Kierkegaardian dialectic of the modes of existing. The culmination of the one dialectic is the complete self-consciousness of objective contemplation of the absolute Notion, whereas the culmination of the other dialectic is the relating of the finite individual to the transcendent but loving God.

This contrast in the basic orientation of the two dialectics, the absolutist and the existential, leads to other differences on more particular points. The most important contrast is expressed by Kierkegaard in a twofold negation.¹⁷ The three stages of life are *not* to be distinguished in an abstract way so that the third will be the synthesis of the first two; the triple division does *not* remove the necessity of facing an ultimate "either/or." The meaning of the latter negation has already been explained when it was pointed out that the ethical stage never achieves complete independence and that, consequently, the individual is never relieved from making a final choice between the aesthetic and the religious mode of existence. This implies that the highest or religious sphere cannot be regarded as the mediating synthesis between the first two, the result of an *Aufhebung* of thesis and antithesis. For one thing, the Hegelian explanation of thesis and antithesis as being opposed because of their limited, and hence abstract, nature does not obtain here. Each sphere embodies in concrete form a total way of life. Furthermore, the passage or leap from one to the other and from their opposition to the highest sphere is not due to any internal necessity and sudden transformation generated by what Hegel liked to call "the power of negativity." Negativity of this sort can lead our minds from one extreme proposition to the other and to a possible resolving judgment, but this is not the same as the real commitment of an individual existent. The latter must be made in finite, personal freedom and not in the quasi-freedom of a total system. And it involves a deliberate rejection of other ways of determining one's existence rather than their higher reconciliation.

It is evident from his preoccupation with Hegel that Kierkegaard could not find in his doctrine on the spheres of existence an adequate solution to the problem of a Christian humanism and the place of aesthetic factors in Christian life. His dialectic seemed to be clearly distinguishable from Hegel's only if no traffic were allowed between

¹⁷ *Postscript*, p. 261.

the ultimate *either* and *or*. Yet when the aesthetic life is no longer admitted to be absolute, there remains the task for Christians of renewing the face of the entire earth.

Finally, a comparison is required between Kierkegaard and Marx, even though these strict contemporaries had no direct historical relation. Although both subjected the Hegelian dialectic to sharp criticism,¹⁸ they moved far apart in their methods and results. For the father of modern Communism it was mainly a question of righting the position of the dialectic: Hegel's thought had to be inverted and placed back on its feet in order to secure the right order required by a materialistic outlook. This corrective would seem to Kierkegaard to be only a superficial tinkering with a system which is radically vitiated by its confusion of thinking with existing. Kierkegaard did not suggest any further manipulations in regard to the proper order between spirit and matter, original and derived activity. His proposed reform had nothing to do with the problem of putting the head and the feet where they belong, for the simple reason that a dialectical process has neither head nor feet, top nor bottom. It has no self-sufficiency or actual inevitability, no matter how it is viewed or for what ends it is employed. Instead of reshuffling the Hegelian dialectic from within, Kierkegaard quietly called attention to the fact that every sort of dialectic is a tool of the individual man and achieves results only in his hands and through his free decisions. Any really drastic criticism must begin with the nexus between the dialectic and the free individual.

3. "THE ACOUSTICS OF THE ROMANTIC SOUL"

A discussion of Kierkegaard's estimate of the aesthetic mode of existence is complicated by the fact that his treatment is itself placed within an aesthetic and pseudonymous framework. Except for some retrospective notes in the *Postscript* and the criticism passed on aesthetic life by the pseudonymous protagonist of ethical values, Judge William, most of his views on aestheticism are presented through the agency of characters in the aesthetic writings who themselves represent this way of life. He thought that the most effective way of presenting this attitude was to provide a sampling of typically romantic effusions. But among all the moods cultivated by the romantics, three seemed to Kierkegaard to voice the major chords of the aesthetic sensibility: sensual immediacy, doubt, and despair. These he associated with three figures who had fascinated the imagination both of the common people and of great

¹⁸ Cf. A. Cornu, *Karl Marx, l'homme et l'oeuvre* (Paris, 1934), for Marx's early attempts to overcome Hegel on philosophical grounds.

artists: Don Juan, Faust, and Ahasuerus, the Wandering Jew. From his student days, Kierkegaard had been closely attracted to these figures and at one time had proposed to write a "natural history" of the Middle Ages around them. They represent the various possibilities of life outside the religious sphere, and it is significant that they all belong to the aesthetic order. Because they both had a folk origin and served as inspirations for major works of art in various mediums, they corroborated his thesis that the aesthetic approach makes a universal appeal to men of different interests and talents. By grouping his reflections upon aesthetic existence around these personages, we can retain something of the concrete richness of Kierkegaard's investigations without losing sight of the dialectical ends which he always kept in mind.¹⁹

DON JUAN: SENSUAL IMMEDIACY

Following in the romantic tradition, Kierkegaard saw in Mozart's *Don Giovanni* the supreme artistic expression of the aesthetic ideal in all its strength and weakness. The pages which he devotes to the music and libretto of this opera are among the finest passages in musical criticism. What Nietzsche was to do for Wagner in the sunny days of their friendship was done by Kierkegaard for Mozart with sustained brilliance and in a generous spirit of gratitude which he never repudiated. He regarded Mozart's music as the best example of that intimate co-operation of refined sensibility and concrete intelligence which the aesthetic life in its sounder aspect tends to promote.²⁰ His comments are a happy combination of detailed objective analysis and broad interpretation; they neither use the occasion as a mere sounding board for his own pet theories nor bog down in the trivialities of program annotation. This section of Kierkegaard's work is a model for sane, philosophical treatment in the field of art.

¹⁹ F. de W. Bolman, Jr., ("Kierkegaard in Limbo" [review of *Either/Or*], *Journal of Philosophy*, XLI [1944], 711-21) suggests that the aesthetic works should be studied for their contributions to empirical realism and their detached insights into art and personality problems. This is a welcome caution against an overly systematic and "theological" approach, but the wider context and unity of plan must also be respected. Cf. G. Vecchi, "Il problema dell'arte nell'esistenzialismo di Kierkegaard," *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica*, XXXVIII (1946), 61-69.

²⁰ See the apostrophe to Mozart which introduces the first part of *Either/Or*, a thoughtful study which, however, overstates the conflict between rationalism and irrationalism in regard to Kierkegaard (Vol. I, pp. 37 f.) P. Mesnard (*op. cit.*, p. 32) maintains that Mozart exercised the deepest influence of all Kierkegaard's sources, a statement which holds true at least of the artists who contributed to his mind. Cf. *Kierkegaard Studies* (London: Lutterworth, 1948), chap. 3, on music.

Seeking to account for the rise of the Don Juan story, Kierkegaard indulges in the romantic counterpart of the "world-historical speculation" which he later ridiculed Hegel for employing. A Don Juan could take his origin only in such a situation as prevailed during the high Middle Ages, when the powerful forces of morality and religion were withdrawn from the world in a flight to God.²¹ Kierkegaard took most of his one-sided information about medieval Catholicism from Görres's famous work on Christian mysticism, from Baader, and from the romantic novels. Hence at this time he looked upon mysticism as a kind of spiritual aestheticism which seeks impatiently to leap over time and the finite in its yearning for the divine. The result of such an abandonment of secular life would be to leave a clear field for the powers of the world and the flesh. Just as St. Paul declares that sin came into the world with the Law in so far as the Law aroused a consciousness of sin, so Kierkegaard attributes the appearance of an embodiment of sensuality, such as Don Juan, to Christianity, in the sense that it directed attention away from the essentially good sensuous aspect of man.

At least when he is speaking through his pseudonyms, Kierkegaard grants that many basic features of aesthetic existence are intrinsically good and fitted for integration with higher principles. The sensuous side of human nature makes two important contributions to Kierkegaard's view of existence. It is only through sense perception that the individual is brought into contact with the existent material world and hence only through this medium that man obtains a sensuous intuition of real movement. Our dependence upon an empirical source for our perception of actual becoming is one of the cornerstones of his polemic against Hegel's idealistic and absolutist theory of mind. Furthermore, neglect of the flesh is the first step toward neglect of the passional element in man and reduction of desire, will, and resolution to aspects of thought. A Don Juan is there to remind us that no conception of human existence is adequate which cannot find a distinctive place for sensuous experience and the full play of the passions. This phase of Kierkegaard's anti-Hegelianism brought him into momentary alliance with a more balanced view of the human self, but it was offset by his extreme Lutheran notion of the order of grace as being in contrast with all that is properly human.

²¹ *Eiðer/Or*, I, 72 ff. Cf. E. Susini, *Franz von Baader et le romantisme mystique* (3 vols.; Paris: J. Vrin, 1942), for the "mystical" notions of the romantics. Kirkegaard was a close reader of Baader but was repelled by his uncontrolled, pantheistic speculations about nature. It was Kierkegaard's misfortune to find in neither the naturalists nor the Hegelians nor the romantics any adequate philosophy of nature, thus forcing him to concentrate too exclusively upon human problems.

In any case, although there is nothing deordinate about the passions and the sensuous level as such, they do introduce disorder into existence when they are taken in isolation from other human forces. The sensuality of which Don Juan is an incarnation is a kind of counterkingdom of the flesh in counterdistinction to, and ultimately in opposition to, the spirit. He represents the mode of living which results when an individual is abandoned by, and eventually himself turns away from, the ethical and religious principles of right order. Taken by himself, Don Juan has all the exuberance and primitive drive which are present in a man before reflection sets in. His is the first phase of aesthetic life, which begins innocently enough in isolation, but not deliberate revolt, from motives which might regulate and discipline sensuous desire. Kierkegaard characterizes this naïve sensuality as a kind of *Schweben*, a hovering or tension between extremes which is best translated by a musical theme. This is the characteristic attitude of the romantic soul when it is healthy and well poised.

Unfortunately, men often make distinctions not in order to achieve a more rational unity but as the first step on the road to progressive disintegration. In Don Juan there is implicit the tendency to make aesthetic interests primary and even exclusive; he has revolted from the rule of the spirit even before he reflects upon it and raises his own proper standard. The very virtues advocated by romanticism help to corrupt men by their narrowness, their inhumane resistance to being supplemented by other perfections of man. Kierkegaard finds this to be the case especially with the two features which he most admired among the romantics: their stress upon the fresh and original and their praise of the passions.

At a time when most literary men and philosophers were priding themselves upon the reflective character of their existence and their facility in calling into question every direct and uncriticized position, Kierkegaard turned to the romantic appreciation of belief and frank sentiment. It is vain to suppose that speculation can ever become completely reflective or mediated in the sense of dispensing with every foundation in what is directly given. But on the other hand, he agreed with Hegel that nothing is to be gained by wandering off into the night in which all cows are black. Reflection can be directed upon the immediately given factors of existence without denying or destroying their immediate character. In fact, this is just what the romantics were doing in their deliberate cultivation of original states of feeling. While admitting the importance of such immediate feelings, Kierkegaard was not willing to surrender the entire guidance of human living into their hands. In addition to recommending the discipline of reason within its proper

bounds, he pointed out that the romantics understand the term "immediate" in too univocal a sense.²² Thus Novalis declares that every action and thought motivated by original feeling is an act of religion and that the religious outlook is encompassed within the aesthetic. To Kierkegaard, this is a token of the confusion of categories induced by the romantic mood. One of his major contentions is that religious faith is a kind of immediacy which is beyond both the first sort of immediate existence and the scope of philosophical reflection.

Just as the romantic philosophers fail to see the distinction between various sorts of immediacy, so they fail to appreciate the full scope of the life of the passions. This is the main objection raised against aestheticism by the ethical representative in the aesthetic writings, Judge William. He observes that the average aesthete is troubled by an inability to make a prompt and permanent decision.²³ This impotence is due in part to the fact that the aesthetic sphere makes no provision for the moral will, which is among the deepest passional principles and the source of our resolution and fidelity. Either the good is identified with the pleasurable, or it is opposed to the extent that it is recognized as having more than an aesthetic and hedonic significance. The romantics are willing to champion the passional aspects of human life only up to the point where the passions minister to the imagination and the pleasure principle, but what is needed is a radical accentuation of this part of man's nature. Hence Kierkegaard's stress upon the passions—upon the will and faith, as well as sensuous desires in their proper order—is a double-pronged weapon, aimed against romanticism as well as Hegelianism.

Sensual immediacy is the basic state of the aesthetic individual. When passion is admitted only at the sensuous level and apart from the moral will, it inevitably turns into abstract and selfish lust. The individual loses power over himself and is made prisoner of the search for the pleasurable moment, a moment which can never be realized to satisfaction. This accounts for the ennui, the restlessness, the instability, and the other secondary aspects of aesthetic life which phenomenological analysis reveals. Kierkegaard describes these phases of aesthetic life in detail and with great psychological and literary skill. His studies in this field are pioneer essays in such philosophical description. But he sub-

²² *Journals*, No. 488.

²³ *Either/Or*, II, 164 ff. Kierkegaard's *Purify Your Hearts* (trans. A. S. Aldworth and W. S. Ferrie [Ashington Rockford, Essex: Daniel, 1937]) expresses in the form of an edifying discourse the ability of a purely aesthetic philosophy to bring unity and health to the human personality. In *Le Mythe de Sisyphe* (new ed.; Paris, 1943), pp. 97 ff., A. Camus regards Don Juan as a type of man's tragically absurd situation in a Godless universe.

ordinates them to his main purpose of providing materials so that we may judge for ourselves about this kind of existence when it pretends to organize all values around its standard. His principal charge is that it cultivates imagination and concrete intelligence at the expense of the will and genuinely reflective reason. As a consequence, the aesthetic personality cannot grow to maturity and cannot even realize the full promise of the aesthetic aspect itself of existence.

FAUST, MAN OF DOUBT

Great care was taken by Kierkegaard to study the Faust legend, not only in its classical form in Goethe, but also in obscure chapbooks, which record the popular versions of this story. He criticized the second part of Goethe's poem as a kind of sentimentalized surrender of Faust's true personality, which either remains true to its own daimonic ideal or vanishes away when conversion is attempted. Kierkegaard pictures Faust as forever loyal to the aesthetic ideal and hence as a lost soul. But he sometimes softens the outlines and complicates the situation by discussing his own relation to Regina Olsen in terms of Faust's relation to the unfortunate Marguerite. Moreover, he often reflects in the *Journals* upon the Faustian element in his own character. The transformations which the Faust character undergoes in his mind are subtle and many-leveled, reminding one of Coleridge's road to Xanadu. Kierkegaard's Faust is a splendid example of how the aesthetic works are open to several different but related interpretations.

Kierkegaard includes Faust as a component of the romantic mind because of his own experience of doubt during his early years. He had witnessed in his own case that passage from confident buoyancy to scepticism which he expresses imaginatively as a transition from Don Juan to Faust. There is a stamp of personal attestation attached to his observations about the terrible inward hunger of the doubter for truth if there be truth and for the passing solace of ordinary life and happy immediacy.²⁴ Another introspective item is that even in his search after untroubled happiness the doubter cannot cease to criticize the false kind of tranquillity based upon unexamined foundations. Like the music critic who cannot play a note, the aesthetic doubter is at least sure that existence is not firmly grasped until it has passed the test of a critical spirit. Even though the results be the abandonment of all hope in our human state, the fundamental questions must at least be posed. This same sort of critical courage animates Kierkegaard's examination of the ways of life which are antagonistic to religious existence. He felt in himself a Faustian relish for the mystery of sin, for experiencing and

²⁴ *Either/Or*, I, 169 ff.; compare with *Journals*, Nos. 107-09.

probing the whole range of human possibilities. But he adds—what a Faust could not add—that the attendant perils of such an exploration are sometimes balanced and overcome by faith in the holiness of God and the goodness of all forms of existence as open to Him. This is the kind of certainty which, in its lineage, is poles removed from the craven and uncritical quest for certainty at all costs which John Dewey rightly asks us to forego, but which Dewey unaccountably equates with any faith in a transcendent God.

Faust is a rebirth of Don Juan, a second phase in the aesthetic dialectic. Anyone who reflects upon the futility of trying to satisfy the human spirit in the sheer flow of immediate feeling and pleasure is liable to become sceptical about every supposed certainty, resting place, and moment of joy. Speaking "historically," Kierkegaard considers Faust to have made his appearance still later in the Middle Ages than did Don Juan, at the moment when reflection began to take the place of direct pursuit of pleasure in an abandoned age. Indeed, he takes Faust as the symbol of Western man left unguided to work out his life plan by himself after revolt from the Catholic Church.²⁵ He is a one-sided, since a purely negative, figure of the men of the Reformation searching individually and in vain for solid ground in a period when the principle of authority had been put aside and all was shifting sand. Kierkegaard does not allow that Faust approached Mephistopheles as a higher authority upon whom he could finally rely. A true sceptic remains suspicious even about superhuman deliverances, especially when he had once been a believer in divine revelation. Although the aesthetic person thinks that his life is conducted beyond good and evil, a moral element of pride is essential to his standpoint in its sceptical phase. Even though he will not turn to God for guidance, he nevertheless thinks that his store of wisdom can be augmented only by some preternatural aid rather than by ordinary human means. For all his critical objections to religious truth, he is often an easy victim of superstition and diabolism.

The Faust problem presents some special difficulties for Kierkegaard's general doctrine on the aesthetic stage. It forces him to reconsider the meaning of immediacy, to state his position in regard to the romantic notion of daimonia, and to distinguish Faustian from ordinary philosophical doubt. These issues help to clarify his stand concerning the philosophical situation of his day, since they were in the forefront of discussion among his contemporaries. They also make his portrait of the aesthetic soul more sharply defined.

²⁵ *Journals*, No. 115. Here Faust is compared with Kierkegaard's beloved Socrates, who unshackled himself from the weight of Greek society, although not from God's rule.

We have noted already how Kierkegaard tried to combine the best features of the romantic stress upon the immediate with the Hegelian insistence upon mediacy or a dialectical appraisal of the given situation. But since he was out of sympathy with the idealistic postulates of the Hegelian dialectic, he had to present another account of the meaning of the mediate. It is not merely the logical antithesis of the state of immediacy and not a product of some mysterious and absolute power of negativity. On the other hand, it is not achieved merely by becoming reflective in just any sort of way about one's original placement in being. This latter conception of the critical attitude was popular among the romantics, who felt that they had overcome the limitations of the life of feeling when they could look with disillusioned eyes upon all of life's affirmations and polar opposites.²⁶ Both the Hegelian and the romantic accounts suffered in Kierkegaard's eyes from excessive abstractness; the first advocates a mediacy only in pure thought, whereas the second advocates one which is confined to the imagination and the sceptical mood. Kierkegaard was convinced that no radically critical attitude toward oneself can be achieved except through a moral and religious sort of appraisal and through an actual change of heart. Hegelianism is foreign to the order of real changes in the mode of existing, and in any case its standard is always an immanent and deterministic one. Romanticism deals with men under real conditions but does not take all the relevant conditions into consideration. No matter how subtly refined the seducer or how exquisitely reflective the doubter, he cannot enter into full possession of himself as long as he fails to view himself in the light of moral standards and religious demands upon existence. Hence Kierkegaard regarded a Faust or a pseudonymous Johannes the Seducer as men still caught in fate and still immature in regard to the further aspects of existence. The only sort of reflection which he deemed capable of removing this state of unfreedom is moral and religious reflection, for it is only through this agency that a man can relate himself freely to a transcendent principle of existence.

In *Fear and Trembling*, Faust is represented as coming to Marguerite under the impulse of an intellectual daimonia. Kierkegaard's study of the romantic writers led him to reflect upon the notions of genius and the daimonic. Eventually he gave this trend of thought an original direction by relating it with the ideas of dread, the exceptional individual, and the religious sacrifice. In his earlier aesthetic writings, however, he con-

²⁶ There is a subtle criticism of this presumption in *Either/Or*, II, 150 ff. The positive nature of ethico-religious reflection is indicated in *Edifying Discourses* (trans. D. F. and L. M. Swenson [4 vols.; Minneapolis: Augsburg Pub. House, 1943]), I, 100; III, 39; esp. IV, 29 ff.

tented himself with defining the general meaning and stating the moral principle implicit in such speculations.²⁷ A daimonic life he took to be one based deliberately upon an all-absorbing idea. The daimonic person relates himself immediately and individually to his leading idea, repudiating by implication the ordinary conventions and attachments of the human community. Such a person need not undergo any visible change to correspond with his distinctive inner state. Kierkegaard liked to underline this discrepancy between shadow and substance as a vivid refutation of Hegel's repeated contention that the inner has no more reality than the outer, that the self can and ought to be adequately expressed in visible form. Although he recognized that a deliberately fostered concealment can be morally dangerous, Kierkegaard refused in the aesthetic books to regard the daimonic principle as intrinsically evil. It was too closely associated in his mind with the Christian teaching on individual vocation and, more particularly, with his own sense of a special calling from God.

But he did not agree with the romantic philosophers that any and every daimonia is legitimate and worth cultivating. Here again, he wished to point out the moral implications behind the aesthetic principles, even when these implications are denied by aesthetes. When the individual seeks to rule his life according to a paramount principle, he institutes a moral relation with that principle and determines his life as good or bad in conformity with the nature of the ideal which is chosen. Moreover, the manner in which he accepts his exceptional calling has a moral consequence. Certain individuals seem to be set aside and marked by nature for this special relation to an absorbing task. Either they can accept this distinction as a gift from God or they can pretend that they are completely *sui generis* and creators of their own destiny in an absolute sense. Faust is a daimonic character of the latter sort and does not escape from moral judgment on this score. His pride is duplicated on a smaller and fundamentally ridiculous scale by all aesthetic individuals. Kierkegaard justifies this assertion by making an analysis of modern man's pitiful attempts to rise above the herd and its featureless mediocrity.

The anonymous character of modern life can be traced directly to its foundation in aesthetic existence. When aesthetic standards are accepted as ultimate, personality fails to develop along normal lines of moral and religious growth. Failing to realize himself integrally and in his proper dignity, the individual has no grounds for distinctive development. The upshot is a contradictory cross movement toward both exces-

²⁷ *Fear and Trembling*, pp. 144 ff.; *Stages*, p. 219; *Journals*, Nos. 508-09 (Kierkegaard himself as a daimonic "police spy" in the service of justice).

sive standardization and the cultivation of idiosyncracies. In modern civilization, both tendencies have received institutional sanction in the honor paid at once to mass uniformity and private hobbies. Kierkegaard's thoughts on this problem have been developed by the existentialists in their critique of *Das Man* and the *on dit*, as well as their satire upon individual busyness. They recognize that uniformity and the craze for fads and for hoeing one's Balzacian garden are only surrogates for, and dim memories of, the reality of community and person. But some existentialists have forgotten that for Kierkegaard this aesthetic condition is not the full report on existence. They have accepted the tale of social frustration and private meaninglessness as though it characterizes human life essentially, whereas in fact it only marks our existence when the experiment is made of grounding it eccentrically on an aesthetic basis alone.

There is a sense in which Kierkegaard considers a Faust to be preferable to a dozen university professors who begin their annual lectures with the nursery formula: "Once upon a time there lived a man named Descartes, and he was a great doubter." The existential doubt of Faust is only parodied by the methodic, textbook doubt of the dons.²⁸ The latter sort of doubt is only cultivated as a theoretical exercise, leaving the rest of one's life untouched and serene; for somehow the "provisional morality" is never replaced or even critically justified. In sharp contrast, Faust illustrates the difference between doubt as a qualified despair of thought and doubt as a thorough, "substantial" despair of the whole personality. But Kierkegaard conceives of Faust as never fully acknowledging the hopelessness of his mode of existence and the depths of his own despair. Faust is willing to continue searching for the happy moment which is worthy of being arrested, even though he is sceptical of ever finding it. He would like to return to academic doubt even when he knows it to be only a ritual and not the kind of doubt which he represents or, rather, *is*. For an open acknowledgment of despair without any possibility of relief, Kierkegaard evokes another legendary figure, the Wandering Jew.

THE DESPAIR OF AHASUERUS

In the Wandering Jew Kierkegaard saw the truest symbol of his age and the outcome of a closed aesthetic existence. Beneath the tranquillity and exaltation of the erotic and beneath the steady intensity of doubt he found silent despair as the last word of aesthetic existence. He concurred with Hoffmann's remark that Ahasuerus must be conceived as endlessly wandering through the world in dull indifference

²⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 88; *Either/Or*, II, 178.

and complete absence of hope in God or man.²⁹ This is the last strand upon which the aesthetic life founders, despite its many evasions of such an issue. It is important to recognize for what they are the various attempts made by individuals to conceal despair or avert their own eyes from it. Kierkegaard describes these dodges with considerable perspicacity, proving at the same time that he could outdo the romantics in the discernment of hidden attitudes. These include the hustle and bustle of everyday life, the search for diversions, the reducing of all actual events to the status of imagination and memory, the cultivation of the arbitrary whim, the search for a repetition of happy events, and irony. From the philosophical standpoint, the latter two artifices are most significant. None of these methods, however, is successful in avoiding the fundamental despair which shipwrecks the aesthetic claim to determine human existence and values according to its exclusive perspective.

The pseudonymous "author" of *Repetition* is a brilliant psychologist and aesthete, Constantine Constantius. He seeks to avoid the fate of Ahasuerus by means of the aesthetic category of "repetition." The profoundest wisdom of the Greeks was contained in the conviction that what is now has also been from all eternity. Constantine is interested in testing the counterthesis that what has been in the past can receive new being in the present. Far from taking panic at a possible repetition of events and the boredom it might entail, he looks to a reflux of eternity into time as the true source of originality and freshness and the only reliable support in a world of constant change. He makes an experiment as a test of this hypothesis, but he approaches the possibility in a purely speculative and "objective" frame of mind.

He tries in vain on a second and a third night to recapture the magical delight of a first night's performance at a Berlin theater.³⁰ He is aware that real repetition is quite other than dull sameness and uniformity, but he cannot determine the conditions under which it may occur. At this point in his investigation, he is consulted about an unhappy love affair by a young man. His acumen is sufficient to tell him that the young man is really undergoing a religious crisis and that his own ministrations can be of no avail in such a situation. At the same time he assures the youth that neither will he find guidance from the professional philosophers, since they do not concern themselves about exist-

²⁹ *Journals*, No. 26; on aesthetic despair, cf. *Either/Or*, II, 162 ff. Kierkegaard synthesized his various views about despair in his later book, *Sickness unto Death* (trans. W. Lowrie [Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1941]). Cf. the comprehensive study by B. Meerpohl, *Die Verzweiflung als metaphysisches Phänomen in der Philosophie Sören Kierkegaards* (Würzburg, 1934).

³⁰ *Repetition*, pp. 36 ff., 94-95.

tential situations and changes or about a genuinely religious relation of man to God. This is an equivalent confession that both Hegelianism and the romantic outlook are impotent before the question of time and eternity. Even the aesthetic mind must eventually conclude that aesthetic principles are insufficient to relate temporal existence to the eternal and the transcendent. If there be a kind of repetition or participation in the eternal mode of being, it can only be attained by breaking through the limits of the aesthetic sphere. By remaining within these confines, Constantine condemns himself to a life of despair and bondage to chance and fate. He intimates that other spheres of existence are more important for man, but he himself lacks the resolution to venture out to explore them.

The final refuge of the despairing aesthetic mind is in the attitude of irony, the favorite pose of the romantics. Kierkegaard is formally concerned with this attitude in his master's thesis on *The Concept of Irony*, the results of which are accepted in the aesthetic books.³¹ His position is that aesthetic irony has a good side and a bad side. It has a salutary effect in preventing people from considering their own situation and interests as absolute, above comparison and criticism. Similarly it provides a strong weapon against the Hegelians' identification of the absolute God with their thoughts about the absolute; as well as against their systematic ignoring of the problem of the individual systematist qua individual man. But romantic irony provides in this way only a negative liberation from error; if taken as an end in itself, as a sufficient determinant of existence, it is stultifying and leads to despair.

The danger of irony is that it tends to reduce everything, including the individual self and God, to the status of possibilities and points in the polar field of imagination. It levels all values to indifference and discovers that good and evil and all other contrasts are at bottom the same. Paradoxically enough, this abstractness brings the romantic position close to that of Hegel. Against them both, Kierkegaard charges that the conditions of a satisfactory human existence are destroyed. The lesson of his analysis of the aesthetic stage is that it ceases to be a genuine mode of existence when it seeks to be self-contained. This is borne out quite exactly by the rightful, positive place of irony in human life. Although the aesthetic order governs the content and expression of irony, it does not provide its basis. This basis is found only in an infinite reality, not in boundless indifference to the articulations and distinctions

³¹ J. Wahl (*Études kierkegaardiennes* [Paris, 1938], chap. 3) integrates Kierkegaard's treatment of irony with his general attack upon romanticism. P. Mesnard (*Op. cit.*, part 4, chap. 1) gives a full account of Kierkegaard's use of four philosophical sources of romanticism—Fichte, F. Schlegel, Tieck, and Solger—in his master's thesis.

of reality. Irony results when the finite is brought into comparison with the infinite and its standards. This supposes, however, that both terms in the comparison are real and that the self employing irony against its own pretensions and those of others is a real member of the finite order. Irony tells us that the finite is not the absolute, rather than that the difference between them is only a moment in a speculative dialectic or one phase in the play of imagination. Romantic irony is incapable by itself of securing the foundations of human existence, for the introduction of God's infinite reality and man's relation to him is possible only if existence is acknowledged to be a moral and religious affair as well as an aesthetic one.

In many ways Kierkegaard is most convincing in his treatment of the aesthetic phase of existence. One reason is that his own temperament and gifts gave him an intimate understanding of this view of things. He was justified in referring to himself customarily as "a poet and a thinker," a combination which is employed effectively in the aesthetic writings. Kierkegaard had mastered the literature of the romantics, which saved him in this instance from chasing systematic phantoms of his own creation. Furthermore, there was good opportunity here to employ a descriptive method and to suggest conclusions rather than establish them directly. We can see for ourselves that an exclusively aesthetic sort of existence is a humanly intolerable abstraction. Such an admission is all that Kierkegaard asks of us at this point in his argument. For it is sufficient to dispose our minds for a sober consideration of the claims of ethical and religious life. This is the purpose of the first stage in his existential dialectic.

PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATION

ROBERT J. HENLE, S.J.

During the early war years the complacency of American teachers of philosophy was disturbed by a growing chorus of criticism and by the alarms of educators' tocsins. What had the philosophers been doing in a world that found itself, at last, without wisdom and truth? By what right did the aristocracy of philosophy perpetuate itself in the world of learning and education, when, apparently, it offered no leadership and no guidance? This criticism was reflected in declining enrollments and loss of interest among students themselves. The American Philosophical Association finally decided to take stock of American philosophy, and in 1943 commissioned a group of university professors to investigate the current status as well as the ideal function of philosophy in liberal education.¹

These professors undertook their task with amazing energy and self-sacrifice. For a year and a half they read innumerable letters and reports, interviewed leaders in various fields, and held regional conferences throughout the country. Their conclusions were embodied in a report published as *Philosophy in American Education*.²

Since the publication of the report a number of textbooks have appeared intended for introductory or general survey courses in

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¹Professor Brand Blanshard of Swarthmore College; Professor Curt J. Ducasse of Brown University; Professor Charles W. Hendel of Yale University; Professor Arthur E. Murphy of the University of Illinois; and Professor Max C. Otto of the University of Wisconsin. There was then no Catholic philosopher on the commission and, it should be pointed out, very little attention was given to Catholic philosophy or its teaching—this being, in the main, a sound procedure, for the elements of the problem are quite different for Catholic educators. The difficulties and dangers involved in the teaching of philosophy in Catholic colleges and universities are quite other than those considered by this commission. Hence the entire discussion of this paper has to do with philosophy as a secular enterprise in America and within non-Catholic education.

²Brand Blanshard and others, *Philosophy in American Education* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1945).

philosophy.³ Despite their differences, all these texts have a direct or indirect relationship to the positions assumed by the commission. Obviously, detailed criticism of each textbook would demand a measured balance of praise and blame, for they contain some well-thought-out sections, like Professor Brand Blanshard's "Personal Ethics,"⁴ as well as inadequate and indeed misleading chapters like Professor John Randall's "The Meaning of Religion for Man."⁵ But of far greater importance than any details of treatment is the general approach and spirit of these books. This approach I believe to be wholly inadequate and mistaken for the purposes of liberal education. There is, in these texts, no promise of improvement in the teaching of philosophy. To understand the general viewpoint in question let us turn to a consideration of the report of the commission appointed by the American Philosophical Association.

The commission listed the demands currently being made upon philosophy as follows:⁶ (a) the demand for integration—the scholar and college student, faced by the particularized expansion of knowledge and the proliferation of subjects and courses, need general unifying principles; (b) the demand for community of mind, that is, for common ideas and ideals which will make communication and co-operation possible among educated men; (c) the demand for a reinterpretation of democracy that will present rationally grounded positive ideals of equality, liberty, and so forth; and (d) the demand for a philosophy of life, for principles to live by. Philosophers are thus being asked to furnish precisely those things which men have traditionally expected from liberal education and from religion.

Obviously, these demands could be met by a system of ultimate truths rationally developed and illumined by intellectual insight which would explain the world and man's life in it. For such a philosophical science would unify a man's whole understanding and would set before him ideas for the inspiration and guidance of his living. Of course, this science as philosophical could not be a mere set of answers to be learned off; it would have to be vitally assimilated by the activity of the individual mind.

Not only would such a science be an adequate answer to the demands made upon it, but it is precisely the sort of thing those making the

³W. E. Hocking and others, *Preface to Philosophy* (textbook) (New York: Macmillan Co., 1946). *Preface to Philosophy* (book of readings) eds. Hoople, Piper, and Tolley, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1946). Abraham Edel, *The Theory and Practice of Philosophy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1946). Harold H. Titus, *Living Issues in Philosophy* (New York: American Book Co., 1946).

⁴Hocking and others, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-95.

⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 297-410.

⁶Blanshard and others, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-21.

demands expected and expect. Dr. Kotschnig, for instance, in a constructive study of education, demanded that all students be taught first principles and how to derive conclusions from them. "We need," he writes, "purposes worthy of civilized man and education must help us to understand them."⁷ This conclusion was based on his analysis of the state of education between the two World Wars.

The roots of the lackadaisical attitude of the young in the immediate past lie deeper. They drew strength from the general anarchy of values which pervaded American life and prevented the schools from formulating any clear-cut objectives. Thus, instead of forming young people in the image of any clearly conceived idea of civilized man, the schools tended to undermine and destroy the sense of values of the younger generation and to leave them naked in a world of predatory animals.⁸

Confirmation of this attitude can be found throughout educational literature.

Philosophy, the criticism runs, is too negative, too destructive, too infertile of positive and generous beliefs. Philosophy, according to the demand, must be looked to as the main resource for filling the vacant place left by vanishing religious belief . . .

The ground for this appeal is usually the belief that American youth are lacking in basic convictions and larger loyalties.⁹

We lack both a comprehensive psychology of the nature of man and comprehensive social ethics. Therefore education has not been able to cope with the rapid modifications in all aspects of civilization. Can we simply preach the gospel of "adapting youth to the changing needs of society"? Must we not have principles to determine which challenges, in the welter of opportunities, we wish youth to accept and which to refuse?¹⁰

The education of a humanist and that of a social scientist are more or less the same. They must both know where to find major premises and how to judge them.¹¹

⁷ Walter M. Kotschnig, *Slaves Need No Leaders* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1942), p. 237.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 60. (Permission to quote has kindly been granted by the publisher.)

⁹ Blanshard and others, *op. cit.*, pp. 106-7. (Permission to quote has kindly been granted by the publisher.)

¹⁰ Robert Ulich, *Review of History of Educational Thought* (New York: American Book Co., 1945), cited by Merritt M. Thompson, in the *Personalist*, XXVII (October, 1946), 443.

¹¹ *The Humanities Chart Their Course* (Stanford University, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1944), p. 13, quoted by M. M. Thompson in the *Personalist*, XXVII (July, 1946), 333.

An inverse order of comment is appropriate here, inasmuch as the third form of student activity cited above—that dealing expressly with philosophical attitudes and ideas—is rare in the majority of modern educational institutions, unless they be religious foundations. Indeed, it is non-existent, if it be interpreted as an obligation laid upon every student to ripen and bring to judgment the relations of what he has learned to the nature of the world and to his own position and conduct in it.¹²

Thus the search continues and must continue for some over-all logic, some strong, not easily broken frame within which both college and school may fulfill their at once diversifying and uniting tasks. This logic must be wide enough to embrace the actual richness and variegation of modern life—a richness partly, if not wholly, reflected in the complexity of our present educational system. It must also be strong enough to give goal and direction to this system—something much less clear at present. It is evidently to be looked for in the character of American society, a society not wholly given to innovation since it acknowledges certain fixed beliefs, not even wholly a law unto itself since there are principles above the state. This logic must further embody certain intangibles of the American spirit, in particular, perhaps, the ideal of cooperation on the level of action irrespective of agreement on ultimates—which is to say, belief in the worth and meaning of the human spirit, however one may understand it. Such a belief rests on that hard but very great thing, tolerance not from absence of standards but through possession of them.¹³

Now, how did the philosophers in fact propose to deal with these demands? What did they have to offer to liberal education and to the men and women of our generation? Here indeed they were frankly humble. The tragic and basic disunity among the philosophers is too plain to be denied. The report does indeed make some attempt to minimize the disagreements of the philosophers; but even this report itself bears witness to it in the obvious divergence of opinions among its own authors. Indeed, despite the effort to minimize disunity, the commission admits the profound lack of agreement in contemporary American philosophy. This is reflected also in the textbooks which are now appearing to implement the proposed courses, for they are

¹² William S. Learned, "Examinations and Education," *Forty-First Annual Report of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching* (New York, 1946), p. 29. (Permission to quote has kindly been granted by the publisher.)

¹³ *General Education in a Free Society*, Report of the Harvard Committee (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1945), pp. 40-41. (Permission to quote has kindly been granted by the publisher.)

so many pages of pros and cons, yeas and nays. The fact is that American philosophers do not have an agreed body of philosophical truth to present to the mind of a student. Physics, chemistry, and other sciences have a publicly validated content which the student must accept as true regardless of his own personal insight; but there is no established philosophical science in the name of which philosophers may speak with authority. As a group, therefore, they cannot now offer first principles, firmly grounded loyalties, or established purposes. In short, philosophy, taken as the enterprise of American secular thought, has no answers for the real problems men are setting it.

Having set out, cogently and clearly, the questions men and women expect philosophy to answer, the philosophers beg to be excused. Philosophy has no assured first principles, no ultimate certitudes, no committed loyalties to share; indeed, so far as the questions asked imply a desire to ground rationally the things men work and fight and hope for, answering would tarnish the pure impartiality of the philosopher and turn him into a partisan.

Even so, the commission does not admit the failure of philosophy in the educational scheme. Philosophers at least agree, it tells us, on one precious thing—the method of philosophizing and of rational thought. “The truth is . . . that philosophy has something to offer of far more value than any set of beliefs, namely, an interest and a standard from which reliable beliefs may spring.”¹⁴ Educators and leaders, young men and young women ask for basic principles, for ideals, for truth. The philosophers offer them something of “far more value”; they offer “not truth, but the search for truth,” the method by which all “ultimate beliefs must be attained and validated.” This is indeed a high claim and a precious offer.

Underlying the proposal that philosophy thus makes its contribution to education, however, is the assumption that all students—or at least a majority of them—will be able to follow out this method to the attainment of validated beliefs, that is, to the attainment of truth. Now, the reflection of philosophers themselves and the history of human beliefs, as well as the common experience of teachers, stand unitedly in opposition to this assumption. Plato, for example, saw clearly that the personal possession of truth through complete understanding and insight could belong to only a few, and to these only after years of study and meditation. The vast majority in the Platonic state would live by right opinion, that is, by truth validated in the minds of the few and accepted on authority by the great mass of men. However much educational theorists, interpreting “democracy” most idealistically, may

¹⁴ Blanshard and others, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

dislike this view, it is still supported by our universal educational experience. The great majority of our students must in many matters accept truth on authority; and perhaps all students, in the beginning of any study, must submit their minds to the authority of a teacher. This is clearly done in the teaching of those sciences which have a positive body of knowledge to present. Certainly no teacher of physics would undertake to prove to a class of beginners the formulae and principles which he is teaching; and certainly not all of those who pursue a science throughout college attain a personal insight into the theories and principles of the science. True it is, of course, that our effort is to lead the student as far as possible and as deeply as possible to personal insight into the sciences, the books, and the theories that he studies; but the common facts of human nature remain; and in face of them it is sheer folly to expect the student, equipped only with a method, to work out a science or a philosophy for himself that will be anything other than a systematization of his personal interests, prejudices, and errors. Hence, even if the high claim of the teachers of philosophy to provide a method be well founded, a method alone would not suffice.

Since the philosophers have no established content to offer, the method must be taught through selected problems and readings from various philosophers. This means that the mind of the inexperienced beginner, unequipped with principles by which to judge, is to be thrown into a course that is a babel of contradiction about the most difficult and profound human problems. For example, the recently published *Preface to Philosophy* contains in its reader one hundred and six short selections from all types of "philosophy." There is a bit of Dewey, a dash of St. Thomas (three pages), an effusion of Walt Whitman's, a considerable amount of Plato, and somewhat less of Aristotle. What sense could an untrained mind, without either basic principles in metaphysics or historical background, possibly make of this collection of contradictions? The accompanying textbook is not more reassuring, for it again is a confusion of opinions. Even when the author argues for a personal conviction, his is but one among many voices. No particular authority attaches to his voice, and his reasons must be crammed into a few pages. The student may indeed find this very interesting; but what integration or ideals or certitude can possibly arise from this monstrous confusion?

This style of presenting philosophy is in principle the same as the presentation that has been followed in our universities previous to the war and to this investigation. And is it not precisely because of this presentation and its inevitable effect upon the student's mind that

there is grave criticism of philosophy itself and of its part in a liberal education? What other situation did Dr. Kotschnig criticize? What other presentation has brought the present generation of graduates to philosophical skepticism? If we seek a parallel abroad, we find that the university teaching of philosophy in France proceeded on the same principles and that distinguished French scholars have been criticizing the program in philosophy on the same grounds. Jacques Larivière, for example, after outlining the philosophical course of the universities, says this:

Among the cultivated people whose mission it was to guide by means of correct ideas, the deep cause, as we said in the beginning, of all the shortcomings and deviations that led the country to intellectual and moral ruin and then to defeat was the lack of a philosophical formation—was, indeed, a deformation of the mind through philosophical education.

So much for the program and its consequences in the intellectual domain. Its consequences are equally deplorable from the moral point of view.¹⁵

It simply is a dictate of common sense and experience that the inevitable result of this method of presentation will be, as it always has been, skepticism and either a despair of philosophy or a disdain for it. If one wanted to devise a course precisely to produce what Plato called "misologists," "haters of argument," one could not be more effective.¹⁶ Young students, without principles to judge by, without

¹⁵ "La cause profonde, disions-nous au début, de toutes les lacunes et de toutes les déviations qui ont conduit le pays à la ruine intellectuelle et morale, puis à la défaite, est, chez les personnes cultivées qui avaient mission de guider par des idées justes, le manque de formation philosophique, voire LA DEFORMATION DE L'ESPRIT PAR L'ENSEIGNEMENT DE LA PHILOSOPHIE.

"Voilà pour le programme et ses conséquences dans le domaine intellectuel. Les conséquences au point de vue moral, sont tout aussi déplorables." Jacques Larivière, *La Reform de l'enseignement de la philosophie en France* (6^e ed.; Montreal, Fides), p. 48.

¹⁶ This is what Plato has to say: "Yes, very likely," he said. 'But it is not in that respect that arguments are like men; I was merely following your lead in discussing that. The similarity lies in this: when a man without proper knowledge concerning arguments has confidence in the truth of an argument and afterwards thinks that it is false, whether it really is so or not, and this happens again and again; then you know, those men especially who have spent their time in disputation come to believe that they are the wisest of men and that they alone have discovered that there is nothing sound or sure in anything, whether argument or anything else, but all things go up and down, like the tide in the Euripus, and nothing is stable for any length of time.'

"Certainly," I said, 'that is very true.'

"Then, Phaedo," he said, 'if there is any system of argument which is true and sure and can be learned, it would be a sad thing if a man, because he has met with some of those arguments which seem to be sometimes true and

that experience which is necessary for mature judgment on the fundamental problems of life, will not, even if given a sound method, work their way to validated beliefs. If, in addition, they are at once plunged into this whirl of opinion, of argument and counterargument, from which neither their textbook nor their teacher can advance to certitude and truth, what can we expect of the students and of their method? Some students will give over the philosophic work as a hopeless task, having heard "great argument about it and about" and evermore coming out by the same door wherein they went; some few may struggle through to a validated authority or a reasoned possession of truth. Thus the method alone, even if sound, would be useless to the majority of students; if the method must be so presented, the presentation itself will make successful use all but impossible.

To turn now to another aspect of the proposed presentation. The philosophers offer a method from which, they say, validated beliefs may spring. Surely the possession of such a method would be a thing of high worth, and students would embark with high expectations and energy upon any course offering it. But what guarantee stands back

sometimes false, should then not blame himself or his own lack of skill, but should end, in his vexation, by throwing the blame gladly upon the arguments and should hate and revile them all the rest of his life, and be deprived of the truth and knowledge of reality.'

"'Yes, by Zeus,' I said, 'it would be sad.'

"'First, then,' said he, 'let us be on our guard against this, and let us not admit into our souls the notion that there is no soundness in arguments at all. Let us far rather assume that we ourselves are not yet in sound condition and that we must strive manfully and eagerly to become so, you and the others for the sake of all your future life, and I because of my impending death; for I fear that I am not just now in a philosophical frame of mind as regards this particular question, but am contentious, like quite uncultured persons. For when they argue about anything, they do not care what the truth is in the matters they are discussing, but are eager only to make their own views seem true to their hearers. And I fancy I differ from them just now only to this extent: I shall not be eager to make what I say seem true to my hearers, except as a secondary matter, but shall be very eager to make myself believe it. For see, my friend, how selfish my attitude is. If what I say is true, I am the gainer by believing it; and if there be nothing for me after death, at any rate I shall not be burdensome to my friends by my lamentations in these last moments. And this ignorance of mine will not last, for that would be an evil, but will soon end. So,' he said, 'Simmias and Cebes, I approach the argument with my mind thus prepared. But you, if you do as I ask, will give little thought to Socrates and much more to the truth; and if you think what I say is true, agree to it, and if not, oppose me with every argument you can muster, that I may not in my eagerness deceive myself and you alike and go away, like a bee, leaving my sting sticking in you.'" Plato, *Phaedo*, trans. H. N. Fowler ("Loeb Classical Library"; New York: Putnam, 1916), I, 311-15. (Permission to quote has kindly been granted by the Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.)

of this method? The very men who offer the golden key to truth and point the rising way—men whose lives have been dedicated to the pursuit—admit, bluntly or in the logic of their discordance, that truth has not yet been validated, that truth still lies, like a rosy mirage, beyond the horizon. The key has for centuries caught in the lock; the weary philosopher trudges eternally up an endless road. Praise the perseverance of the philosophers and the enduring fire of their love—but surely this is poor recommendation to those who seek “first principles” and ultimate ideals. What good to tell them that the method is more important than the goal? Surely, for men, it is simply false to say “that it is more important that it [a belief] be reasoned than that it be true.”¹⁷ On the contrary, truth is the prime value and it bestows all value on reasoning, on searching, on method; otherwise philosophizing becomes a mere game for dilettanti, not the serious pursuit of a man like Plato, who knew that there was an absolute truth and sought its possession. Nothing speaks so eloquently of the bankruptcy of contemporary American philosophy as a defense based on the glorification of method and of the “search” for truth.

If philosophy must present this program to prospective students, it is no wonder that enrollments are shrinking. Anyone who deals with students today, alerted as they are to the need of truth and standards by the events through which they have lived and are living, knows that such a method will carry a guarantee as effective as that of a get-rich-quick pamphlet written by a hack writer in a tenement.

There remain two other points on which philosophers are said to agree. They agree in rejecting “folly and superstition,” and in a negative dialectic. It is true that there is some agreement on what should be called “folly and superstition.” Yet one wonders how much this agreement is truly a matter of philosophy and how far it arises from the background of our common civilization. As a matter of fact, the philosophers of the past have not always rejected what *we* today would call “folly and superstition.” Even today one philosopher will reject this or that religious doctrine or practice as “folly and superstition”; another will regard all religion as superstition, while others will integrate religion with their own philosophical system.

But, whatever the case may be, it remains true that professional philosophers, being clever men and well versed in the art of discussion, can wield criticism with considerable skill, and the temptation to do so is a strong one; not only because they can succeed therein, but also because, as educators, they know that they must unsettle the mind before it will tackle problems with intellectual urgency. It is easy

¹⁷ Blanshard and others, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

for a brilliant and learned man to challenge and unseat the convictions of the young, to uncover the lack of grounds—or, at least, of consciously possessed rational grounds—for belief. Any college teacher knows that this is an easy victory and that it can be achieved against truth and falsity alike, even, sometimes, against the basic convictions of common sense.

When the professor of philosophy has demolished folly and superstition and has unsettled belief and traditional ideas, what has he to offer the mind and will of the student? A method.

So far we have let stand the assumption that philosophy has at least an established and valid method. Is this true? Can philosophers offer a method of validating beliefs, of overcoming at last their own negations?

The commission speaks of rational thought and of reasoning; but, taken as signifying philosophical method, these terms mask another disagreement. Philosophers do not agree on method; there are various and divergent opinions as to what constitutes valid method. This is not surprising, of course, for methodology is inseparable from philosophical principles; a metaphysics determines a method at least as much as it is determined by method. The fact therefore remains that philosophy teaching lays before the student not only alternatives in content, but a choice of methods. The immature student must therefore make an initial option, a choice of method before he can begin working out his own principles and ideals.

It is far easier, too, to bring the immature mind to see a difficulty than to see its solution. The clever youths who, in poor imitation of Socrates, taunted their elders in Athens with dialectical puzzles were not the last to turn a superficial logic against maturer wisdom. Even if one had substantial truth to replace the discarded assumptions of youth, the negative dialectic would need cautious application. But when, as in this case, the masters must let the immature student fend for himself in the reconstruction of convictions, is it not perhaps better that the average student let philosophy alone?

The commission has indeed detailed the criticisms levelled against the contribution of philosophy to liberal education. And they have made proposals for the future. But they have not been able to touch the real source of the difficulty. Recent textbooks leave the matter in the same unsatisfactory state. Apparently philosophy is being presented and will be presented in the same way; and its contribution will, in principle, be the same as during these last decades which saw graduates coming forth from our secular liberal arts colleges without first principles and solid loyalties. If common sense has been rendered

suspect, if religious belief has been destroyed, if the destroyer himself can offer no assured choice among multifarious opinions, then the student, who must live, finds himself forced to live without the guidance of reason or the drive of conviction. The only normal result has been and will be scepticism or relativism. Yet every man urgently needs and desires some strong and certain faith to give meaning to life. If this need is stronger than reasoned scepticism, he will look for conviction wherever he may happen to find it. He may find it in the right places; but generally he will seek escape in some sort of irrationality, in emotionalism, ungrounded fideism, or in the occult or the mystic. The history of the decline of both ancient and medieval philosophy is there to illustrate it. And today we have already witnessed the same phenomenon. Dr. Kotschnig's indictment of prewar education was exactly this. Moreover, the passionate adherence of educated men and women to the ideals of Nazism is an enormous and terrifying example of exactly the same thing. Indeed, then, in a world where men, because they are men, demand certitude and standards; where strength lies only in those who, like Communists or Catholics, strongly adhere to a positive doctrine, philosophy appears as a pale and ineffectual leader.

Let us not be deceived. The optimistic rhetoric of the committee and of philosophy textbooks masks a simple and insurmountable difficulty. The American secular enterprise of philosophy cannot present principles of integration and cultural community; it cannot ground democracy or answer the basic questions about human living. It pretends to offer a method; but there is really no agreement about method and all the methods exhaust themselves in a fruitless enterprise. It therefore cannot answer the needs of our students; and, worse, it destroys what the student has, leaving him without loyalty or principle, confused and despairing of truth itself.

May not even the question be raised whether men who so conceive and so present philosophy have a legitimate claim to sit in the doctor's chair and assist in the education of the young? *Doceat in quantum doctus!* Must not American philosophy make a far more profound examination of conscience and a deeper reform than hitherto, before it can claim a place among the common disciplines of a liberal education?

NOTES AND DISCUSSION

ST. THOMAS AND THE DESIRE FOR THE VISION OF GOD

Omnis intellectus naturaliter desiderat divinae substantiae visionem.

—*Contra Gentiles*, III, 57.

DONALD A. GALLAGHER

The role of the commentator is somewhat paradoxical in that the scholar who sets out to interpret the mind of a great thinker aims at illuminating the thought of the master, but finds it exceedingly difficult not to obscure that thought so far as he views it from another perspective and under different historical circumstances; he aims at absorbing and effacing himself in the role of interpreter, but can hardly avoid interposing some of his opaqueness between the master and the reader. St. Thomas Aquinas, who knew the difficulties confronting a commentator from his own experience, might not be too much surprised or disappointed—if we can imagine him in his humility feeling an author's natural disappointment at misunderstanding—at the controversy excited among his commentators over the meaning of his doctrine on the natural desire for God. But the fact is that the text of St. Thomas, while it is limpid and profoundly intelligible, has now and again suffered obscuring at the hands of even its greatest commentators. As for ourselves, normally during the course of our student years we become acquainted with the writings of St. Thomas only after contact with the expositions of his greater or lesser interpreters, who in their turn illuminate or obfuscate. If, by an effort of imagination, we can go back and read St. Thomas as though reading and learning the doctrines set forth for the first time, we can hardly fail to see them in new light. It is not the least important part of the historian's task that he aids us in recapturing such a pristine vision; and it is part of the paradox of his role that without his mediation we may never attain such an immediate view of the master's inward thought. It is the purpose of Father O'Connor, in the *Eternal Quest*, to assist us in recapturing the wisdom of St. Thomas, and in particular the original meaning of his teaching on the natural desire for God.¹ The author is professor of dogmatic theology at St. Joseph's Sem-

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¹ William R. O'Connor, *The Eternal Quest* (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1947).

inary, Dunwoodie, New York, and is well known for his *The Layman's Call* and other publications. The present work, which earned one of the Cardinal Spellman awards for 1947 from the Catholic Theological Society, is the outgrowth of a doctoral dissertation accepted by Fordham University some years ago.² Despite considerable remodeling, all the scaffolding involved in the original construction has not been removed, such as heavy and obvious transitions, schematic and repetitious summaries. However, these stylistic disadvantages are overshadowed by the author's clear and forcible presentation and by the substantial content of the book.

The texts of St. Thomas on the natural desire for God appear to be inconsistent in two principal respects. He frequently affirms the existence of a natural desire for God. "Every intellect naturally desires the vision of the divine substance."³ Yet there are texts in which he appears to deny this straightforward assertion: ". . . [man] has merit, not from the fact that he desires beatitude, which he desires naturally, but from the fact that he desires this special object, which he does not desire naturally, such as the vision of God, which nevertheless, actually constitutes his true beatitude."⁴ There is a second inconsistency, seemingly, in the Angelic Doctor's teaching that no created intellect can arrive at the vision of God without divine aid and in his teaching that it is natural for the human intellect to attain this vision once the soul is rid of the body after death.⁵ Obviously, it is not to be expected that so great a theologian and philosopher is contradicting himself on such momentous matters. Father O'Connor finds little difficulty in showing that the second inconsistency is not genuine. St. Thomas is at once freer and more exact in his use of the term "nature," as he wrote before the controversies on nature and grace of a later age. Thus, he speaks of "nature" as that which belongs *de jure* to our nature as rational animals and also as that which we possess *de facto* from creation. In the latter so-called Augustinian sense of the term, referring to what we possess *a nativitate*, or as the Creator made us, St. Thomas speaks of many things as natural which are

² Cf. also Father O'Connor's article, "The Natural Desire for God in St. Thomas," *The New Scholasticism*, XIV (July, 1940), pp. 213-67, with bibliography.

³ "Omnis intellectus naturaliter desiderat divinae substantiae visionem" (CG, III, 57).

⁴ ". . . meretur [homo] non ex hoc quod appetit beatitudinem quam naturaliter appetit, sed ex hoc quod appetit hoc speciale quod non naturaliter appetit, ut visionem Dei, in quo tamen secundum rei veritatem sua beatitudo consistit" (*De Ver.*, 22.7).

⁵ Cf. CG, III, 52, and *De Ver.*, 13. 1 ad 1, and *ibid.*, 3 ad 6.

not such in the sense of belonging to our essential constitution. He can speak, accordingly, of the human intellect's naturally attaining the vision of God after its departure from the body, since the intellectual soul was made for this end (pp. 16-23).⁶

The first difficulty is more crucial; and over it the greatest commentators have toiled, some complaining that the words of St. Thomas do not lack ambiguity. It is Father O'Connor's contention that the commentators have failed to penetrate the true meaning of St. Thomas's doctrine on the natural desire for God, chiefly because of the preoccupations, arising in the main out of the theological controversies of their age, which they brought to his text. These preoccupations involve three principal assumptions. First of all, the commentators generally assume that natural desire implies opposition to the supernatural, whereas St. Thomas was not concerned with such a contrast so much as with contrasting natural desire as a necessary tendency with the elicited perfect act of free choice. Secondly, they assume that elicited appetite, for St. Thomas, is opposed to natural appetite, whereas St. Thomas himself speaks of elicited acts, not elicited appetite. Finally, they assume that St. Thomas is speaking of a natural desire for the *beatific* vision, whereas he prefers to speak of the natural desire for the vision of God and does not refer to this vision as beatifying in the context of natural desire (pp. 70-72).

There can be no doubt that the great Catholic doctors of the Reformation era had to answer difficulties not directly envisaged by St. Thomas himself and that in so doing they enriched Catholic theology and philosophy. Father O'Connor would not dispute this historical fact and is not concerned with evaluating the theological views of these men, but with appraising the accuracy of their interpretation of St. Thomas. It is not a question of going back to St. Thomas as though nothing had happened since his day, but of going back to see what he did say in his own day. In so doing we may find the basis for new insights into traditional doctrine.

The third assumption is crucial, because the author's main thesis centers in the contention that it is incorrect and misleading to speak of a natural desire for the *beatific* vision. St. Thomas prefers to speak of the desire of the vision of God because, according to Father O'Connor, the natural desire to see God is not a natural desire for God as ultimate beatitude. One's immediate reaction may be, "If it's not a beatifying vision, what is it?" Let us proceed a way with Father O'Connor before giving the distinction that constitutes his reply.

⁶ For other texts, see Chapter I, "The Texts of Saint Thomas."

The author, following Father Brisbois, S.J., classifies the principal Thomist commentators in reference to this question into maximizers and minimizers.⁷ According to the minimizing school, which diminishes and restricts the desire as much as possible, the natural desire for God is not a genuine natural desire, but only an obediential potency, a nonrepugnance, or suitableness. For Bañez, this is all St. Thomas means. For Cajetan, this is all a strictly natural desire can mean; but St. Thomas, speaking as a theologian, refers to a desire to see God that naturally arises after revelation has made him known as our ultimate end and beatitude. According to the maximizers, who give the natural desire its full force, it is a genuine natural desire. For Dominic Soto, natural desire, which follows cognition, is the expression of an innate tendency of the will, a *pondus naturae*, independent of cognition, towards God as our final happiness and last end. For Sylvester of Ferrara, St. Thomas refers to an elicited act of desire to see God as the first cause of all created effects, a desire that arises spontaneously and necessarily after the existence of God is known (pp. 24-30).

The use of convenient labels such as "maximizer" may occasion some uneasiness, particularly when it is evident from Father O'Connor's subsequent explanation that some of the so-called maximizers share traits characteristic of the "minimizer." In the process of rescuing St. Thomas from his commentators we must avoid the temptation to force these men, great thinkers in their own right, into convenient pigeonholes. At times Father O'Connor gives the impression of a derivative knowledge of the philosophy of the commentators. A case in point is his brief discussion of John of St. Thomas, who is classified as an eclectic and of whom he says, "His attempts to reconcile the views of Cajetan and John of Ferrara *have not been regarded* as very successful" (*italics mine*). In spite of these limitations, the author does give us the basic texts of the commentators selected for special discussion and shows that they have imported elements into St. Thomas's doctrine which distort or at least obscure its meaning. Undoubtedly this is one of Father O'Connor's best contributions to the problem of natural desire. It may seem temerarious to some that anyone should question the authority of the venerable commentators. Father Garrigou-Lagrange, dean of present-day commentators, says in *The One God* that the Thomists, after Cajetan, did not distort the doctrine of St. Thomas in this matter; they simply added necessary distinctions

⁷ Cf. E. Brisbois, S.J., "Le Desir de voir Dieu et la métaphysique du vouloir selon saint Thomas," *Nouvelle revue théologique*, LXIII (1936), 978-89, 1089-1113.

in order to avoid ambiguity.⁸ But the very fact that the commentators did disagree among themselves leads one to suspect that the difficulty lies not in the obscurity of the original text but in their own preconceptions. At least, this is a legitimate working hypothesis for the historian; and, acting upon it, Father O'Connor came to the conclusion that the commentators had failed.⁹

In the more positive portion of his work, following his criticism of the commentators, Father O'Connor discusses the background of natural desire in Aristotelian and Thomist thought, and then proceeds to his solution of the problem. Among the most useful sections of the book is that dealing with St. Thomas's teaching on appetite and desire, which covers such topics as the location of desire within the causality of the good, the desire for the good and the meaning of *ens naturae*, the implicit desire for God in all creatures that is not the natural desire for the vision of God, the *actus perfectus* and *actus imperfectus* of the will, the natural appetite and will, and the natural appetite and cognition. Father O'Connor points out, in discussing natural appetite, that St. Thomas himself does not employ the expression now common among Thomist scholars, "elicited appetite." St. Thomas opposes *actus elicitedus* to *actus imperatus*. For it is the act and not the faculty that is elicited; sometimes, the elicit is *actus imperfectus*—as in the will's tendency to its end—and sometimes it is *actus perfectus*—as in the will's perfect act of operation in the free choice of means to an end. Natural appetite, on the level of will, follows cognition; it is not perfect act, but *motus*. Some interpreters of St. Thomas are led to posit an elicited appetite, will as following cognition, as opposed to natural appetite in itself, because they have adopted the Scotistic conception of the natural appetite of the will as a primary noncognitive tendency—that is, a *pondus naturae* prior to cognition. Father O'Connor is not concerned with evaluating the consistency of this notion in Scotistic philosophy. It is, he thinks, confusing when it is used to elucidate the quite different Thomist doctrine of will and appetite.¹⁰

⁸ *The One God* (Saint Louis: Herder, 1943), pp. 332-37.

⁹ The healthy reaction against the tendency to venerate the word of the "orthodox" commentators as the last word on St. Thomas should not degenerate into a tendency to belittle such giants as Cajetan and John of St. Thomas, who deserve full-length historical studies as much as various important lesser lights of the medieval period.

¹⁰ Cf. Chapter III, "The Scotistic Interlude," for an account of Scotus's doctrine, and Chapter IV, "Maximizing Interpretations," for an account of Scotistic influence upon the Thomist commentators. The source of the Scotistic conception that natural appetite in its primary sense is the innate tendency of nature as such, without any reference to cognition even in the case of the will, Father O'Connor would trace back to Plotinus.

Those under the influence of this Scotistic conception would incline to answer affirmatively the question, Does the will always actually tend towards happiness even prior to intellectual cognition? In the doctrine of St. Thomas, on the other hand, not based on a univocal view of natural desire, the will by nature wills the first good as *per se volitum*, yet the will is not always actually willing it. Without actual apprehension in the intellect, there is no actual tendency in the will (pp. 95-134).

Father O'Connor is now ready to expound his own solution to the problem of the natural desire for the vision of God, which he does in three basic propositions. (1) Once God is known to exist, a tendency necessarily arises in the intellect towards knowing him directly and immediately. This alone is the natural desire for the vision of God; and in this doctrine St. Thomas carries to its logical conclusion the principle enunciated by Aristotle—all men by nature desire to know. (2) The will has its own necessary tendency towards happiness in general. This is its natural desire. (3) There is no necessary tendency or natural desire during the course of this life towards God as our beatitude (p. 156).

Since St. Thomas did not refer to a natural desire for the beatific vision, as his commentators generally do, he could consistently maintain both propositions one and three. According to Father O'Connor, this is because St. Thomas distinguished between a tendency towards happiness in general and one towards a particular object as constituting our happiness.

Father O'Connor has undoubtedly scored a point in showing—it was under everybody's nose all the time—that St. Thomas does not employ the expression "beatific vision" in speaking of the natural desire for God. Whenever we return to study his exact terminology—a process which should not result in slavish copying, or all personal philosophizing would cease—we see the subject in new light. This is all to the good; but in my opinion Father O'Connor's emphasis upon this matter of terminology, indispensable to his interpretation of the

A fairly recent example of the terminology objected to by Father O'Connor is the excellent study of Richard Baker, *The Thomistic Theory of the Passions*, (Notre Dame, 1941). The author purports to examine the doctrine of St. Thomas on the human appetite and to collect from his writings representative texts. The discussion of elicited appetite, especially pages 12 to 18, contains no reference to St. Thomas in which the latter employs the expression *appetitus elicited*. The lucid summary of the difference between natural and elicited appetite is taken from Cajetan, *In I Summae Theologiae*, 19. 1. St. Thomas himself (*ST*, I, 19. 1) distinguishes between *appetitus naturalis* and *appetitus animalis*. Further investigation of this point, of course, would involve determining whether particular commentators had taken over Scotistic terminology or some of the philosophic doctrine of noncognitive tendency in the will as well.

problem, may not mean as much as he thinks. He admits that St. Thomas hardly ever uses the expression *visio beata* in any context, preferring such expressions as *scientia beata*. If this is so, and if St. Thomas prefers to employ the expression "vision of God," then at least one may say that he has not definitely ruled out the expression "beatific vision" as erroneous in the context of natural desire and that Father O'Connor has not proved his thesis upon this ground.¹¹

Father O'Connor devotes two important chapters to explaining his distinction between the natural desire of the intellect for truth that culminates in the desire for knowing the essence of God, and the natural desire of the will for happiness in general that terminates in no object in this life. In his conclusion he reaffirms his view that the natural desire for happiness in the will is only for happiness in general, that the natural desire to see God is not a desire for God as ultimate beatitude. The basic reason, he argues, why God cannot be the beatitude towards which we are inclined by natural necessity is that, if he were, nobody could reject him as our true ultimate end. "The natural curiosity," he concludes, "to see God after we know that He exists is all St. Thomas means by his natural desire for the vision of God" (p. 151). "Curiosity" strikes me as a weak word. It is apt for Father O'Connor's own thesis, as it keeps the natural "desire" of the intellect as free from an appetitive "urge" as possible. Is it as apt for St. Thomas's own view? I cannot see how anyone who has read the magnificent third book of the *Summa contra Gentiles*, in which St. Thomas uses surprisingly forcible language about the natural desire for God, can fail to agree that Father O'Connor

¹¹ On the term *visio beatificans*, cf. p. 261, n. 7. It is, of course, more than a matter of terminology. Father O'Connor argues that, strictly speaking, it is contradictory to speak of a natural desire for the beatific vision. "As far as we are concerned, the divine essence cannot be beatifying before it is seen. We tend towards the divine essence as an object still to be known, but not as an object that will give us supreme happiness since it must first be known before we can be drawn to it necessarily as our end. That is why we say there is a natural tendency towards the vision of God, which pertains to the order of knowledge, but not to the beatific vision, which pertains to the order of the will and its end. In this life there can only be a freely elicited act of desire for the vision of God as our supreme happiness" ("The Natural Desire," pp. 254-55, note). Father O'Connor's argument depends upon the validity of his distinction between the two natural desires which he claims St. Thomas is careful to keep separate, that of intellect for truth and that of will for happiness in general. In the text upon which Father O'Connor places much emphasis (in the 1940 article as well as in the book), St. Thomas does not formally assert the distinction between the natural desire of the intellect and that of the will, and does not lend support to such a sharp cleavage between the two potencies. Father O'Connor's text, like others employed at crucial stages of the argument, does not seem decisive for his solution of the problem. (Cf. *The Eternal Quest*, pp. 159-63, and St. Thomas, *In IV Sent.*, d. 49, 1. 3 sol. 1 ad 2).

has considerably attenuated the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor. This may be simply a question of a word, yet it is revealing. Father O'Connor has undoubtedly studied the texts carefully, and it is amazing to me that he asserts so confidently that all that St. Thomas means by the natural desire for God is "curiosity."

Although Father O'Connor intends to stress the deep interconnection between intellect and will, he seems to be cutting the two asunder. If the intellect's tendency is to know, and ultimately to know God Himself, and if the will's tendency is to seek happiness in general, what is the bond of unity between these tendencies? Which orientates which? Are they in separate compartments altogether? What is the natural desire of the rational creature through intellect and will?¹² Why may we not speak of a natural desire for the vision of God that, as tending to know, pertains to intellect and that, as tending to the satisfaction that follows knowledge, pertains to will? It may be objected that while the intellect tends by nature to a knowledge it does not yet possess, the will can never tend towards anything except on condition that the object to which it tends is first present in the intellect. Indeed, Father O'Connor urges that this is the ultimate reason why we can have a necessary tendency to know the still unknown essence of God, but no necessary tendency in the will towards the same divine essence as our beatitude while it remains unknown to us (p. 181). Nevertheless, while it is true that the intellect, *in via*, does not enjoy the vision of God and that the will, consequently, does not rejoice therein, the intellect does tend to know the essence of God; and the will, in proportion to the knowledge attained by the intellect, desires to rejoice in the end indicated by knowledge, known as that which promises to be the consummation of all knowledges and all desires.¹³ Furthermore, it is not adequate to maintain, as Father O'Connor repeatedly does, that the will only tends towards abstract happiness, or happiness in general, and to let the matter rest there. (I cannot resist adding that then the will would have nothing in which to rest.) Strictly speaking, it is more proper to say that the will desires that which will completely exhaust the *ratio* of the universal good than to say that all men desire the universal good as good in general. The will does not desire the good in the abstract; it desires *the* good, presented to it *secundum modum abstractionis*, which is, in Maritain's phrase, the metaphysical concretized good and is as universal as being itself. The good in general is the necessary formal object under which the will desires

¹² Cf. *ST*, I, 12, 8 ad 4.

¹³ Cf. *CG*, III, 25.

whatever it desires, but the will is seeking an existential good that saturates all desire.¹⁴

The volume contains useful appendices, those of particular interest being concerned with natural appetite and cognition, to which we have already referred, and Aristotle and the end of man. In discussing this latter topic, Father O'Connor points out that it is not true, as sometimes imagined, that the difference between Aristotle and St. Thomas lies solely in the fact that the Greek philosopher labored under the handicap of lacking complete certainty about personal immortality and the existence of God as we know him in Christian thought. If Aristotle had had this knowledge, his conception of the end of man and of beatitude would have been the same as ours. This view, however, continues Father O'Connor, fails to consider the basic difference between Aristotle and the Christian philosopher's notion of the end of man. For Aristotle, man's highest end consists in the exercise of his highest power, the speculative intellect. It matters little, as far as this conception of man's end is concerned, whether the exercise of speculation be confined to the present life or continued into the next (pp. 197-201).¹⁵

Father O'Connor argues that the Aristotelian end of man is regulative or normative and that St. Thomas did not judge this view defective in its own order. In short, St. Thomas conceded that this regulative end is truly the natural end of man, which would have been man's end if God had established him in a purely natural order and had not in fact destined us for the beatific vision. Father O'Connor here assumes two propositions that affect his argument crucially. Is it so certain, in the first place, that the end of man, according to Aristotle, is merely regulative? Even though it be true that Aristotle's metaphysics could not carry him beyond a normative end, was he not striving, in the latter part of his *Ethics*, for an end truly worthy of the name, for a term? In other words, to put the matter simply, we must not imagine Aristotle as though *he* existed in a neatly natural order and as though he thought very clearly and neatly about a purely natural end. His philosophy is profound—nobody doubts that—but

¹⁴ Jacques Maritain, *De Bergson à Thomas d'Aquin* (New York: Maison française, 1944) p. 156. Cf. Henri Renard, S.J., and William Stackhouse, S.J., *The Philosophy of Man* (Saint Louis: Swift, 1946), p. 106. (Planographed.) As Father Renard puts it, "[Saint Thomas] does not say that the end, that is, felicity in general (concretized) which the will necessarily desires, and the formal object—abstract good—which is the aspect under which any particular object is desired, are identical. In other words, the will tends naturally and necessarily to its end, the universal concrete good, and it naturally but not necessarily desires a particular object because of its goodness."

¹⁵ Cf. A. C. Pegis, "Matter, Beatitude and Liberty," *The Thomist*, V (1943), 265-80.

there are gaps in it, and some of these gaps are open to a larger view of nature and its end than Aristotle was able to attain. The truth in St. Albert's remark that Aristotle is given to us by nature *quasi regula veritatis* has to be counterbalanced by the truth in St. Bonaventure's dictum that Aristotle expresses not only the incarnation of human reason but the philosophy of fallen nature.¹⁶ If there is a natural desire for the vision of God, it would be strange if the master of those who know knew it not, strange if he had not given voice to this longing of nature. Secondly, is it evident that St. Thomas held that the end of man according to Aristotle was regulative and complete in its own order, or that there could be such an end? All the texts that Father O'Connor refers to, chiefly from Book III of the *Contra Gentiles*, do not designate Aristotle's conception of ultimate felicity as an ultimate end *simpliciter*, even in the natural order. Moreover, it is noteworthy that St. Thomas describes this "ultimate felicity" of the speculative intellect achievable through speculative wisdom as imperfect beatitude, not as beatitude perfect in its own order and not as one that might have been a perfect beatitude.¹⁷

It is significant that Father O'Connor, after arguing that St. Thomas recognizes Aristotle's end as complete and possible in the natural order, concludes his discussion by saying, "It is not without significance that actually no natural end ever existed" (p. 206). This is the point that requires elaboration; and it brings to mind the challenging thesis of Father Henri de Lubac, S.J., who argues that, according to the Fathers and St. Thomas Aquinas, man's natural desire for the beatific vision is unconditional though inefficacious and that the end of man cannot but be the beatific vision.¹⁸ In the present volume, Father O'Connor alludes to De Lubac in a brief note as a maximizer *par excellence*. During the past March [1948], in the Annual Aquinas Lecture delivered at Marquette University on "Saint Thomas and the Natural Desire for God," Father O'Connor reaffirmed his position forcibly and with rhetorical effectiveness superior to that in the book-length treatment. In his conclusion to the lecture, he clearly outlined his

¹⁶ St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, d. 30, 2. 1 fund. 4 (ed. Quaracchi, II, 271). For St. Albert, cf. E. Gilson, "Pourquoi saint Thomas a critiqué saint Augustin," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, I (Paris: Vrin, 1926-27), 8.

¹⁷ *ST*, I-II, 3. 6.

¹⁸ Henri de Lubac, S.J., *Surnaturel, études historiques* (Paris: Aubier, 1946). Father Garrigou-Lagrange argues that the natural desire can only be interpreted as unconditional and efficacious (which is theologically untenable), or conditional and inefficacious (which must be St. Thomas's meaning). Father de Lubac argues that the natural desire for the end, the vision of God, is absolute, but that man cannot attain this end by his own resources.

divergence from Father de Lubac. The American theologian did not attempt to evaluate Father de Lubac's own theological and philosophical position so much as he did the French Jesuit's interpretation of the text of St. Thomas. He claims that De Lubac's manner of interpreting St. Thomas shows that he is, with the maximizers, in the Augustinian-Scotistic tradition.¹⁹ According to Father O'Connor, Scotus's radical Augustinianism on the natural destiny of man leads to the thesis that God is the natural end of man, even though it takes supernatural aid to reach him. The originality of De Lubac within this tradition, Father O'Connor feels, lies in his use of the term "exigency." To rid it of its dangerous connotations, De Lubac describes exigency not as a demand on our part for the beatific vision, but as an impulse implanted in us by God which we have but to obey.²⁰

The principal point at issue, according to Father O'Connor, is whether the "natural end" is terminal or regulative. Father de Lubac argues that it is contradictory for man to have a natural end, because the desire of nature cannot be terminated in the order of nature. O'Connor agrees that there cannot be a natural terminal end, but insists that there is the hypothetical possibility of a natural end that is normative and regulative. If this is so, then there is no necessary exigency in man for the vision of God as beatifying; and confusion arises if we persist in "crossing" the orders of the intellect and will.

The analysis of man's spiritual nature, Fathers de Lubac and O'Connor agree, shows the possibility of his arriving at the vision of God. St. Thomas himself teaches, "Each and every created intellect is capable of attaining the vision of the divine substance, notwithstanding the inferiority of its nature."²¹ What is the meaning of this "is capable of attaining"? For Father O'Connor, man's possibility of arriving at the divine vision means that we *can* know the essence of God,

¹⁹ O'Connor, *The Eternal Quest*, p. 51.

²⁰ De Lubac, *op. cit.*, p. 490. "Ce que nous voulons nécessairement, d'un vouloir absolu, on peut dire en général, si l'on veut, que nous l'exigeons. Disons-le donc provisoirement de la vue même de Dieu. Mais que ce soit pour ajouter aussitôt: nous ne l'exigeons point parce qu'il nous plaît de l'exiger; nous l'exigeons parce que nous ne pouvons pas ne pas le vouloir. Loin d'être dominé par lui, cet objet de notre vouloir le domine. Il s'impose à nous, il exige que nous le voulions. . . . Exigence, donc; exigence essentielle, exigence dans la nature, mais, qui, en réalité, n'est plus naturelle dans sa source que dans son objet. Exigence qui commande en nous. Exigence qui par conséquent ne peut jamais prendre de notre part le ton d'un réclamation. Exigence qui est exactement l'inverse de celle qu'on imaginait d'abord. Par elle nous ne commandons pas; nous avons à obéir. . . . Exigence mise en l'homme par le créateur, lorsqu'il le fit à son image, lui assignant comme idéal et comme terme sa ressemblance."

²¹ "Quilibet . . . intellectus creatus potest pervenire ad divinae substantiae visionem non impediante inferioritate naturae" (CG, III, 57).

for a natural tendency that cannot reach its term would be in vain. Before any natural desire attains its goal, however, many conditions have to be fulfilled; in this quite special case supernatural helps must be granted to nature. Such a desire is in harmony with a spiritual nature and, given the proper conditions, can be fulfilled. For Father de Lubac, the possibility of the vision of God does not mean the possibility of man's being ordered to a superior end, but the possibility of seeing God possessed by a being which is elevated to attain its end.²²

Father O'Connor is to be commended for his thorough-going attempt to cut his way back, through a maze of conflicting opinions, to the text of St. Thomas. It is difficult to see that he does justice, however, to two important sets of texts that Father de Lubac—accused, often superficially, of not being an accurate interpreter of St. Thomas—employs to support his position. One set includes texts commonly cited to prove that St. Thomas taught in effect that man could have been created in the *status purae naturae*; the other, texts expounding his doctrine that a natural desire cannot be in vain.²³ We have touched upon the first point, let us take one example of the latter. It is difficult to see how Father O'Connor's explanation of the formula "a natural desire cannot be in vain" does justice to the famous text of the *Compendium Theologiae*, II, 104.

Let us reread the text in Father Cyril Vollert's recent translation.

A thing may be in potency in two ways: either naturally, that is, with respect to perfections that can be reduced to act by a natural agent; or else with respect to perfections that cannot be reduced to act by a natural agent but require some other agent. . . .

Our intellect has a natural potency with regard to certain intelligible objects, namely, those that can be reduced to act by the agent intellect. We possess this faculty as an innate principle that enables us to understand in actuality. However, we cannot attain our ultimate end by the actuation of our intellect through the instrumentality of the agent intellect. For the function of the agent intellect consists in rendering actually intelligible the phantasms that of themselves are only potentially intelligible. . . . Hence the efficacy of the agent intellect in reducing our intellect to act is restricted to intelligible objects of which we can gain knowledge by way of sense perception. Man's last end cannot consist in such cognition.

²² *Op. cit.*, pp. 431 ff.

²³ In the important appendix, "La Béatitude naturelle selon saint Thomas," *ibid.*, pp. 449-65, Father de Lubac examines the texts cited in support of the *status purae naturae* and shows that St. Thomas does not formally teach this doctrine and that the texts can be explained satisfactorily otherwise.

The reason is that, once the ultimate end has been reached, natural desire ceases. But no matter how much we may advance in this kind of understanding, whereby we derive knowledge from the senses, there still remains a natural desire to know other objects. For many things are quite beyond the reach of the senses. We can have but a slight knowledge of such things through information based on sense experience. We may get to know that they exist, but we cannot know what they are, for the natures of immaterial substances belong to a different genus from the natures of sensible things and excel them, we may say, beyond all proportion.

Moreover, as regards objects that fall under sense experience, there are many whose nature we cannot know with any certainty. Some of them, indeed, elude our knowledge altogether; others we can know but vaguely. Hence our natural desire for more perfect knowledge ever remains. But a natural desire cannot be doomed to frustration.

Accordingly we reach our last end when our intellect is actualized by some higher agent than an agent con-natural to us, that is, by an agent capable of gratifying our natural, inborn craving for knowledge. So great is our innate desire for knowledge that, once we apprehend an effect, we wish to know its cause. Moreover, after we have gained some knowledge of the circumstances investing a thing, our thirst is not assuaged until we penetrate to its essence. Therefore our natural craving for knowledge cannot be satisfied until we know the first cause, and that not in any fashion, but in its very essence. This first cause is God. Consequently, the ultimate end of an intellectual creature is the vision of God in His essence.²⁴

Father O'Connor does not make much use of this important text; but he does comment upon the point involved by arguing that, even were the impediment of the inferiority of nature to remain so that the vision of God were never realized in fact, it would always be true that the natural desire of man for God is not a tendency towards the absolutely impossible.²⁵

²⁴ *Compendium of Theology* (Saint Louis: Herder, 1947), pp. 109-10. (Permission to quote from this book has kindly been granted by the publisher.) Father Rousselot (*The Intellectualism of Saint Thomas* [New York: Sheed, 1935], p. 178), notes that in this argument, in which there is no appeal to revelation, St. Thomas arrives at his conclusion with surprising rapidity after an elaborate buildup. Note also that, after analyzing man and his abstract mode of knowledge, St. Thomas concludes that the end of an *intellectual creature* is to see God in his essence. Elsewhere, with arguments that apply to angels and men, he shows that all intelligent creatures have natural desire for God (CG, III, 25, 50, and 57).

²⁵ Father O'Connor paraphrases the conclusion of the *Compendium* text in a

Father de Lubac, commenting expressly upon the *Compendium Theologiae*, II, 104, argues that one should conclude from the text that a desire would be in vain that was not really destined to be satisfied some day. It is excessive subtlety to make St. Thomas say that in order for the desire not to be vain, it suffices that there be an abstract possibility of its appeasement—it suffices that the hypothesis be possible of another order of things in which this appeasement would really take place, even with the actual assurance that, in the world as God made it, this desire would always remain unappeased. "We do not see what, historically, could justify such an exegesis."²⁶

It certainly seems that De Lubac's interpretation is closer to St. Thomas here. The *Compendium* teaches that natural desire cannot be in vain and that we cannot satisfy the natural desire without seeing the essence of God. St. Thomas, who is surely competent to make the finest of distinctions, makes some straightforward assertions and does not hem and haw. Is the principle "a natural desire cannot be in vain" really guaranteed if man is merely "orderable" to an end, even though not ordered thereto in fact? Does St. Thomas, who says in the *Compendium Theologiae* quite simply that man's last end *cannot* consist in the cognition of intelligibles derived from sense experience, really mean that our desire would not be in vain merely because it is not absolutely impossible for God to provide another end than the so-called natural end? Without intending to evaluate the work of Father de Lubac, I should say that apparently some of his critics have not faced the texts of the Common Doctor as honestly and unprejudicially as he has.

This is not the place, and ours is not the competence, to settle the difference between Father O'Connor, as representative of many theologians in this country, and Father de Lubac. We have suggested some issues, principally from the philosophical point of view, which have to be threshed out. We have already indicated that Father O'Connor's thesis is of value for his discussion of the commentators, for the Aristotelian background of the problem of natural desire, for St. Thomas's views on natural desire and cognition, and for the useful collection of texts. He has shown that the commentators have not said the last word on the subject; but his own contribution raises so

fashion which surely diminishes its force: a knowledge of the first cause in this direct and immediate fashion must be at least possible, since a natural desire cannot be in vain (*The Eternal Quest*, p. 9).

²⁶ De Lubac, *op. cit.*, p. 469. Cf. the helpful résumé and criticism of De Lubac by Father Leopold Malevez, "L'Esprit et le désir de Dieu," *Nouvelle revue théologique*, LXIX (janvier, 1947), pp. 3-31.

many questions in turn that we feel his is not the last word either. Whether De Lubac's thesis be right or wrong, with reference to natural desire, Father O'Connor's positive solution is weak, in my opinion, because it disunites intellect and will and jeopardizes the unity of man's nature and of the end of nature. Even should De Lubac's view be acknowledged as sound, O'Connor's work will remain valuable as a demonstration of the inadequacies of previous interpretations; but it would stand charged with not having fully escaped the preconceptions like those that diverted the old masters; and it would thus remain intermediary between the "old school" of modern—that is, postmedieval—theologians and the "new theology" of De Lubac, which aspires to return to the ancient traditions of the Fathers and Doctors and claims to show the harmony between St. Augustine and St. Thomas on man as an image of God.

HEGELIANISM IN FRANCE

BERNARD DE GUIBERT, S.J.

It is the opinion of Mr. Gabriel Marcel that if atheist, positivist, evolutionist, and Nietzschean doctrines are on the decline, Hegelianism is not, nor the currents of thought that are influenced by Hegel. Mr. Marcel believes that Hegelianism alone remains alive and threatening, among all those philosophies that hastened the dechristianization of the West in the nineteenth century. He thinks this may be because the profundities of Hegelianism lead to "a great yearning of soul."

The vitality Hegelianism has in common with every great philosophy is intensified by a very remarkable activity in France today. This fact has struck a number of people that have begun to follow present-day French thought after having been out of touch with it for some time. Indeed, it would seem that Hegelianism occupies the place held by Kantianism for almost a century.

Not only does every philosophical review publish articles on Hegel, but translations of him are multiplied in spite of the difficulties he presents. It is true that a few translations of the *Enzyklopädie*, together with introductions, were published in France about a century ago; but Hegelianism remained actually quite superficial; there was nothing in French philosophy that would bear comparison with English

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or Italian Neo-Hegelianism. Renan and Taine were nothing but very poor disciples of the German philosophers. Before the first World War, Delbos¹ and Noël² showed a direct knowledge of the Hegelian dialectic; and L. Herr wrote a serious and intelligent essay on *Die grosse Enzyklopädie*.³ Still, it was only between the two World Wars that Jean Wahl, with his *Le Malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel*,⁴ initiated a certain philosophical public into the works of the young Hegel. In this book Hegel appears something of a romantic, or at least a mystic, and not much different from Kierkegaard, as Wahl has pointed out in his studies of Kierkegaard.

Wahl and Andler⁵ foretold the importance of the *Phänomenologie*, which had remained a closed book to the elite among the French philosophers. The work of translating it—a formidable task that could be attempted only by an uncommonly courageous specialist—was preceded by the formation of a small but fervent group of Hegelian thinkers at the Sorbonne, a group that had been introduced to the chief works published before the *Phänomenologie*.

The leader of this group was Koyré, who laid down the methodological conditions for the study of Hegel and insisted on the intellectuality of the Jena period;⁶ he himself translated some very difficult passages on time. Koyré's disciple, Alexandre Kojève, between the years 1933 and 1939 explained the *Phänomenologie* chapter by chapter, having in his audience—besides Koyré himself—such philosophers as Aron, Merleau-Ponty, Bataille, Polin, Klossousky, E. Weill, and G. Fessard. These names are indication enough that Hegel's influence could not but increase. Jean Hyppolite, a member of the Sorbonne, translated the *Phänomenologie*⁷ after several years of the self-schooling. To the newly translated *Die Philosophie der Geschichte*⁸ were added translations of select passages from Hegel made by the Communists Lefebvre and Bretonneau⁹ (who had already translated some Hegelian lectures as well as Lenin's dialectic, and had written an introduction to select passages from Marx), and in addition translations of *Die Philosophie*

¹ V. Delbos, *De Kant aux post-kantiens* (Paris: Aubier, 1940).

² J. Noël, *La Logique de Hegel* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1933 [reprint]).

³ L. Herr, "Hegel," *La Grande encyclopédie*, tome XIX.

⁴ Paris: Rieder, 1929.

⁵ Ch. Andler, "Le Fondement du savoir dans La Phénoménologie de l'esprit de Hegel," *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, XXXVIII (1931), 317-40.

⁶ A. Koyré, "Hegel à Iéna," *Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses*, XV (1935), 420-58.

⁷ *La Phénoménologie de l'esprit* (Paris: Aubier, 1939, 1941).

⁸ *Leçons sur la philosophie de l'histoire*, trans. J. Gibelin (Paris: J. Vrin, 1937).

⁹ *Morceaux choisis* (Paris: Gallimard, 1939).

*des Rechts*¹⁰ and *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*¹¹ and of *Die Beweise vom Dasein Gottes*.¹² Besides all this, translations will soon be published, it is announced, of *Glauben und Wissen* and some other works of the same period and—most important of all—of the whole *Wissenschaft der Logik*, which up to now he has been almost unknown in France.

To give some idea of the work of these first-class writers, let us examine three recent books, from which an idea can be had of the *climat* of Hegelian studies in France and their future foretold.

The first is the thesis *De la médiation dans la philosophie de Hegel*,¹³ defended at the Sorbonne in 1944 by Father Henri Niel. It is worth noting, indeed, that French Catholics—or, more accurately, French Jesuits—are by no means inconspicuous in the present philosophic movement. It is enough to mention the names of Father Niel and Father Fessard (Kojève says that Father Fessard is the first “Marxisant” in France) and Father Régnier, together with their friend Mery, who is publishing a book on *Glauben und Wissen*.

Father Niel’s book deals with the whole of Hegel’s works, of which he gives the development and a most exact summary. The book insists particularly on the question of dialectic. Hegel sets out to synthesize the Greek idea of finite totality and the Christian one of the transcendental infinite. At first Hegel seemed to think that meditation is realized by love and that Christ is pre-eminently the mediator. Then his thought became somewhat more intellectual. This participation of the infinite in the finite is marked out psychologically in the *Phänomenologie*, speculatively in the *Enzyklopädie*; finally, in the *Vorlesungen*, logic is completely realized in history—in art, religion, and so on. Father Niel shows us the genesis of the notion of mediation and leads us by degrees to what is regarded by Hegel as the full achievement of that mediation. He comes to the conclusion that the Hegelian enterprise, the unity of which was broken by its historical development, did not succeed. The only Hegelian refutation of Hegelianism is to make plain the antinomies it conceals and the ones revealed by the movements springing from it.

The second important work on Hegel is the thesis *Genèse et structure de La Phénoménologie de l’esprit de Hegel*,¹⁴ defended by J. Hyppolite at the Sorbonne in 1946. Hyppolite, writing in the *Revue de méta-*

¹⁰ *Principes de la philosophie du droit* (Paris: Gallimard, 1940).

¹¹ *Esthétique*, trans. V. Jankélévitch (Paris: Aubier, 1944).

¹² *Les Preuves de l’existence de Dieu*, trans. H. Niel (Paris: Aubier, 1947).

¹³ Paris: Aubier, 1945.

¹⁴ Paris: Aubier, 1946.

physique et de morale, had already shown the trend of his work in several articles on the works of Hegel that were written before 1807. His thesis, written in the typical university manner, shows clearly that he knows thoroughly all the important studies on his subject. It is an objective exegesis of texts. For this reason it will be, together with the translation, the necessary instrument—if not the textbook—of every beginning French student of Hegel. This is not to say that *Genèse et structure* is easy reading. It follows a most abstruse text too closely and does not always succeed in throwing light upon it. In the first part of the thesis, however, Hyppolite describes the right place of the *Phänomenologie*, showing what it sets out to be and what its method and history are. In the seventh part, the last, Hyppolite shows the relation of the *Phänomenologie*, the *Logik*, and absolute cognition. Though he has not completed his work, his small *Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire de Hegel*¹⁵ shows that he will become one of the most active, as well as qualified, pioneers of Hegelianism in the French university.

Alexandre Kojève's *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel*¹⁶ is his lectures that he gave in the Sorbonne on the *Phänomenologie*. They have been collected and edited by R. Queneau. The way the book has been done makes it difficult to use and makes it difficult, too, to work out the exegesis of the first chapters of the *Phänomenologie*; but as Kojève has a great sense of pedagogy, constantly repeating and summing up his thought, his interpretation of Hegel is quite clear. Kojève is clearly an extreme leftist. He is as atheistic as Feuerbach, as much a champion of the people as Marx, and as conscious of human mortality as Heidegger. According to Kojève, Hegel seems to be the last of the philosophers. The ones following him have either clung to views and systems he superseded or have merely reflected him with greater or less success.

If Hegel has said almost everything than can be said about philosophy, it is because he has reflected man's temporal "becoming." The *Phänomenologie* was written when a new world seemed to be born; it coincided with the battle of Jena and reflects it. It treats of the consciousness man gains of himself when, in his struggle for "dignity," he tries to have himself recognized as a man and when, having put aside the divine Master, he accepts himself as one who becomes more and more a man by working, as one who must die.

The theses of Father Niel and J. Hyppolite and the lectures of Kojève indicate the possibilities of Hegelianism in France. The study

¹⁵ Paris: Rivière, 1948.

¹⁶ Paris: Gallimard, 1947.

of Hegel is beginning to give French Communists the philosophical notions from which they have been so free until now. It may be that their crude materialism will shortly turn them against the Hegelianism that, after all, did produce the most genial thoughts of the young Marx.

The task of the members of the university, who, following Hyppolite, try to penetrate Hegel's secrets, will not be one mainly of the search for objectivity and a reconstruction of the past. It will be their task, we hope, to find in Hegel some essential categories that will lead us all to ponder art and law, the life of the mind, and human history.

Moreover, there are others who think that Hegel may be important from the standpoint of Christianity. These men think that he may lend "dignity" to the believer's intellectual life, in the same way as Aristotle did in the thirteenth century. If Hegel is no less dangerous than Averroes, with his absolute rationalism, still, they think that his philosophy does not perhaps exclude the possibility of a philosophical and religious mind subjecting to Christian directions that wonderful lucidity of his for all that concerns the human mind in history.

THE COMMUNIST CONDEMNATION OF REVEREND METHODIUS HABAN, O.P.

ROBERT J. HENLE, S.J.

The Reverend Methodius Haban, O.P., has recently been condemned to two years in prison by a Communist special court in Czechoslovakia. THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN has received the following information from European scholars who are in close touch with Father Haban.

In 1930 Father Haban founded the *filosoficka revue*, which was for a long time the only Catholic philosophical review in the Slav countries. He also initiated and directed the Czechoslovakian translation of the *Summa Theologiae* which was completed before the war. These activities, together with his scientific books, had gained him a reputation as one of the leading scholars and Catholic thinkers of Czechoslovakia. Scholars who are personally acquainted with Father Haban assert that he has at no time taken any part in politics and has been completely devoted to his work as a scholar and educator.

From this information it therefore appears that the condemnation of Father Haban is another move in the destruction of independent thought and humanistic and religious traditions in Czechoslovakia.

SPANISH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY

JUAN ROIG GIRONELLA, S.J.

An international congress of philosophy was held in Barcelona from October 4 to October 10, 1948. The occasion for it was the centenaries of the Spanish philosophers Suarez and Balmes—the third centenary of the birth of Suarez (January 5, 1548) and the first centenary of the death of Balmes (January 9, 1848). The congress was promoted by the Spanish government, which acted through the Louis Vives Institute of Philosophy, a part of the government's Higher Council of Scientific Investigation. Though the congress was held as a celebration of the two centenaries, it did not exclusively concern itself with Suarez and Balmes; it gave its attention to a great many different philosophical subjects.

About a hundred and fifty professional philosophers came to the congress, besides a great many interested visitors and spectators, representing, as the official program of the congress shows, almost every principal nation of the world: the United States, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Switzerland, England, Ireland, Belgium, Holland, Argentina, and India. Though these were not the only nations represented—many philosophers arrived after the official program had been printed—they indicate the interest and collaboration that the congress called forth.

About a hundred and thirty papers were read, Spaniards reading more than any others did and then, coming in order, Italians, Frenchmen, Argentinians, Belgians, and Germans. Germany did very well in sending four men to the congress, considering the difficulties Germany faces, and especially well in having its delegation headed by Dr. D. Joachim von Rintelen, the president of the philosophical congress in Mainz during the first week of August. The complete text of all the papers (and communications) that were read at the congress will be published shortly.

There were present at the congress philosophers of every school of thought, yet the complete predominance of Christian philosophy throughout the meetings was marked. Its various tendencies and trends were of course represented and were heard and discussed sympathetically. It was plain, nevertheless, that there was great unity, great

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good will, within Christian philosophy itself and that all its adherents encouraged one another in working for truth.

The papers read on Suarez and Balmes—particularly on Suarez—were a special and memorable feature of the congress. A synopsis of Suarezian philosophy was the topic of two general, introductory papers, which were followed by others on Suarezian metaphysics, ethics, jurisprudence, politics, and sociology. Still others were concerned with special studies like Suarez's contribution to metaphysics and jurisprudence, his anticipation of modern political ideas, his influence in Holland during the seventeenth century, and the manuscripts of his works in Roman libraries and collections.

Among the more interesting papers on Balmes were those that dealt with his handling of the critical problem, his explanation of the *sensus communis*, and his metaphysics. Professor Finlayson, a delegate from the United States, speaking on what Balmes contributed toward developing the concept of time, declared that he was a century ahead of others when he stated the impossibility of conceiving a static universe. Historical points taken up in connection with Balmes were given in papers on Balmes and Vico and Platonism, Balmes's influence in Italy, and the contents of his private library. Finally, the more cultural aspects of Balmes's influence were described by D. Woodruff in "Balmes and the English Catholic's View," by M. Chevalier in "A Page from Spanish Thought in the Restoration of Integral Humanism," and by Winowska in "Features of Balmes's Ethnic Psychology."

Though Suarez and Balmes were in the center of the stage at the congress, a number of papers took up modern philosophers and modern philosophical movements. The papers of Professor Castelli of Rome and M. Marcel di Corte of Liège, for example, were pointed toward existentialism. The Dominican Father Dokx, the Jesuit Father Palmes, and Dr. Puig presented and defended Thomist and Neo-Scholastic views. Still other papers were devoted to modern physics and cosmology.

The Barcelona congress may be looked on as a proof that among Spaniards there has been much interest and activity in philosophy during the past few years, a proof that is given support by the fact of publications—either wholly or partly philosophical—like the *Revista de Filosofia*, *Pensamiento*, and *Verdad y Vida*. And the congress was a token of the earnestness and eagerness of Spanish philosophers in rebuilding—with the thinkers of other nations—a sounder world, where right ideas will prevent such serious political and social troubles as ours has known.

CHRONICLE

THE MEDIAEVAL INSTITUTE of the University of Notre Dame announces four series of public lectures, made possible through the Michael P. Grace II Trust.

The first series of lectures will be given by Professor Urban T. Holmes, Jr., of the University of North Carolina. His subject is "With Alexander Neckham in London and Paris: A Study in English and French Civilization in the Second Half of the Twelfth Century." The series will run from Monday, December 13, 1948, through Friday, December 17.

The second series will be given by Dr. Stephen Kuttner, of the Catholic University of America. His subject is "Canonical Aspects of Mediaeval History: The Importance and Influence of Canonical Concepts in Mediaeval History." The series will run from Monday, January 17, 1949, through Friday, January 21.

The third series will be given by Professor Gaines Post, of the University of Wisconsin. His subject is "Roman and Canon Law and Representation in the Thirteenth Century." The series will run from Monday, February 14, 1949, through Friday, February 18.

The fourth series will be given by the Reverend George B. Flahiff, C.S.B., of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto. His subject is "English Critics of Civilization in the Late Twelfth Century." The series will run from Monday, March 21, 1949, through Friday, March 25.

THE LATE PROFESSOR MORRIS R. COHEN, of City College of New York, is being honored by prominent historians and philosophers at twelve evening meetings of the Cooper Union Forums.

Professor Cohen's book, *The Meaning of Human History*, gives the series its title; and chapter and section headings will supply the titles for the subjects of individual discussions. The first meeting of the series was held on October 17, 1948; the final one will be held on January 16, 1949, the lecture to be delivered by Dr. Philip Wiener, professor of philosophy at City College, on the life of Professor Cohen and his work in the philosophy of history.

The Tuesday evening series of Cooper Union Forums, which opened on October 19, 1948, continues last year's discussions of modern science and now includes ethical and political interrelationships of science. The Friday series, which began on October 22, is on Americana.

¹ THE EDITORIAL HOUSE OF MORCELLIANA (Brescia) announces a new series of textbooks, "Guide di Cultura," in philosophy, theology, and the minor disciplines of a seminary course, under the general editorship

of M. F. Sciacca, professor of philosophy in the University of Genoa. So far there have appeared texts in experimental psychology and criticism of art, as well as *Epistemologia*, by Fraco Amerio.

Doctor Communis, a new periodical of the Roman Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas, made its appearance this year. The editors say:

We do not claim for ourselves the sphere of specialized scholarship (though we will not exclude certain learned articles) nor that of subtle and fruitless discussion; but our intention is to investigate useful or necessary questions of our day in philosophy, theology, and canon law.

The periodical appears three times a year and is published by Marietti. The first number contains articles by Monsignor Pietro Parente, Father Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., Father Charles Boyer, S.J., Father Eugenio T. Toccafondi, O.P., Father Ludovicus Bender, O.P., and Professors Giovanni Perez, Amedeo Giannini, and Bianca Magnino. There are sections on the acts of the Academy, book reviews, and summaries of other European periodicals. The price of the first number is four hundred lire.

BOOK REVIEWS

NICOLAUS OF AUTRE COURT: A STUDY IN FOURTEENTH CENTURY THOUGHT. By Julius Rudolph Weinberg. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, for the University of Cincinnati, 1948. Pp. ix + 242. \$3.75.

Any study of the history of the thought of the Middle Ages presents us with a remarkable picture of genius, of traditionalism, and at the same time of a striking originality. Far from being all of a piece, the Middle Ages have handed down to us as many different solutions to the persistent problems of philosophy as there were great men who attempted these solutions. Some stressed the role of reason, some that of faith, some turned to a curious mixture of both. An exceeding few carefully delineated the proper function of each.

If we are to believe Nicolaus's own words, as expressed in the Prologues to the *Exigit Ordo*, he would seem to belong more especially to the second class. Men should cleave to the law of Christ; they should be interested in the possession of charity and the moral virtues; they should preach the word of God instead of being satisfied with a constant reading and repetition of the sayings of Aristotle and Averroes, an occupation which had proved to be sterile and fruitless. Consequently, Nicolaus of Autrecourt, self-described as a friend of truth, had decided to burst once and for all the Aristotelian bubble.

In this regard, Nicolaus of Autrecourt has found a kindred spirit in the person of Dr. Weinberg. However, there is this difference: Nicolaus conceived it as his vocation to deal a deathblow to Aristotelianism; Professor Weinberg has pronounced the time of death, namely in the "annihilating criticism of the fourteenth century by Nicolaus of Autrecourt and in the eighteenth century by David Hume" (p. 3). Consequently, Dr. Weinberg is perfectly consistent in considering any revival of Aristotelian metaphysics and epistemology as a resurrection of error. If the Aristotelian revival, of which Dr. Weinberg speaks, were a servile copying of the dead Aristotle, certainly it should be condemned, since it would be a denial of any progress throughout so many centuries. No century, and certainly no thinker, has a monopoly on truth; each makes its proper contribution. The philosopher should try to sift the wheat from the chaff; he must reject what is false and accept what is true, taking the latter as the starting point of a search

for ever greater clarifications, since it is possible to learn from past mistakes as well as past successes.

Professor Weinberg has found inconsistencies in the doctrine of Nicolaus of Autrecourt. Certainly there are many cases where one detail is not co-ordinated with another. However, we cannot blame Nicolaus too much on that score. His purpose was, I think, primarily destructive; he attacked what he considered to be the position of Aristotle on metaphysics, physics, logic, and the doctrine on the soul. He used whatever weapons were to be got from the pre-Socratics and from his own contemporaries, and substituted a probable opinion, which he stated actually to be false, in place of the Aristotelian doctrine. Therefore I think it would be a bit unfair to expect consistency from Nicolaus, once we have given approval to his prime purpose, the refutation of Aristotle. Dr. Weinberg considers this refutation successful and annihilating (p. 3). I can hardly agree with him on this point. Dr. Weinberg attributes the following doctrine to Nicolaus:

The existence of the soul cannot be inferred from the evidence of psychical acts. It makes no difference whether the acts are explained as distinct from the substance of the soul or as identical with that substance. For the question is an epistemological one which cannot be answered by a physical or psychological explanation of the connections of substances and accidents (p. 108).

It seems to me that there are certain evidences which must be accepted; otherwise all speculation becomes impossible, and all attempts to seek an explanation of certain cosmic forces vain, with the result that pure philosophy would be retired to an ivory tower. Again, many of the doctrines which Nicolaus so devastatingly refuted never were, as far as I can see, the doctrine of Aristotle. For example, Nicolaus did make a good case against relations; but the attack was against relations as set forth by a man like Henry of Ghent. Because of an essentialist tradition, relations were construed as absolute *res*, a position which William of Ockham also quite rightly assailed. But to refute some medieval thinker who is filled with an Avicennacized Platonism is certainly not to refute Aristotle. The question here is not whether Aristotle is refutable, but whether Nicolaus has refuted him.

In the first chapter Dr. Weinberg deals with Nicolaus of Autrecourt's theory of evidence. As a starting point of all philosophical speculation, Nicolaus places the principle of noncontradiction, which principle, says Professor Weinberg, is universally valid and a criterion of necessary truth to which all philosophical claims can be subjected (p. 13). As a consequence, states Dr. Weinberg,

the logic of Aristotle and the Schoolmen can be turned against their metaphysics with devastating consequence If noncontradiction is a valid and pervasive condition of reality, it is inescapably so no matter whether it is understood and expounded before or after we discover what, in particular, that reality consists of. And, indeed, if the law of noncontradiction is valid and pervasive, it is no less so even if very little of the reality to which it applies can ever be discovered (p. 14).

Dr. Weinberg would seem to mean that we can reason without reality, and that if our reasoning is correct, reality will of necessity be in conformity with our reasoning. If so, then it is merely the restatement of a much-controverted philosophical position. This, I should say, is to put the Kantian cart before the horse. The law of noncontradiction is a law of thought, because first it is a law of things. Apart from reality, the law of contradiction would be useless, since it is applicable finally to things; from the principle of noncontradiction alone we would deduce nothing. Moreover, there are other evidences and principles, to deny which renders philosophy bankrupt and makes of it a mere game. I have in mind, as an example, the fact of causality. There may be "no objection to starting with noncontradiction," as Professor Weinberg says, if only it were possible to start. I can only say that, if there were no things, there would be no thought, not even the principle of noncontradiction.

I think Dr. Weinberg is quite correct in his interpretation of Nicolaus on this point. My only quarrel with him is his apparent acceptance of such a doctrine. It led Nicolaus of Autrecourt to ultimate absurdities and inconsistencies and finally to a much-deserved condemnation.

Chapter II deals with the critique of cause and substance. From the first chapter, we can, barring inconsistencies, already surmise what will follow. Dr. Weinberg is again correct in his statement of Nicolaus's position.

The discovery that pure logic cannot find necessary connection between the known and the unknown has great consequences . . . the existence of material and spiritual substances and the efficacy of causes is rendered wholly uncertain (p. 36).

Of course, such a statement does not mean that Nicolaus of Autrecourt did not accept the fact of causality and spiritual and material substances; but he maintained their existence on nonphilosophical grounds. There is some reason for thinking that Nicolaus accepted on a rational basis the existence of the soul, especially if we examine only the *Correspondence* with Bernard of Arezzo. It seems difficult to reconcile such an interpretation with the *Exigit Ordo*. However, the only known manuscript of this latter work is incomplete, breaking off in the midst

of a discussion of the question *an actus cognoscendi producitur actu ab anima et objecto et multae quaestiones de Deo et intelligentiis et voluntate*; consequently, I doubt whether we can definitively establish Nicolaus's exact doctrine on this point. However, I am in agreement with Dr. Weinberg, that had Nicolaus maintained the possibility of a strict demonstration for the existence of the soul, he would have been inconsistent with his own demands for scientific demonstration.

Chapter III gives an analysis of some of the details of Nicolaus's critique. It is of importance to note in this chapter that Professor Weinberg quite rightly denies the possibility of labeling Nicolaus's position with the tag of phenomenalism.

Chapter V, on the possible sources and purpose of the critique, should, I think, have been the most important part of Dr. Weinberg's book. We shall be poorly prepared to give a detailed analysis of Nicolaus's thought until both the immediate sources and purpose of his critique have been accurately determined. In the meantime, we must rely chiefly on Nicolaus's own words. Dr. Weinberg outlines a few possibilities which cannot be proved. He maintains that

ample material can be found to support the view that fourteenth century criticism in Christendom was an almost self-contained growth, so that the sources of Nicolaus's critique are to be found in Christian scholasticism itself (p. 87).

He then singles out William of Ockham, Ralph Fitz-Ralph, Henry of Harclay, and Petrus Aureoli, all of whom were interested in explaining philosophically the possibility of miracles, denied by the so-called Latin Averroists. I must confess that I am quite dissatisfied with the present explanations. I am of the opinion that progress in editing the texts of early fourteenth-century writers will clarify this point. There is a vast storehouse of unedited fourteenth-century material; until much more progress is made in editing it, we shall be necessarily handicapped in any thorough study of that very complex century. At this point, I should like to suggest that an increased number of time-saving, reasonably correct popular editions would be a partial solution. After all, we have been studying, with at least fair success, St. Thomas, St. Albert the Great, Duns Scotus, and many others for centuries; yet for the most part there are still no semblances of *critical* editions available.

From pages 102 to 113 Dr. Weinberg gives a summary of Nicolaus's negative critique, stating that "it is only the preamble to a very original and positive method of philosophizing" (p. 112). Certainly, Nicolaus of Autrecourt had taken a position, but a position which was neither original nor positive; rather it was one which precluded the possibility

of philosophizing. Nicolaus was necessitated by the exigencies of his own starting point to arrive at an impasse. Unlike some other philosophers, he did not even insist on a probability according to which we could contentedly lead our daily lives; on the contrary, he warned us not to be misled by his reasonings. If Nicolaus was to attack Aristotle, certainly he had to do so on the basis of some principles, or else commit himself forever to silence. It is true, Nicolaus claims that the eternity of things, based on atomism, is probable, and more probable than the doctrine of Aristotle; still, absolutely speaking, it is false. Here I consider Nicolaus to be indirectly making out a case against the so-called Latin Averroists, who tried both to maintain the eternity of the world and still hold for both generation and corruption, as well as safeguard the Christian dogma of individual resurrection. If he intended a definite positive doctrine upon which he would insist, I find it difficult to admit that Nicolaus would have been so careless in failing to reconcile so many details in his work, as Dr. Weinberg has several times quite correctly indicated. Nicolaus of Autrecourt set himself an impossible task. We should in no way be surprised that he failed. I do not find Dr. Weinberg very convincing in his insistence on the positive side of Nicolaus of Autrecourt's views.

In the chapters dealing with Nicolaus's views on motion and change, the eternity of things, cognition, causation, and eternal recurrence, Dr. Weinberg has given a quite accurate presentation. At times the terminology strikes one as being anachronous; however, this need cause the reader no serious difficulty if it is remembered that Nicolaus of Autrecourt wrote in the fourteenth century.

Dr. Weinberg has stated that my punctuation of the text of the *Exigit* makes the text unnecessarily difficult (p. 221, note); I have read and reread the text in question, but I fail to see what has caused all the difficulty.

Dr. Weinberg assigns the date of the *Exigit Ordo* of Nicolaus to the decade 1330-1340; I should locate it a few years later. Dr. Weinberg has also suggested some emendations to my edition of the text, which are well worth consideration; but several of them I am not, as yet, ready to accept.

The value of Professor Weinberg's monograph is undeniable; it helps to open up a field which has been scarcely touched and which is of great importance, if we are to come to an understanding of the fourteenth century. I should like, therefore, to congratulate Dr. Weinberg on the happy outcome of his long and patient labors.

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INTUITION ET RELIGION: LE PROBLEME EXISTENTIALISTE. By Paul Ortegat, S.J. Louvain: Editions de l'Institut Supérieur, 1947. Pp. 248.

Father Ortegat, whose *Philosophie de la religion* (1938) was a pioneer Catholic work in its field, here continues his study of the philosophical bases of religion. His present concern is with those thinkers who stress the intuitive and dynamic elements at the expense of the discursive and structural. The greater portion of the book is given over to an exposition and criticism of the intuitionist theses, leaving only a scant forty pages at the end for a sketch of Ortegat's own doctrine of "personalist realism." The author remarks at the beginning that he hesitated for some time before attempting to group together systems so diverse as those of "Scheler and G. Marcel, Le Roy and Bergson, Heidegger and Jaspers" (p. 46). In actual fact, he considers not only these philosophers but also Kierkegaard, Sartre, Lavelle, and others. Although Ortegat recognizes the great differences separating these men, he seeks to define a common outlook shared by them all. They agree in according a primacy to existence and act over essence and possibility, to intuition and immediacy over all kinds of discursive and dialectical reasoning, and to freedom and the will over necessity and the ideally determined acts of reason. Furthermore, there is a common conviction that the human person is centrally important and that the religious problem is the main one facing men today. The only fundamental cleavage comes in regard to the proper solution of this religious question. One answer is the nihilistic and pessimistic teaching of left-wing existentialism; the other is more optimistic and fideistic, admitting the genuinity of values given in religious faith and love.

Although Ortegat's schematic account of intuitionism is supple and clear, it does not cope successfully with the very wide range of viewpoints it is supposed to cover. Apart from the most general propositions, there are few statements which can be transferred from one of these philosophers to the next. Moreover, serious attention does not seem to have been given to the integral texts of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Jaspers. It would have been both more manageable and truer to the situation to limit analysis to two contrasting existentialists, like Sartre and Marcel, and perhaps to trace out their relationship to the methods of Bergson and Scheler. Contemporary existentialism in its religious aspects requires the same careful and detailed treatment which was given to Scheler's intuitionism a quarter of a century ago by Przywara in his masterful study, *Religionsbegründung*. Perhaps the best pages in Ortegat's volume are those devoted to the religious insights of the turbulent and brilliant Max Scheler.

There are also some keen critical evaluations of the fundamental themes of existentialism. Ortegat shows the one-sided stress on existence to be a counterpart of the idealist exaggeration of the essential and deterministic side of reality. Only a philosophy of being and of man's participation in being can reunite spontaneity and intelligibility, value and truth. Since the human mode of participation is personal, there is also a basis for overcoming the solipsism and isolation of individuals to which Sartre's premises lead. The human spirit develops in a communal way not only in worldly matters but also in regard to God. While prizing the teaching of religious intuitionism on God's transcendence and mystery, Ortegat notes that for Christian saints God is also the principle of all truth and light and an immanent presence transforming human nature by the union of friendship. He suggests in a final chapter that personalist realism preserves the best features of idealism and existentialism by firmly anchoring intellect and will in our personal being and by regarding that being as an act of adherence to the absolute being.

JAMES COLLINS

Saint Louis University

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: A FRAMEWORK OF PRINCIPLE. By William Ernest Hocking. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1947. Pp. xi + 243. \$3.00.

If Scholastic philosophers are casting about for promising areas of exploration, this volume suggests the type of task they might well consider undertaking. Professor Hocking, studying the moral basis of a fundamental freedom of modern democratic society, takes up the changed role of the press today. That its scope is philosophical is stated explicitly in a note (p. 160); that the issue is new stands out in several places (pp. 84, 98, 112).

What is this new issue? The answer must begin with a statement of the original issue of the freedom of the press as it emerged when John Milton championed it. At that time the danger to freedom of expression came from government. Arbitrary censorship, wielding the political power of coercion, had to be destroyed so that men might enjoy the exercise of their right to criticize existing institutions and persons in power.

Today, however, the threat to freedom of the press (which includes freedom of expression generally) comes from the proprietors of the press themselves. In their editorial columns they keep waving the tattered old flag of Milton. Hocking has raised a banner with more meaning to people of our day. His platform is straightforward enough,

as far as the evil he objects to is concerned. Society today needs accurate information in its daily press in order to survive. We cannot operate our American democracy, governed through universal manhood suffrage, unless our people have access through the opinion-forming agencies of the press, the radio, and the movies to all the relevant information on which public policy should be framed. This holds true in both domestic and international affairs. Objectively, the press today has a public purpose.

But it is organized as a private, commercialized industry. It is owned by people who, as members of huge, well-equipped, well-staffed corporations, belong to a social and political group with economic and political interests often at variance with those of other groups. Since they control the media through which public opinion is shaped, they are in a position to exploit their opinion-forming function for private ends. Moreover, they look upon readers as customers. They are therefore less interested in educating than in entertaining, amusing, shocking—in catering to the public taste en masse. They do not consider it their duty to raise the level of public intelligence of political and social affairs beyond what the traffic will bear.

Hocking's remedy for this anomaly is moral rather than legal. He would hammer home the duty of the press to keep our citizens well informed. He shies away from governmental control, except that he wants present laws against libel, defamation, and so on to be enforced; and he does suggest that if the press does not reform itself, legislation may become necessary to punish provable distortion of facts.

Moral reform never promises quick results, but no one can consistently pooh-pooh its necessity or its long-range efficacy.

What Hocking has written about the connection between moral rights and moral duties (p. 74), and some of the things he has written about the objective "standard of right thinking, the requirement of justice, the firm code of honest beauty" (p. 19), reveal a stiffening confidence in the capacity of the human intellect to know what is true and good. He rejects the relativity of truth and insists that "some truth at least must be knowable in advance" (p. 107). What he omits saying is that the American people, as an organized political society, have agreed upon certain moral truths and incorporated them in their constitutional and legal system. One of these is that deliberate lying, where it injures others, can under certain circumstances be legally punished. No problem exists about the principle. It could therefore be extended to abuses of the press. After all, we are not asking the American people to philosophize about epistemology. Our legal system has adopted moderate realism.

At times an excessive individualism crops out in these pages, and sometimes rationalism, sometimes voluntarism. Similarly, Hocking's exposition of the reasons why the Fascists and Communists have rejected the "Western" concept of freedom of the press (pp. 21-40) leaves a great deal to be desired. One would like to see many more illustrative examples and concrete applications, in place of rather airy passages of literary intellectualism which hardly advance the argument. But all in all, as a "framework of principle" for the Commission on Freedom of the Press, Hocking has produced a noble structure. One wonders why Scholastics write so much about medical ethics and so little about the other basic moral issues of modern society.

ROBERT C. HARTNETT, S.J.

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A PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS. By Louis O. Kattsoff. Ames: Iowa State College Press, 1948. Pp. x + 266. \$5.00.

This book should prove very useful to those who have to give courses in mathematical philosophy and to students who wish to approach this difficult and excessively complicated subject. Based on courses given to students whose knowledge of philosophy and mathematics was that of an undergraduate senior, the book aims (a) at providing accounts of the diverse symbolized structures which have developed out of the conflicts of the schools of mathematical philosophy and (b) at a criticism of the various doctrines which will lead on to what appears to be an eclectic standpoint which is at once empirical and rationalistic.

The book contains a useful, if not exhaustive, bibliography. It provides lengthy accounts, in the relevant symbolisms, of logistical, formalist, intuitionist theories; it includes also (a most valuable feature in view of the general inaccessibility of Frege's work) a section (pp. 40-47) in which Frege's symbolism is exhibited. As it has been the usual custom among authors to refer to the extreme complication of Frege's symbolism, but not to produce examples illustrative of this complication, students will now be able to judge for themselves of the matter without loss of time.

Other valuable features of the book are the chapters on Gödel's theorem, on Church's logical investigations, and on Mannoury's psychologism.

Of the chapters in which the author develops his own philosophical views there would be much to say, too much, in fact, for inclusion here. For example, it is said (p. 252), that "in so far, then, as there is an identity of structure, reality has the same structural properties as does

mathematics." The author argues from this view to the possibility of a metaphysics based on the applicability of mathematics to reality, indicating that such a metaphysics would be a return to rationalism of the Cartesian type. It will be quite obvious to the author that a Thomist would be bound to be at variance with such a conception of the state of affairs, and it will be equally obvious to him that it would not be possible to develop a criticism of his views in a few words. We conclude, therefore, by stating that we disagree with the properly philosophical conclusions of the author, while wholeheartedly recommending his work as a very useful instrument of study.

BRIAN COFFEY

Saint Louis University

PILGRIM OF THE ABSOLUTE. By Leon Bloy. Selection by Raïssa Maritain. Introduction by Jacques Maritain. New York: Pantheon Books, 1947. Pp. 358. \$3.50.

Leon Bloy is a Frenchman who seems often more like the Russian novelist's concept of a human being than like anyone an American reader might hope to be acquainted with at first hand. He is all over himself on the inside. He sees, feels, shrieks, reasons, and uses poetry for his vehicle of thought and caricature or grisly satire. His book will tonic any Catholic who has the nerve to read it and the patience to try to fathom the profound meanings Bloy can pack into his words. He is a Catholic schooled in a spiritually "progressive" school, where the methods of educating the individual are ascribed to the Holy Spirit and the pattern is very hard to discern. Anyway, he is a Catholic, alive every minute you can spend with him and prodding you in the depths of your untroubled theoretical knowledge with the horrid facts of reality. The world of Leon Bloy is no world for a complacent soul.

But the reading of Leon Bloy would be good penance for a complacent soul.

The selections, made by Raïssa Maritain, give us her choice from his writings that really make a whole. And the whole boils down to this: A Catholic in the world is still a Catholic, one under the special providence of God and destined to a work of surpassing importance as well as to the personal destiny of saving his soul. This Catholic will hate, will love. He must be taught in the hard school of personal suffering what is worth hating, what deserves love—and God is infinitely lovable and evil must be hated.

I suppose the "typical" American would find fault with Bloy because while he always worked furiously he starved. He lectured every one, and his children were hungry. "Efficiency" cannot be found in him nor

success in the sense in which, maybe, most Catholics itch to define success—lots of worldly goods and the unanimous applause of those who count!

It is not possible to grasp a tornado. Nor is it possible to give "tastes" of Bloy. But he has to be quoted, if only to show his translator's skill, if only to make the reader of this review feel curious about him.

He will make demands of patience and much effort at understanding from his Thomist-minded readers, as the following to Jacques Maritain will show.

You are seeking, you say, O professor of philosophy, O Cartesian, you believe with Malebranche that truth is something *one seeks!* You believe that the human mind is capable of something! You believe, in other words, that with a certain degree of effort a person with black eyes could manage to acquire green eyes spangled with gold!

He will prod his reader with the hard lesson of truth which every man needs and few are ready to hear with gladness.

In declaring us members of Jesus Christ, the Holy Spirit clothed us with the dignity of Redeemers, and, when we refuse to suffer, we are straitly guilty of simony and betrayal of trust. We have been made for that and for that alone. When we shed our blood, it flows on Calvary, and from thence over the whole earth. Woe to us, therefore, if this blood be poisoned! When we shed our tears, which are "the blood of our souls," they fall on the heart of the Virgin, and from thence onto all living hearts.

He draws the picture of every one of us in bold, broad caricatures—and we can likely find ourselves delineated, each for himself in these pages, as can this marvelous creature:

You never tire of admiring the Christian woman, so feared by the parish clergy, who outwardly resembles an examination of conscience, your conscience . . . Her clothes bring to mind the impregnable walls of Babylon . . . As for her face, or rather the expression on her face, it betrays such a conflict between surliness and compunction, so furious a mixture of swooning piety and acrimony, of syrup and vinegar, of benedictine and crude oil, that it is impossible to define it with any precision . . . Her ostler's voice, for use whenever some female stranger has taken her seat in church, assumes the clear tones of a reed organ or the languishing sonorities of a viol d'amore when she says her rosary.

In his voluminous output Bloy has written mostly things that only a Catholic, or one steeped—as are almost all Frenchmen—in the Catholic ethos can understand. Maybe in reading him his reader can come upon

the same experience as he claims for himself: "For my part I declare that I never sought or found anything, unless one wishes to describe as a discovery the fact of tripping blindly over a threshold and being thrown flat on one's stomach into the House of Light."

BAKEWELL MORRISON, S.J.

Saint Louis University

THE LOGIC OF THE SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES. By F. S. C. Northrop. New York: Macmillan Co., 1947. Pp. vii + 402. \$4.50.

This is a collection of papers and essays some of which have been published previously.

The basic thesis of the book is the same as that developed, with a wealth of historical illustration, in the author's *The Meeting of East and West*. While he asserts that method varies with different subject matters, he nonetheless places the only ultimate means of verification in the methodology of modern natural science. Thus, in the last analysis, every type of human knowledge depends *intrinsically* upon natural science. Philosophy and theology are destroyed as independent disciplines. And Professor Northrop knows no other alternative to the Kantian dichotomy between speculative and practical science.

This naive view is illustrated by the same erroneous view of St. Thomas's philosophy and of medieval theology which we pointed out in a previous notice of *The Meeting of East and West*.¹ Professor Northrop would be well advised, if only for the sake of his own reputation, to acquaint himself with the alternatives which he ignores in so cavalier a fashion.

ROBERT J. HENLE, S.J.

Saint Louis University

OUR EMERGENT CIVILIZATION. By Ruth Nanda Anshen. New York: Harper & Bros., 1947. Pp. ix + 339. \$4.50.

The fourth volume of the "Science of Culture Series" brings together a distinguished group of writers in discussion on the central problems of our future civilization. The volume is well planned and offers an excellent essay in mutual understanding.

Professor Brand Blanshard ("Can Men Be Reasonable") makes a clear-headed plea for the use of reason. His arguments against naturalism, a Freudian explanation of opinion, and logical positivism are

¹ "Professor Northrop's Idea of Thomism," *THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN*, XXIV (January, 1947), 108-15.

sound and well-pointed. Though a further development of Professor Blanshard's rationalism would uncover disagreement, I find myself wholly in accord with the argument of his excellent paper.

Jacques Maritain offers an approach to metaphysics that may be congenial to the modern temper and again proposes theocentric humanism as the solution to the problems of our future culture.

Professor Northrop repeats his thesis that natural science is the touchstone of all philosophy, theology, culture, and so forth. The essays dealing with ethics are also less satisfying.

The discussion of common questions afforded by this series leads to a clarification of issues and of differences which is of no small importance.

ROBERT J. HENLE, S.J.

Saint Louis University

SUMMA THEOLOGIAE. S. Thomae Aquinatis. Cum textu ex recensione Leonina. 4 vols. Turin: Marietti, 1948. Vol. I, Pars I, pp. xxiv + 605. Vol. II, Pars I-II, pp. viii + 615. Vol. III, Pars II-II, pp. x + 943. Vol. IV, Pars III et Suppl., pp. ix + 1127. £3 5s.

The text in this new Marietti edition of the *Summa* is that of the Leonine edition. The print is that of former editions, with boldface type to distinguish headings and the key sentences in the responses. There is an introduction by the Reverend C. St. Suermondt, O.P., the head of the Leonine Commission. The notes are of two kinds. Reference notes identify St. Thomas's quotations and indicate the cross references to his own work. Doctrinal notes add other passages from St. Thomas, or show the present theological status of a doctrine, or explain certain things which a beginner must know in order to read effectively. For Pars Prima, the Reverend P. Caramello has worked out a completely new set of these doctrinal notes. In an appendix to Volume I, he has also written "annotations" to some of the articles; these are directed to more advanced students. In the other three volumes, the doctrinal notes are the standard ones of De Rubeis, Billuart, and so on.

GEORGE P. KLUBERTANZ, S.J.

Saint Louis University

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- . *The City of God*. Translated and edited by Marcus Dods. 2 vols. New York: Hafner Pub. Co., 1948. Vol. I, pp. 573; Vol. II, pp. 580. Text ed., \$5.00; paper, \$3.00.
- . *The City of God*. With an introductory study by Etienne Gilson. Vol. I translated by D. B. Zema, S.J.; fall, 1948. Vol. II translated by J. R. O'Donnell, C.S.B.; spring, 1949. Vol. III translated by G. G. Walsh, S.J.; summer, 1949. New York: Cosmopolitan Science & Art Service Co.
- . *Confessions*. Translated with a general introduction to the study of St. Augustine by Vernon J. Bourke. New York: Cosmopolitan Science & Art Service Co., 1948.
- . *The Lord's Sermon on the Mount*. Translated by John J. Jenson. Westminster: Newman Book Shop, 1948. Pp. 227. \$2.75.
- BENTHAM, JEREMY. *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*. Edited with an introduction by Laurence J. Lafleur. New York: Hafner Pub. Co., 1948. Pp. 430. Cloth, \$3.00; paper, \$1.50.
- BERGIN, THOMAS GODDARD, and FISCH, MAX HAROLD. *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1948. Pp. xviii + 398. \$5.00.
- BERLIN, ISAIAH. *Karl Marx*. 2d ed. revised. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1948. Pp. 273.
- BOWLE, JOHN. *Western Political Thought: An Historical Introduction from the Origins to Rousseau*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1948. Pp. 462. \$5.00.
- BUBER, MARTIN. *Hasidism*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1948. Pp. viii + 208. \$3.75.
- Though Hasidism is a Jewish religious movement, Professor Buber of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem presents it as having philosophical interest. There is a short index and an extremely brief glossary. (To be reviewed.)
- CARR, E. H. *The Moral Foundations for World Order*. Denver: Univ. of Denver, Social Science Found., 1948. Pp. 26. 50¢.
- COHEN, MORRIS R. *A Source Book in Greek Science*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. Pp. 576. \$9.00.
- CONANT, JAMES BRYANT. *Education in a Divided World: The Function of the Public Schools in Our Unique Society*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. Pp. 259. \$3.00.
- CORWIN, EDWARD S. *Liberty Against Government*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1948. Pp. 198. \$3.00.
- CROW, LESTER D., and CROW, ALICE. *Educational Psychology*. New York: American Book Co.
- DANTE. *Dante Theologian: The Divine Comedy*. Translation and commentary by Patrick Cummins, O.S.B. Saint Louis: B. Herder, 1948. Pp. 604. \$6.00.
- This work consists of an entirely new rhymed translation of the *Divine Comedy*, to which are added a literal and a "spiritual" commentary. (To be reviewed.)
- DE LUBAC, HENRI. *The Un-Marxian Socialist: A Study of Proudhon*. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1948. Pp. 320. \$3.50.
- DENNIS, WAYNE. *Readings in the History of Psychology*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1948. Pp. 598. \$4.75.

Essays in Political Theory Presented to George H. Sabine. Edited by Milton R. Konvitz and Arthur E. Murphy. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1948. Pp. xi + 333. \$4.00.

FROESCHELS, EMIL. *Philosophy in Wit.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1948. Pp. xiii + 61. \$2.75.

Dr. Emil Froeschels, formerly professor of medical philosophy at the University of Vienna, discovers in the formation and the recognition of wit evidence of congenital philosophical knowledge. He finds similar evidence in our knowledge of the infinite and of the world. Such congenital knowledge is at first "not-expression-ripe," and it is precisely in this form that such knowledge enters into wit.

GINSBERG, MORRIS. *Reason and Unreason in Society.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. Pp. 300. \$4.00.

HARMON, FRANCIS LELANDE. *Understanding Personality.* Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co.; Nov., 1948. Pp. x + 338. \$3.50.

A competent, well-balanced presentation of the psychology of personality, intended primarily as a textbook, but useful also for the general reader interested in this field.

HARTSHORNE, CHARLES. *The Divine Relativity.* New Haven: Yale University Press; Sept., 1948. Pp. xvi + 164. \$2.75.

Professor Hartshorne, of the University of Chicago, sets himself to re-define the idea of God. He seeks to avoid the difficulties and "contradictions" others have experienced in their doctrines of God by his doctrine of "surrelativism." The book is well indexed. (To be reviewed.)

HOOPER, ALFRED. *Makers of Mathematics.* New York: Random House, 1948. Pp. 411. \$3.75.

HUME, DAVID. *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.* Edited with an introduction by Henry D. Aiken. New York: Hafner Pub. Co., 1948. Cloth, \$1.80; paper, 80¢.

IGLESIAS, ANTONIO. *Culture's Emergent Pathway.* New York: Exposition Press, 1948. Pp. 104. \$2.50.

INGE, W. R., REV. *Mysticism in Religion.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. \$3.50.

JAMES, WILLIAM. *Essays in Pragmatism.* New York: Hafner Pub. Co.; May, 1948. Cloth, \$1.90; paper, 90¢.

JEFFREYS, HAROLD. *Theory of Probability.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1948. Pp. 400. \$10.00.

JENNINGS, J. G. *The Vedantic Buddhism of the Buddha.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1948. Pp. 747. \$16.00.

KALLEN, HORACE M. *Ideals and Experience.* Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press. Pp. 60. 75¢.

———. *The Liberal Spirit: Essays on Problems of Freedom in the Modern World.* Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1948. Pp. xii + 242. \$3.00.

KELLY, GEORGE, REV. *Primer on the Taft-Hartley Act.* New York: Christopher Press, 1948. Pp. 120. Cloth, \$1.75; paper, \$1.00.

KNOWLES, DAVID. *The Prospects of Medieval Studies: An Inaugural Lecture.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1948. Pp. 22. 50¢.

KOCOUREK, R. A. (compiler). *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature.* St. Paul: North Central Pub. Co., 1948. Pp. iv + 176. \$1.00.

After a brief introduction and two very short chapters, the author gives his translation of *The Principles of Nature* of St. Thomas Aquinas. In the form of appendices, there is a translation of Books I and II of St. Thomas's *Commentary on the Physics*, followed by a few texts from Aristotle and St. Albert the Great. The last two appendices give an outline of the physical works of Aristotle and of St. Thomas's *Commentary on Book I of the Physics*.

Learning and World Peace. Edited by Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, and R. M. MacIver. New York: Harper & Bros.; Nov., 1948. Pp. xix + 694. \$6.50.

This is the eighth symposium published by the Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion in their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life. Sixty authors study the contributions which scholarship and learning have made to the cause of peace. There are three appendices, the first on art and the churches, the second on the problems of UNESCO, and the third answering question, How can scholars meet the current challenge? There is an index.

LODGE, R. C. *Plato's Theory of Education.* New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1948. Pp. 330. \$5.00.

LUDDY, AILBE JOHN, REV. *The Case of Peter Abelard.* Westminster: Newman Book Shop, 1948. Pp. 103. \$2.50.

MILL, JOHN STUART. *Philosophy of Scientific Method.* New York: Hafner Pub. Co.; May, 1948. Cloth, \$3.50; paper, \$1.75.

MUELLER, GUSTAV E. *Philosophy of Literature.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1948. Pp. 226. \$3.50.

Professor Mueller of the University of Oklahoma shows that the great works of literature each have their own philosophical significance and have survived on that account. The great writers, from Homer to Hermann Hesse, are said to manifest the "evaluative worldview" of their particular culture. Professor Mueller believes that each culture has three periods: first, the religious world view; then the idealistic culture; and finally the loss of confidence in the world and in self.

MURPHY, JOHN PRENTICE, D.D. *The Size of Life: A Religious Speculation.* New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1948. Pp. 164. \$2.25.

NEWMAN, JOHN HENRY, CARDINAL. *Essays and Sketches.* Edited by Charles Frederick Harrold. 3 vols. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1948. Vol. 1, pp. xviii + 382; Vol. 2, pp. xvi + 368; Vol. 3, pp. xvi + 381. \$3.50 per vol.

This group of three volumes continues the excellent edition of selections from the works of Cardinal Newman. Professor Harrold again furnishes illuminating and sympathetic introductions. Volume I contains articles and tracts entitled "Personal and Literary Character of Cicero"; "Poetry, with Reference to Aristotle's Poetics"; "Primitive Christianity"; "The Rationalistic and the Catholic Tempers Contrasted"; "Holy Scripture in its Relation to the Catholic Creed"; "Prospects of the Anglican Church."

Volume II contains the papers "The Theology of St. Ignatius"; "Catholicity of the Anglican Church"; "Private Judgment"; "The Tamworth Reading Room"; "Milman's View of Christianity"; "Rise and Progress of Universities" (selections from the original discourses).

Volume III contains the sketches and essays called "The Church of the Fathers"; "The Last Years of St. Chrysostom"; "Benedictine Schools"; "An Internal Argument for Christianity." The chapters devoted to Demetrius and to Martin and Maximus have been omitted from this edition of "The Church of the Fathers."

ORGAN, TROY WILSON. *An Index to Aristotle.* Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1948. Pp. 224. \$5.00.

PARKES, JAMES. *Judaism and Christianity.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1948. Pp. 220. \$3.50.

This book by an Anglican clergyman is based on a course of lectures given at the Jewish Institute of Religion in New York during the years 1946 and 1947. Its purpose is to remove hatred and suspicion by promoting mutual understanding. All men of good will must praise such a purpose; but many Christians will feel that they cannot accept the author's version of Christianity.

- PFEIFFER, EHRENFRIED. *The Earth's Face and Human Destiny*. Emmaus, Pa.: Rodale Press, 1948. Pp. 183. \$2.75.
- PLATO. *The Portable Plato: Symposium, Phaedo, and Republic*. Edited by Scott Buchanan. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. New York: Viking Press.
- RENARD, HENRI, S.J. *Philosophy of Man*. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1948. Pp. 238.

This is a college textbook in rational psychology. Topics covered are indicated by the following chapter headings: "Life," "The Unity of Man," "The Operative Potencies (Powers) of the Soul," "The Problem of Knowledge in General," "Knowledge of the Senses," "The Intellect," and "The Appetites of Man." There are subject and author indexes.

- RUDHYAR, DANE. *Modern Man's Conflicts*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1948. Pp. 226. \$3.75.

The copywriter who wrote the advertising for this book calls it "a serious effort . . . to synchronize Eastern and Western culture." The book is rather to be characterized by syncretism. Everything can be found in it; matter and form, participation, Yoga, Fire and the Earth-Mother, Genesis, the cult of the Virgin, American imperialism, and—of course—The Atomic Bomb. The book is full of errors and inaccuracies; it has no value either for the scholar or for the general reading public.

- RUSSELL, BERTRAND. *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits*. New York: Simon & Schuster. \$5.00.

- RYAN, JOHN K., REV. *The Reputation of St. Thomas Aquinas among English Protestant Thinkers of the Seventeenth Century*. Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1948. Pp. ix + 126. \$2.50.

This is a reprint, "with some small changes," of an article which appeared in the *New Scholasticism* of January and April, 1948, under the same title.

- SARTRE, JEAN-PAUL. *The Emotions*. Translated from the French by Bernard Frechtman. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1948. Pp. 97. \$2.75.

The present-day leader of existentialism offers an outline of the phenomenology of the emotions. M. Sartre surveys and rejects the theories of James-Lange and Janet, the functional theory of emotion-form, and the psychoanalytic theory. According to all evidence, the author believes he has thus adequately surveyed all alternative positions! He then presents his own view, that emotion is "being-in-the-world" according to the very particular laws of "magic."

- SEESHOLTZ, ANNE. *Saint Elizabeth*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1948. Pp. 136. \$2.75.

This popular presentation of a thirteenth-century saint may have some value in enriching our knowledge of the backgrounds of thirteenth-century thought.

- SENECA. *Naturales Quaestiones*. Text emended and explained by William Hardy Alexander. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1948. Pp. 92. \$1.75.

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The author, apparently a Christian Scientist himself, examines the teachings of Mary Baker Eddy to see whether they are, or at least involve, a philosophical system. He concludes that Christian Science is a religion, an idealistic pantheism, and a science. Though this work was presented as a thesis to the Department of Philosophy at Boston University in 1946, it

manifests an ignorance of the history of philosophy and religion that is at variance with any ideal of scholarly research. For example, the author says, "The acceptance of the concept of principle . . . is new for a Christian interpretation of God" (p. 39).

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This is a carefully documented exploration of Kierkegaard's thoughts on man and religion. Where possible, Kierkegaard's own words are used. There is a detailed index. (To be reviewed.)

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The chapters of this book are taken from a series of radio talks, and from articles written originally for various magazines. Though the book is purely popular in tone and presentation, philosophers may find some interest in the central theme, which is that of the nature of man, as well as in the chapter on "St. Thomas Aquinas and the *Summa Theologica*" and in the appendixes on Mr. Aldous Huxley and "Thomistic Ethics and the World of Today."

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